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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for political corruption
96 results foundAuthor: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by the Victims Summary: Based on interviews with 7,600 people in Afghanistan, this report discusses the experiences and perceptions of bribery and corruption in Afghanistan during the period autumn 2008 - autumn 2009. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 42p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: Shelf Number: 117725 Keywords: BriberyPolitical Corruption |
Author: Aning, Kwesi Title: Understanding the Intersection of Drugs, Politics & Crime in West Africa: An Interpretive Analysis Summary: This paper examines the relationship between drugs, politics and crime in West Africa by using Ghana as a case study, and discusses some of the initiatives in place to curb the international drug trade as it affects West African states. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 12p. Source: Internet Resource; Accessed August 13, 2010 at: http://http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/wor_docus/45_GCST_Policy_Brief_6_-_Understanding_The_Intersection_Of_Drugs,_Politics_&_Crime_In_West_Africa._An_Interpretive_Analysis.pdf; Policy Brief Series; No. 6 Year: 2010 Country: Africa URL: http://http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/wor_docus/45_GCST_Policy_Brief_6_-_Understanding_The_Intersection_Of_Drugs,_Politics_&_Crime_In_West_Africa._An_Interpretive_Analysis.pdf; Policy Brief Series; No. 6 Shelf Number: 119599 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug Trafficking ControlPolitical Corruption |
Author: Lyday, Corbin Title: Corruption Assessment for Jamaica Summary: In 2007, a newly-elected Government came to power in Jamaica with a strong anti-corruption focus. It has appointed new reform champions to key positions—particularly in the police and customs—to join other recent change agents. Together, these new officials have begun to use their statutory authority quickly and aggressively to uncover illicit wealth and non-compliance with laws and regulation, or to shake up existing law enforcement institutions and practices. Within the first 6 months of 2008, nearly 50 members of the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF)—the most visible arm of both the problem and potential solution — were arrested and charged with offenses linked to corruption. While most of those have been low-ranking officers, the Office of the Contractor General has documented credible allegations of large-scale violations of public procurement regulations. Other higher-ranking allegations are sure to follow. In July 2008, public opinion polls for the first time listed corruption as the second-most serious problem facing Jamaica, behind crime and violence. Because independent media have followed recent developments carefully and systematically, there is a growing recognition by Jamaican society that such violations are not merely the result of mismanagement or incompetence, but a direct product of a political system that rewards patronage at the expense of transparency. While the way forward may not be clear, there is a growing sense society must take action against corruption in order to win the ‘other’ battles of crime, violence, and the squeeze on the country’s treasury made more acute by huge new increases in energy and food prices. The anti-corruption spotlight has been switched to the ‘on’ position and is now likely to stay that way for the foreseeable future, even as the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) pursues new anti-crime measures and alternative means to enhance food and fuel security. The most visible champions have taken the reins within a small number of public sector agencies and ministries, such as the Anti-Corruption Branch of the JCF, the Customs Department, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Office of the Contractor-General. But their influence in the current environment arguably goes beyond narrow mandates. Indeed, their continued success or failure rests heavily on the degree to which they can secure non-partisan, publicized support for their efforts from the country’s top political leadership as well as on the operational competence of their own organizations, especially at mid-levels. Indirectly, it also depends on the vigor with which the country’s systems of justice can investigate, arraign, prosecute and convict key ‘big fish’ accused of corruption. Their combined success at more or less the same time will send a powerful message to a cynical and uneasy society that business as usual will simply not be tolerated. The dynamics of these efforts are complicated and potentially dangerous. As the state moves to tighten procurement, clean up ‘ghost worker’ lists, move from low-level to higher-level targeting of corrupt police and public officials on a non-partisan basis, and move toward political party accountability, it will encounter fierce resistance. Many believe that the assassination of Jamaica Urban Transit Company (JUTC) Chairman Douglas Chambers in July 2008 can be construed to mean that the underworld has thrown down the gauntlet against this effort to ‘take back’ the state. Because both Jamaica’s state and society will need help and encouragement to continue to do the right thing, this Assessment urges 3-4 short-term examples of financial and organizational support from USAID/Jamaica including: immediate convening of a national integrity roundtable; personnel secondment; short-term mid-level leadership development; and the engagement of society toward corruption awareness. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2008. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 28, 2010 at: http://usaid-comet.org/reports/Jamaica%20Corruption%20Assessment%20Report%20%209-11-08.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Jamaica URL: http://usaid-comet.org/reports/Jamaica%20Corruption%20Assessment%20Report%20%209-11-08.pdf Shelf Number: 119695 Keywords: Police CorruptionPolice MisconductPolitical Corruption |
Author: Title: Cutting the Links Between Crime and Local Politics: Colombia's 2011 Elections Summary: Deeply entrenched connections between criminal and political actors are a major obstacle to conflict resolution in Colombia. Illegal armed groups seek to consolidate and expand their holds over local governments in the October 2011 governorship, mayoral, departmental assembly and municipal council elections. The national government appears more willing and better prepared than in the past to curb the influence of illegal actors on the elections, but the challenges remain huge. The high number of killed prospective candidates bodes ill for the campaign, suggesting that the decade-old trend of decreasing electoral violence could be reversed. There are substantial risks that a variety of additional means, including intimidation and illegal money, will be used to influence outcomes. The government must rigorously implement additional measures to protect candidates and shield the electoral process against criminal infiltration, corruption and fraud. Failure to mitigate these risks would mean in many places four more years of poor local governance, high levels of corruption and enduring violence. Decentralisation in the 1980s and 1990s greatly increased the tasks and the resources of local government, but in many municipalities, capabilities failed to keep pace. This mismatch made local governments increasingly attractive targets for both guerrillas and paramilitaries. Violence against candidates, local office holders and political and social activists soared. With a largely hostile attitude to local governments, guerrillas have mainly concentrated on sabotaging and disturbing the electoral process. By contrast, paramilitary groups, particularly after the formation of a national structure under the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), used their links with economic and political elites to infiltrate local governments and capture public resources. That peaked in the 2003 local elections. Since then, and particularly after the official demobilisation of these groups in 2006, the influence politicians linked to paramilitaries enjoyed has weakened but not disappeared. The October elections are the first test of how democratic institutions under the government of President Juan Manuel Santos cope with the growing power of new illegal armed groups and paramilitary successors (NIAGs), now acknowledged as the country’s biggest security threat. These organisations, which the government calls BACRIM (criminal gangs), are unlikely to have a unified stance towards the elections. Some will be content with minimal relations to local politics to guarantee their impunity, access to information and freedom of action. But NIAGs are rapidly evolving into larger, more robust criminal networks, so some could develop a more ambitious political agenda. Several advocates of land restitution for the victims of Colombia’s long-running armed conflict already have been assassinated, suggesting that this major Santos initiative is likely to be met by alliances between criminals and some segments of local economic elites, in defence of the status quo. Meanwhile, frequent attacks against prospective candidates and civilians suggest that the weakened FARC wants to prove it is not a spent force. Colombia is better prepared than in the past to take on these challenges. Impunity is decreasing, as judicial investigations into links between politicians and paramilitaries have resulted in the conviction of some two dozen members of Congress. Investigations and indictments are now moving down to the local government level, albeit slowly and unevenly. In July 2011, the government signed into law a far-ranging political reform, paving the way for the imposition of penalties on parties that endorse candidates with links to illegal armed groups or face investigation for drug trafficking and crimes against humanity. Election financing rules and anti-corruption norms have also been stiffened, although shortcomings in the legal framework remain. Over the long term, these changes should favour more competitive and cleaner local elections, but in the short term, their impact will, for a number of reasons, be limited. The approval of the political reform law less than four months ahead of the elections has heightened uncertainty, and time is running short to apply some of the innovations. More broadly, political parties remain weak, and there are doubts whether they can even effectively determine their own nominees in all cases. Meaningful competition is unlikely to emerge in regions where the political and economic environment is heavily biased towards elites formerly linked to paramilitaries. Clientelism continues to be a drag on local politics, while links between criminals and politicians are frequently difficult to expose because of deep-seated popular mistrust of unresponsive local authorities. Guaranteeing the conditions for free, fair and competitive elections remains the dominant immediate challenge for the government. But more needs to be done to protect local government from the influence of illegal armed groups over the long term. The National Electoral Council (CNE) must be strengthened and become more independent. Congress needs to update and simplify Colombia’s diverse electoral rules. Political parties must establish stronger internal structures and develop a culture of accountability. These changes will ultimately be insufficient, however, if local government continues to lack the institutional capacities to guarantee democratic, clean and efficient management of its affairs. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 37: Accessed July 26, 2011 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/37%20Cutting%20the%20Links%20Between%20Crime%20and%20Local%20Politics%20Colombias%202011%20Elections.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/37%20Cutting%20the%20Links%20Between%20Crime%20and%20Local%20Politics%20Colombias%202011%20Elections.pdf Shelf Number: 122156 Keywords: Criminal NetworksCriminal Violence (Colombia)ParamilitariesParamilitary GroupsPolitical Corruption |
Author: Title: Violence and Politics in Venezuela Summary: Every half hour, a person is killed in Venezuela. The presence of organised crime combined with an enormous number of firearms in civilian hands and impunity, as well as police corruption and brutality, have entrenched violence in society. While such problems did not begin with President Hugo Chávez, his government has to account for its ambiguity towards various armed groups, its inability or unwillingness to tackle corruption and criminal complicity in parts of the security forces, its policy to arm civilians “in defence of the revolution”, and – last but not least – the president’s own confrontational rhetoric. Positive steps such as constructive engagement with Colombia as well as some limited security reform do not compensate for these failures. While the prospect of presidential elections in 2012 could postpone social explosion, the deterioration of the president’s health has added considerable uncertainty. In any event, the degree of polarisation and militarisation in society is likely to undermine the chances for either a non-violent continuation of the current regime or a peaceful transition to a post-Chávez era. A significant part of the problem was inherited from previous administrations. In 1999, the incoming President Chávez was faced with a country in which homicide rates had tripled in less than two decades, and many institutions were in the process of collapse, eroded by corruption and impunity. During the “Bolivarian revolution”, however, these problems have become substantially worse. Today, more than ten people are murdered on the streets of Caracas every day – the majority by individual criminals, members of street gangs or the police themselves – while kidnapping and robbery rates are soaring. By attributing the problem to “social perceptions of insecurity”, or structural causes, such as widespread poverty, inherited from past governments, the government is downplaying the magnitude and destructive extent of criminal violence. The massive, but temporary, deployment of security forces in highly visible operations, and even police reform and disarmament programs, will have little impact if they are not part of an integrated strategy to reduce crime, end impunity and protect citizens. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 38: Year: 2011 Country: Venezuela URL: Shelf Number: 122747 Keywords: Criminal Violence (Venezuela)HomicidesOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionViolent Crime |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Calderon's Caldron: Lessons from Mexico's Battle Against Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and Michoacan Summary: Over the past several years Mexico has suffered from drug-trade-related violence, extraordinarily intense and grisly even by criminal market standards. Its drug trafficking organizations have been engaged in ever-spiraling turf wars over smuggling routes and corruption networks, turning the streets of some Mexican cities into macabre displays of gun fights and murders. The criminal groups have shown a determined willingness to fight Mexican law enforcement and security forces and an increasing ambition to control other illicit and informal economies in Mexico and to extort legal businesses. Finding Mexican police forces pervaded by corruption and lacking the capacity to effectively deal with organized crime, President Felipe Calderón dispatched the military into Mexico’s streets. Yet while scoring some successes in capturing prominent drug traffickers, the military too has found it enormously difficult to suppress the violence and reduce the insecurity of Mexican citizens. Institutional reforms to improve the police forces and justice system, although crucial for expanding the rule of law in Mexico, have been slow and will inevitably require years of committed effort. Meanwhile, patience among many Mexicans with the battle against the criminal groups is starting to run out. To a degree unprecedented in the history of U.S.-Mexican relations, Mexico has welcomed U.S. cooperation in combating organized crime. An assistance package approved in 2008 by the U.S. Congress and called The Merida Initiative first focused on beefing up Mexican law enforcement agencies through technological transfers and intelligence sharing. A subsequent iteration of the U.S. approach adopted in 2009 and referred to as Beyond Merida emphasized deeper institutional reforms. It also expanded the scope of policies to combat illicit economies in Mexico by emphasizing socio-economic approaches to strengthen the resilience of communities against organized crime. But the government of Mexico has found the U.S. partnership lacking and has complained about the persistence of demand for drugs in the United States and the flows of guns and criminal money from the United States to Mexico. This monograph explores the effectiveness of the security and law enforcement and socio-economic approaches adopted in Mexico over the past several years to combat the drug trafficking organizations. It also analyzes the evolution of organized crime in Mexico, including in reaction to anti-crime actions taken by the Mexican government. It is based on fieldwork I undertook in Mexico in October 2009 and particularly in March 2011. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, Latin America Initiative, 2011. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 3, 2011 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/09_calderon_felbab_brown/09_calderon_felbab_brown.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/09_calderon_felbab_brown/09_calderon_felbab_brown.pdf Shelf Number: 122966 Keywords: Drug TraffickingOrganized Crime (Mexico)Political Corruption |
Author: Gastrow, Peter Title: Termites at Work: Transnational Organized Crime and State Erosion in Kenya Summary: The threat posed by organized crime is not confined to serious crimes such as racketeering, the global drug trade, or human trafficking. For many developing countries and fragile states, powerful transnational criminal networks constitute a direct threat to the state itself, not through open confrontation but by penetrating state institutions through bribery and corruption and by subverting or undermining them from within. Governments that lack the capacity to counter such penetration, or that acquiesce in it, run the risk of becoming criminalized or “captured” states. This paper examines whether Kenya faces such a threat. Six categories of transnational organized crime are examined, pointing to significant increases in criminal activity with pervasive impacts on government institutions in Kenya. Rampant corruption in the police, judiciary, and other state institutions has facilitated criminal networks’ penetration of political institutions. The research findings do not justify Kenya being labeled a criminalized state, but its foundations are under attack. Determined interventions are required to stem organized criminal networks from further undermining the state. The paper concludes with recommendations for steps to be taken at the national, regional, and international levels: National • Establish an independent, specialized serious crimes unit. • Enhance research, analysis, and information dissemination on organized crime in Kenya and East Africa. • Carry out a major overhaul of company registration systems to enhance accuracy, transparency, and public access. Regional • Significantly enhance police cooperation in the East African Community. International • Develop an East African Community Initiative that builds on the experience of the interagency West Africa Coast Initiative. Details: New York: International Peace Institute, 2011. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 18, 2011 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_2562.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Kenya URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_2562.pdf Shelf Number: 123045 Keywords: Criminal NetworksOrganized Crime (Kenya)Political Corruption |
Author: de Willebois, Emile van der Does Title: The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It Summary: Corruption is estimated to be at least a $40 billion dollar a year business. Every day, funds destined for schools, healthcare, and infrastructure in the world’s most fragile economies are siphoned off and stashed away in the world’s financial centers and tax havens. Corruption, like a disease, is eating away at the foundation of people’s faith in government. It undermines the stability and security of nations. So it is a development challenge in more ways than one: it directly affects development assistance, but it also undermines the preconditions for growth and equity. This report, The Puppet Masters, deals with the corporate and financial structures that form the building blocks of hidden money trails. In particular, it focuses on the ease with which corrupt actors hide their interests behind a corporate veil and the difficulties investigators face in trying to lift that veil. It serves as a powerful reminder that recovering the proceeds of corruption is a collective responsibility that involves both the public and private sector. Law enforcement and prosecution cannot go after stolen assets, confiscate and then return them if they are hidden behind the corporate veil. All financial centers and developed countries have committed, through the UN Convention against Corruption and international anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism standards, to improving the transparency of legal entities and other arrangements. This StAR report provides evidence of how far we still have to go to make these commitments a reality. Narrowing the gap between stated commitments and practice on the ground has a direct impact on actual recovery of assets. Details: Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2011. 284p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2011 at: http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/documents/Puppet%20Masters%20Report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/documents/Puppet%20Masters%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 123150 Keywords: CorruptionFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingPolitical CorruptionStolen Assets |
Author: Transparency International Title: The East African Bribery Index 2011 Summary: Burundi has retained the top position as the most bribery prone country in East Africa, according to the East African Bribery Index 2011. Burundi has a bribery prevalence level of 37.9% up from 36.7% in 2010, while Uganda and Tanzania have been ranked second and third at 33.9% and 31.6% respectively, both up from 33% and 28.6% in 2010. Kenya recorded a slight improvement at 28.8% down from 31.9% in 2010. Rwanda is once again ranked fifth with a bribery prevalence of 5.1% down from 6.6% last year. Methodology The East African Bribery Index is a governance tool developed to measure bribery levels in the private and public sectors in the region. The survey was conducted among 12,924 respondents selected through random household sampling across all the administrative regions in the five countries between February and May 2011. The respondents were asked to mention institutions where they were required to pay bribes or where bribes were expected as a condition to access services, and if the service sought was delivered upon payment or refusal to pay the bribe. KEY FINDINGS Institutional rankings The police, revenue authorities and the judiciary across the different countries were poorly rated in the regional aggregate index. All the police institutions in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi appeared in the list of the ten most bribery prone institutions in East Africa. Uganda Police lead the pack of the most bribery prone institutions in the region, followed by the Burundi Police, Customs/Revenue Authority – Burundi, Kenya Police and Uganda Revenue Authority in that order. For the second year running, the survey did not record enough bribery reports to formulate an index for Rwanda. The bribery reports recorded for most of the institutions were statistically insignificant to form a reliable basis for ranking. The survey also sought to establish the sectors most affected by bribery. The law enforcement sector emerged the most bribery prone sector in Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda. The health and education sectors were also ranked adversely in comparison to the other sectors. Bribery incidence across genders The survey also analysed bribery payments in the water, education and health sectors according to gender. In Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, there were higher instances of women experiencing bribe demands or expectations in the health sector and similarly paying a bribe than the men. In the water and education sectors, more bribes were demanded from and paid by the men than women in the three countries. Male respondents were more likely to experience a bribery situation as well as pay a bribe in the different sectors in Burundi. Reporting of corruption cases Reporting of corruption cases was low in all the five countries. Burundi recorded the lowest number of people forwarding corruption complaints with only 3.2% reporting corruption incidents. Only 7.1 % of the respondents in Kenya reported incidents of corruption compared to 10.8% last year; 9.9% and 6.9% forwarded corruption complaints in Uganda and Tanzania respectively while 16% filed complaints in Rwanda. Corruption perception Rwanda retained the most positive outlook in this regard. Only 2.4 of the Rwandan respondents described the country as extremely corrupt compared to 36.8% in Tanzania, 44% in Kenya, 51.3% in Uganda and 53.1% in Burundi. In terms of the public’s perception on the government’s commitment to tackle graft, Rwanda topped once again with 93% of the respondents saying that their government is sufficiently committed to the cause. This perceptual judgment was most adverse in Uganda where 61% of the respondents believe their government lacks the commitment to confront corruption. 45.4% and 47.3% held the same view in Kenya and Burundi respectively. Next steps The commitment shown by the East African countries to attract foreign investments and promote trade in the region may face challenges if corruption and other forms of public inefficiencies are not tackled. Improving governance practices therefore becomes an urgent imperative if the East African countries are to achieve developmental objectives and realise full economic and political integration. Confronting corruption occupies the core of such a response. The bribery index is a snapshot of corruption in a region or country and is not institution-specific. Therefore, in order to understand the extent and scope of corruption in an institution, an institutional integrity study to identify systematic weaknesses that may predispose the organisation to corrupt practices is necessary. The TI national chapters and contacts (partners) in the five East African countries thus welcome partnerships with public institutions aimed at comprehensively identifying and strengthening internal systems and procedures to curb corruption. Details: Berlin: Transparency International, 2011. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 28, 2011 at: http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases_nc/2011/2011_10_20_east_african_bribery_index_2011 Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases_nc/2011/2011_10_20_east_african_bribery_index_2011 Shelf Number: 123165 Keywords: BriberyBribesFraud and Corruption (East Africa)Misconduct in OfficePolitical Corruption |
Author: Vallejo, Catalina Title: Iron fist politics in Colombia: A panorama of destruction Summary: During the last decade many Latin American countries have resorted to mano dura (iron fist) politics and militarisation to combat crime, drugs and subversion. The high number of killed, injured and displaced persons in Colombia is a testimony of the failure of the iron fist policy with regard to in a crucial aspect of security: developing cultures of respect. When making policy in response to illegal groups’ violence, does using the same violent strategy allow for constructive social engagement? Does it break cycles of violence? While the villains’ death makes for a peaceful ending in comic books, in Latin America it reproduces violence. It is urgent to reimagine heroism and restore “enemies” their human dignity. Details: Bergen, Norway: CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), 2011. 4p. Source: CMI Brief, Volume 11 No. 1: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 31, 2012 at http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4364-iron-fist-politics-in-colombia.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4364-iron-fist-politics-in-colombia.pdf Shelf Number: 123886 Keywords: Criminal NetworksCriminal Violence (Colombia)ParamilitariesParamilitary GroupsPolitical CorruptionViolence (Colombia) |
Author: Victor, Kain Sebastian Title: CIA and the Contras' cocaine connection: Funny Farm and the Coca Cultivation Program - a true story how CIA used cocaine to finance an insurgency Summary: The evidence shows that the government knew that the Contras’ decided to traffic cocaine to finance themselves. The government participated in the drug trafficking by not interrupting it. CIA ordered the Contras to traffic drugs. Traffickers were protected from prosecution and received government contract. The government knew and sanctioned the drug trafficking into the US to support the Contras. The White House urged lenience for at least one convicted trafficker and terrorist. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) protected major drug traffickers, who diverted drug proceeds to finance the Contras. When former Contra mercenaries accused the CIA run Contras of being involved in drug trafficking the Senate started to investigate. Confidential memos and papers were leaked to the State Department, the Justice Department, the White House and CIA, who in a joined effort tried to sabotage the investigation. Documents were withheld, witnesses labelled as terrorist threats and put under surveillance, and the credibility of the Senatorial subcommittee’s members was questioned in the press. The conclusion of the investigation was that CIA had allowed the Contras to traffic cocaine and had protected them from prosecution. The conclusion went unnoticed in the media. When the drug connection came to the media’s attention a decade later, they focused on how the media covered the news, not news that the government had sanctioned drug trafficking. It were three small articles in San Jose Mercury News that sparked it all, and caused the Senate to force DOJ and CIA to investigate. When the official investigations were finished two years later and the reports release, the media’s attention had turned to Monica Lewinsky affair. All the reporters did was to quote from the conclusions of the reports. The mainstream media reported that the US Government had not sanctioned drug trafficking, but the media missed the scoop. The reports confirmed that the government knew about the Contras involvement in drug trafficking, that the government protected traffickers from prosecution, that the government granted contracts to trafficker whom they knew were drug trafficker, and that the Contras in part was funded by drug proceeds. The conclusions in the official reports denied what their reports confirmed. What evidence does exists, which shows that the government knew about and was involvement in the Contras’ drugs trafficking? This is the report about the evidence. Details: Denmark: Roskilde University, 2006, Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 17, 2012 at http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/1978/1/CIA%20and%20the%20Contras%E2%80%99%20cocaine%20connection%20(RUB%20version).pdf Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/1978/1/CIA%20and%20the%20Contras%E2%80%99%20cocaine%20connection%20(RUB%20version).pdf Shelf Number: 124165 Keywords: CocaineDrug TraffickingPolitical Corruption |
Author: Zander, Markus Title: Dynamic in land tenure, local power and the peasant economy: the case of Peten, Guatemala Summary: This article analyses the ongoing process of land grabbing by cattle farmers and drug traffickers in south-eastern Petén, Guatemala and its socio-economic consequences. In the last decade, this process has strongly accelerated due to several factors, which made investment in land more attractive and resulted in sharply increasing land prices. In the 236 communities included in the field study, 30% of all peasant families have already sold their land, some of them hoping to escape poverty, others under often violent pressure from buyers mostly related to the drug trade, who are securing control over large territories. For lack of economic alternatives the landless families end up leasing plots for cultivation from their neighbours, working as day labourers on big cattle ranches or occupying land in the protected areas in northern Petén, with poverty and conflicts about resources on a steady rise. Value chain analysis shows that the conversion from small scale peasant agriculture to extensive livestock production reduces land productivity and diminishes local added value and employment, thus providing further arguments for changes in agricultural politics to halt or reverse the process. Details: Land Deals Politics Initiative (LDPI) Source: Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2012 at http://www.future-agricultures.org/papers-and-presentations/doc_download/1095-dynamics-in-land-tenure-local-power-and-the-peasant-economy-the-case-of-peten-guatemala Year: 0 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.future-agricultures.org/papers-and-presentations/doc_download/1095-dynamics-in-land-tenure-local-power-and-the-peasant-economy-the-case-of-peten-guatemala Shelf Number: 124219 Keywords: Drug TraffickingPolitical CorruptionProperty Theft (Guatemala) |
Author: Cheung, Yan Leung Title: How Much Do Firms Pay As Bribes and What Benefits Do They Get? Evidence From Corruption Cases Worldwide Summary: We analyze a hand-collected sample of 166 prominent bribery cases, involving 107 publicly listed firms from 20 stock markets that have been reported to have bribed government officials in 52 countries worldwide during 1971-2007. We focus on the initial date of award of the contract for which the bribe was paid (rather than of the revelation of the bribery). Our data enable us to describe in detail the mechanisms through which bribes affect firm value. We find that firm performance, the rank of the politicians bribed, as well as bribe-paying and bribe-taking country characteristics affect the magnitude of the bribes and the benefits that firms derive from them. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 17981: Accessed April 9, 2012 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17981 Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17981 Shelf Number: 124889 Keywords: BriberyBribesPolitical Corruption |
Author: Justesen, Mogens K. Title: Exploiting the Poor: Bureaucratic Corruption and Poverty in Africa Summary: Corruption is a major source of slow development in Africa – the poorest region of the world. While extant research has focused on the causes and consequences of corruption at the macro-level, less effort has been devoted to understanding the micro-foundation of corruption, as well as the mechanisms through which poverty may be related to corruption and bribery. In this paper, we develop a simple model of the relationship between poverty and corruption. The model suggests that poor people are more likely to be victims of corrupt behavior by street-level government bureaucrats. Poor people often rely heavily on services provided by governments and are therefore more likely to be met by demands for bribes in return for obtaining those services. We test this proposition using micro-level survey data from the Afrobarometer. Since individuals are surveyed in different countries, we use multilevel regressions to estimate the effect of poverty on people’s experience with paying bribes. The results show that poor people are indeed much more prone to pay bribes to government officials. This suggests that the people who are worst off materially are also more likely to be victims of corruption. Details: Legon-Accra, Ghana: Afrobarometer, 2012. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 139: Accessed September 13, 2012 at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=151822 Year: 2012 Country: Ghana URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=151822 Shelf Number: 126327 Keywords: BriberyPolitical CorruptionPoverty (Ghana) |
Author: Hudson, Andrew Title: Baseless Prosecutions of Human Rights Defenders in Colombia: In the Dock and Under the Gun Summary: In a criminal justice system plagued by impunity, the tenacity with which Colombian prosecutors pursue human rights defenders for supposed crimes is striking. While corruption and arbitrary actions are a systemic problem throughout the judicial system, those who peacefully promote human rights are singled out for particular intimidation through baseless investigations and prosecutions. Unfounded charges are often widely publicized, undermining the credibility of defenders and marking them as targets for physical attack, often by paramilitary groups. While defenders are not alone in being subjected to false investigations, their persecution is distinctive due to the nature of the charges and the methods of collecting, and falsifying, evidence. They are usually accused of rebellion and membership in a guerrilla organization. By the time defenders are illegally detained, they have often been investigated in secret for many months or even years. Two of the hallmarks distinctive to defenders’ cases are the use of false testimony from ex-combatants and of inadmissible intelligence files. Charges are typically based on spurious allegations by ex-guerrillas whose testimony has been coerced or coached by regional prosecutors. Armed with such erroneous evidence, which is objectively inadequate to initiate an investigation, prosecutors and others publicly pre-judge the defendants, stigmatizing defenders as terrorists. Because defenders are singled out for this type of persecution, solutions that focus specifically on defenders are needed. The steadfast investigation of spurious criminal complaints against defenders stands in stark contrast to the failure to investigate attacks, threats, and other forms of intimidation perpetrated against them or against civilians more generally. The Colombian state also fails to prosecute or otherwise discipline judicial officials who instigate such specious prosecutions. Human rights defenders in Colombia play a legitimate and essential role in protecting basic rights and strengthening democratic institutions. Charges against them are often politically motivated and intended primarily to discredit and stigmatize them individually and as a class. Unfounded criminal charges are damaging in many ways: The stigmatization of defenders as terrorist sympathizers places them at considerable risk of reprisal and death threats by paramilitaries or others; The proceedings force defenders to expend time and resources defending themselves, diminishing their capacity to perform productive human rights work; The charges discredit defenders and tarnish their reputations as legitimate human rights activists; and The threat of political prosecution has a chilling effect, encouraging defenders to practice selfcensorship and limit their activities. In relation to Colombia, the U.N. Special Representative on Human Rights Defenders has stated that such “proceedings are part of a strategy to silence human rights defenders.”3 Despite increasing attention to the issue, in the absence of a detailed study, some Colombian officials refuse to acknowledge that there is a widespread problem. Human Rights First has spent more than a year researching and documenting 32 cases of unfounded prosecutions against defenders. Analysis of primary materials such as interviews with defenders, defense briefs, prosecutors’ resolutions, and judicial sentences reveal the spurious nature of these criminal investigations. For the first time, this report reveals a positive development: prosecutors and judges all over Colombia are recognizing the existence of malicious prosecutions against defenders. However, it is not enough to identify the problem or to mitigate its effects after damage has been done. There must be fundamental changes in the justice system. As a major supporter of judicial reform in Colombia, the United States can play a constructive role in combating malicious prosecutions of human rights defenders. It is clearly in the interests of the United States to have a vibrant civil society in Colombia, which can freely express ideas and strengthen respect for the rule of law. Based on an analysis of 32 cases and extensive interviews with government officials and human rights defenders, Human Rights First makes concluding recommendations. Details: New York: Human Rights First, 2009. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 1, 2012 at: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/090211-HRD-colombia-eng.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/090211-HRD-colombia-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 127048 Keywords: False AccusationsHuman Rights Defenders (Colombia)Judicial SystemPolitical CorruptionProsecution |
Author: Pettengill, Julia Title: Russian Corruption: Domestic and international consequences How—and why—the U.K. should bolster anti-corruption efforts in the Russian Federation Summary: • The Russian Federation has made tremendous strides since the economic chaos of the post-Soviet 1990s. However, the country remains plagued by endemic corruption, suffusing a system in which the boundaries between the public and private sector are blurred. • This phenomenon has also gone hand-in-hand with the erosion of democratic development and return of authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin. It is used as a means of cementing the loyalty of the political elite, and flourishes in the absence of judicial independence and government transparency. • According to polls, corruption is one of the foremost causes of dissatisfaction amongst the Russian public, and was one of the issues which inspired the mass protests of 2011-2012. Anticorruption activism by individuals such as Alexey Navalny has highlighted the potential for this issue to be used as an impetus for political reform. • While the Russian government has integrated international anticorruption standards into its domestic legislation, those measures are selectively enforced, usually against political opponents. The government’s most recent anti-corruption measures are unlikely to prove successful, as they do not address the need for systemic reforms such as the introduction of political competition, judicial independence and breaking the government monopoly on the media. • Corruption in Russia is often tied, both directly and indirectly, to human rights abuses, by entrenching disrespect for individual rights in the political system. The case of the billionaire political prisoner, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and the wrongful imprisonment and death of the whistleblower attorney Sergei Magnitsky aptly demonstrate this connection. • Russian corruption undermines the economic prospects, civil liberties and fundamental dignity of the Russian population. However, the scale of this domestic problem also has significant ramifications in a globalised economy, as funds obtained through corruption are laundered and circulated throughout the world— often finding homes in global financial-centres such as London. Corrupt business practices exported into the international market undermine the stability and integrity of the international financial system. • The United Kingdom has one of the most sophisticated anti-corruption regulatory structures in the world, and is internationally respected for its judicial independence. However, the enforcement of these regulations, particularly by banks and by agencies charged with oversight of the importation of funds tied to corruption, has consistently been criticised as insufficient by the Financial Services Authority (F.S.A.) and other bodies. • The significant presence of Russian wealth and immigrants in the U.K. is a positive development. However, the likelihood of corrupt practices having been responsible for some Russian wealth should inform the assessment of funds brought into the country from Russia, as well as from other countries with reputations for corruption. • Improved domestic enforcement is crucial to any effort by the U.K. to bolster anti-corruption efforts abroad. Banks should be subjected to increased pressure to engage in more rigorous assessments of risk in relation to funds from Russia and other corrupt countries. Additionally, investment in the Serious Fraud Office should be increased. • The U.K. Parliament should undertake measures to enhance public scrutiny of corruption, including pushing forward libel reform. The current libel law regime aids those whose wealth is obtained through corruption by providing them with a significant weapon with which to forestall investigations and silence public criticism of their activities. • Parliament should pass a U.K. version of the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, which was signed into law in the United States in December 2012, and imposes visa bans and asset freezes on the individuals implicated in the imprisonment and death of Magnitsky, as well as any other Russian citizen credibly suspected of human rights abuses. If the U.K. passed a similar measure, this would have direct consequences for the individuals who engage in rights abuses, often for personal benefit via corrupt practices, and chip away at the incentives for participating in this system. • The British government should increase its engagement with representative of Russia’s embattled, but burgeoning, civil society. This should extend to high-level meetings with ministers in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F.C.O.), as well as engagement with parliamentary forums such as relevant All-Party Parliamentary Groups (A.P.P.G.s). • The U.K. should robustly promote an anti-corruption agenda in international forums. In particular, the U.K. should use its G8 presidency this year to push for measurable benchmarks for Russia to undertake economic and political reforms relevant to a genuine systemic anti-corruption campaign. Details: London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2013 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/HJS-Russian-corruption-Report_Low-Res-Final-A5-4-Apr-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Russia URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/HJS-Russian-corruption-Report_Low-Res-Final-A5-4-Apr-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 128674 Keywords: Corruption (Russia)Political Corruption |
Author: Sukharenko, Alexander Title: Russian Organized Crime and its Impact on Foreign Economies Summary: According to Russia’s National Security Strategy (2009), criminalization of the economy is one of the long-term threats to internal security. In 2011, Russia’s shadow economy was probably worth 19 trillion rubles ($632 billion), or 35 percent of gross domestic product. While rising in absolute terms, the figure has fallen from 77 percent of GDP in 1994 and tumbled to as low as 28 percent in 2009-2010. This size is 3.5 times larger than corresponding G-7 economies like the U.S., France, and Canada (GFI, 2013). The World Economic Forum reports on global competiveness show that the level of harm of business caused by Russian organized crime is one of the highest, not only in Europe, but also in the whole world. In 2012, Russia ranks 114th out of 144 countries on this indicator (WEF, 2012). The lack of laws, lax regulation, corruption, and extreme forms of violence have enabled criminal organizations to make substantial inroads into lucrative economic sectors, including energy, metallurgy, construction, banking and retail. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (2012) estimated that some 1,000 different companies are controlled by organized crime. Organized crimes’ success can be attributed in part to the fact that many members of the elite, who are influential in economics and politics, are directly involved in illicit activities. Corrupt officials provide criminal front companies with licenses and quotas, customs exemptions, budgetary funds, municipal and state property. Further, law enforcement officials often help eliminate their competitors, and provide criminal bosses with protection from the law. A significant portion of criminal proceeds are transferred and laundered through offshore banks and shell companies. According to Global Financial Integrity, Russia is the fifth largest exporter of illicit capital over the past decade, behind China, Mexico, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, respectively (GFI, 2012). The Russian economy lost at least $211.5 billion in illicit financial outflows from 1994 to 2011 (or about US$11.8 billion per annum). These outflows represent the proceeds of crime, corruption, and tax evasion, and have serious negative consequences for the national economy (GFI, 2013). Some of this money has returned to Russia at favorable exchange rates, where it has been reinvested in other illicit schemes or used to purchase real estate, companies, and banks. As a result of this cycle, many criminal bosses made up a significant proportion of the new wealthy class. Details: Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2013. 3p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief No. 114, 2013: Accessed May 22, 2013 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-sukharenko-russian-organized-crime.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Russia URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-sukharenko-russian-organized-crime.pdf Shelf Number: 128775 Keywords: Money LaunderingOrganized Crime (Russia)Political CorruptionShadow Economies |
Author: Organization of American States Title: The Drug Problem in the Americas: Studies. Drugs and Security Summary: The relationship between the drug problem and security can be explained principally by the state’s weakness in performing its law and order functions, property protection and crime prevention. The varying capabilities of different states in the region to guarantee protection for their citizens and effective law enforcement constitute a key variable in understanding why in some countries the drug problem is viewed as a major security threat, while in others its effect is less intense. While drug use tends to be high among people who have committed crimes, this does not mean that the majority of drug users commit crimes. The relationship between drug use and the occurrence of crime tends to be highest in specific urban spaces, and is generally associated with drug use by socially marginalized groups. Drug trafficking is an important factor behind the high mortality rates of some countries in the hemisphere. Nevertheless, there is not enough evidence to conclude that recent changes in drug trafficking routes have resulted in a decline in violent deaths, suggesting that other underlying factors may be driving this violence. The relationship between the drug problem and organized crime works both ways: Illegal drugs provide resources that fuel crime, while organized crime serves as the engine to sustain much of the drug market. From a security perspective, the problem is more about organized crime than drugs. Illegal firearms trafficking is a major problem throughout the hemisphere, exacerbated by the relationship between illegal drugs and organized crime. Illegal drugs drive crime, violence, corruption, and impunity. These four factors are key to understanding the interaction among prohibition, criminal organizations, and state institutions. The drug problem accentuates corruption within countries, taking advantage of institutional weaknesses, lack of controls and regulations, and lack of judicial independence. Institutional responses to address the drug problem may trigger reactions that further aggravate levels of violence and crime. Often times, State attempts to combat criminal factions simultaneously and head-on lead to fragmentation and power vacuums that exacerbate violence. Details: Washington, DC: OAS, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 25, 2013 at: http://www.cicad.oas.org/main/policy/informeDrogas2013/drogasSeguridad_ENG.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.cicad.oas.org/main/policy/informeDrogas2013/drogasSeguridad_ENG.pdf Shelf Number: 128798 Keywords: Drug Abuse and CrimeDrug EnforcementDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Barone, Guglielmo Title: The Effect of Organized Crime on Public Funds Summary: Organized crime is widely regarded as damaging to the economy, to say nothing of people’s lives. Yet little is known about the mechanism at work. This paper helps fill the gap by analyzing the impact of organized crime on the allocation of public subsidies to businesses. We assemble an innovative data set on Italian mafia crimes at municipal level and test whether organized crime diverts public funding. We exploit exogenous variations at the level of municipalities to instrument current mafia-style activity by using exogenous shifters of land productivity in the 19th century. Our results show that the presence of organized crime positively affects both the extensive margin (probability of funding) and the intensive margin (amount of public funding to enterprises). The impact is economically relevant and equal to at least one standard deviation of the dependent variable. Organized crime is also found to cause episodes of corruption in the public administration. A series of robustness checks confirm the findings. Our results suggest that geographically targeted aid policies should be careful to take local crime conditions into account. Details: Bologna: Bank of Italy, Economic Research Union, 2013. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No. 916 : Accessed July 17, 2013 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281920 Year: 2013 Country: Italy URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281920 Shelf Number: 129425 Keywords: Organized Crime (Italy)Political CorruptionPublic Economy |
Author: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Title: Business, Corruption and Crime in Serbia: The impact of bribery and other crime on private enterprise Summary: This survey of businesses in Serbia reveals that corruption and other forms of crime are a great hindrance to private enterprise and have a negative effect on private investment. A significant percentage of businesses pay bribes to public officials repeatedly over the course of the year. Businesses in the Accommodation and Food service activities sector and the Transportation and Storage sectors combined are those most affected by bribery, followed by businesses in the Wholesale trade and Retail trade sector. The public officials with the highest risk of bribery in interactions with businesses are public utilities officers, police officers, municipal or provincial officers and customs officers. While indicators of corruption perceptions are undoubtedly useful for raising awareness, this survey measures the actual experience of corruption and crime through representative sample surveys of businesses in order to provide a more realistic, evidence-based assessment of corruption and crime affecting the business sector. In so doing it focuses on the extent and pattern of bribery by businesses from five different sectors (accounting for over 71.1 per cent of all businesses in Serbia) in their frequent interactions with the public administration. According to the survey, of all the businesses that had contact with a public official in the 12 months prior to the survey 17 per cent paid a bribe to a public official. The average prevalence of business bribery in Serbia is higher than the share of ordinary Serbian citizens (9.3 per cent) who experienced the same in UNODC's 2011 study on the general population. The examination of the experience of businesses that pay bribes to public officials underlines the fact that corruption plays a role in the daily business of many companies. Bribe-paying businesses pay an average of 7 bribes per year, or about one bribe every seven weeks. The prevalence of bribery is substantially higher among micro (up to 9 employees) businesses than among businesses of other sizes. A substantial share of all the bribes paid to public officials by businesses in Serbia are paid in cash (45.2 per cent), followed by the provision of food and drink in exchange for an illicit "favour" by the public official (25.5 per cent) and other goods (21.7 per cent). When bribes are paid in cash, the mean amount paid per bribe is 52,588 Dinar, or the equivalent of 935 EUR-PPP. As for which party actually broaches the subject of kickbacks, in 43.5 per cent of all bribery cases the payment of a bribe is offered by a representative of the business without a prior request being made, whereas in over half (56.1 per cent) of cases payment is either explicitly (16.2 per cent) or implicitly (22.4 per cent) requested by the public official or are paid after a third-party request (17.5 per cent). The most common purposes for paying bribes cited by businesses is to "speed up business-related procedures" (40.3 per cent of all bribes), "receiving better treatment" (19 per cent) and "making the finalization of a procedure possible" (11.3 per cent). At the same time, almost a quarter (23.4 per cent) of bribes paid serve for no specific immediate purpose for the businesses paying them, suggesting that these are "sweeteners" given to public officials to "groom" them for future interactions in the interest of the company. None of the businesses part of the survey had reported bribery incidents in the 12 months prior to the survey to official authorities in Serbia, which suggests that businesses often feel obliged to participate in bribery. This is also reflected in the main reasons cited for not reporting bribery: "it is common practice to pay or give gifts to public officials" (34.2 per cent), "it is pointless to report it as nobody would care " (30.8 per cent) and "the payment or gift was given as a sign of gratitude to the public servant for delivering the service requested " (21.6 per cent). Bribery in the private sector not only comprises bribes paid by businesses to public officials, it also takes place between businesses themselves in order to secure business transactions. Though lower than the prevalence of bribery between the private and public sector, at 6.6 per cent the prevalence of business-to-business bribery indicates that the practice does exist in Serbia. None of the businesses in the survey reported such business to business bribery incidents to relevant authorities. Some 9.2 per cent of business representatives decided not to make a major investment in the 12 months prior to the survey due to the fear of having to pay bribes to obtain requisite services or permits, thus the impact of bribery on business activity can be substantial. The consequences of other more conventional crimes on a business's property and economic activities can also be considerable, both in terms of direct costs stemming from physical damage and indirect costs in the form of insurance premiums, security expenditure and lost investment opportunities. For instance, more than one third of businesses (35.5 per cent) in Serbia fall victim to fraud by outsiders in various different guises in a year and such businesses are victimized an average of 10.1 times in that time period. Annual prevalence rates for burglary (10.2 per cent) and vandalism (9.5 per cent) in the private sector are also significant, as are the average number of times businesses affected fall victim to those crimes (4.4 and 2.8 respectively). The prevalence rate of motor vehicle theft (MVT) is 1.7 per cent of all car owning businesses, with victims suffering an average of 1.4 incidents. Moreover, over the past 12 months 1 per cent of all businesses in Serbia fell victim to extortion, a crime that can be linked to organized criminal groups. In marked contrast to corruption, a larger share of conventional crimes (on average, 41.8 per cent for five crime types) is reported to the police by businesses in Serbia. While the majority of business representatives (76.2 per cent) consider that the crime risk for their company has remained stable in comparison to the previous 12 months, around one in six (17.1 per cent) think it is on the increase and 2.8 per cent on the decrease. The fear of crime plays a very important role in the decision-making process of business leaders when it comes to making major investments. Although there are some differences by economic sector, on average one out of ten (10.6 per cent) entrepreneurs in Serbia state that they did not make a major investment in the previous 12 months due to the fear of crime. Yet while about 93.2 per cent of businesses in Serbia use at least one protective security system against crime, only 44.8 per cent have any kind of insurance against the economic cost of crime. Together corruption and other forms of crime place a considerable burden on economic development in Serbia. Putting in place more and better targeted measures for protecting businesses against crimes, as well as for preventing corruption (such as effective internal compliance measures and other policies concerning corruption) could make that burden considerably lighter. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 27, 2014 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Serbia_Business_corruption_report_ENG.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Serbia_Business_corruption_report_ENG.pdf Shelf Number: 131809 Keywords: BriberyBusiness CrimeCommercial CrimeCrime Against BusinessesCrime StatisticsPolitical Corruption |
Author: Title: Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency Summary: In its latest report, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency, the International Crisis Group examines the emergence, rise and evolution of a movement whose four-year insurgency has killed thousands, displaced close to a million, destroyed public infrastructure and weakened the country's already poor economy, particularly in the North East. The government's failure to provide security and basic services makes poor youth, in particular, an easy recruitment target for anti-state militias. As Boko Haram's network expands into Cameroon and Niger, a military response is not enough. Only deep political and socio-economic reform can ease the injustices that fuel the insurgency. The report's major findings and recommendations are: - Boko Haram's evolution since 2002 is strongly linked to failed governance, economic hardship, rising social inequality, corruption and impunity. Most Nigerians are poorer today than at independence in 1960. Poverty is most dire in the north, where Boko Haram, the latest of many northern fundamentalist movements, has tapped into Muslim revivalism and hopes to establish an Islamic state. - Since 2010, the group's campaign has grown, targeting not only security forces and politicians, but also civilians, traditional and religious leaders, public institutions, the UN presence and schools. It is more dispersed than ever, with many leaders in Cameroon and Niger, both of which are poorly equipped to address an armed Islamist threat. Boko Haram's leader, Abubakar Shekau, seems to have little control over its factions, including Ansaru, which focuses on foreign targets. - Insecurity in much of the north may also worsen political violence and undermine the credibility of the 2015 elections, further damaging government legitimacy. -Federal and state governments must end impunity by prosecuting crimes by security services, government officials and Boko Haram members alike, and urgently develop and implement a socio-economic intervention program for the North East region. - Civic education to halt politicisation of religions, effective development and anti-corruption efforts, and police who are seen as partners to citizens are all vital. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 216: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf Shelf Number: 1132191 Keywords: HomicidesHuman Rights (Nigeria)Political CorruptionViolenceViolent Crimes |
Author: Owens, Kaitlin Title: Honduras: Journalism in the Shadow of Impunity Summary: This report examines the surge in violence directed against journalists following the ouster of President Jose Manuel Zelaya in June 2009. Since then at least 32 Honduran journalists have been killed and many more continue to work in a climate of fear and self-censorship. Reporters who cover corruption and organized crime are routinely targeted for their work and attacked or killed with almost complete impunity. The sources of the violence against journalists are varied. Transnational drug cartels have infiltrated the country so effectively that the present crisis in Honduras cannot be understood in isolation from its Central American neighbours. That said, it is also clear that the absence of reliable institutions has allowed the violence to escalate far more rapidly than many anticipated. Much of the violence is produced by the state itself, perhaps most significantly by a corrupt police force. In a special report on police criminality in Honduras, the Tegucigalpa-based Violence Observatory (Observatorio de Violencia) found that between January 2011 and November 2012 police officers killed 149 civilians, approximately six per month. The taint of corruption and a culture of impunity have undermined trust among state agencies and public confidence in key institutions. Public distrust of the police is so great that crimes are rarely reported. Moreover, due to widespread corruption and inefficiency among the force, only an estimated 20 per cent of crime is reported, and of that less than four per cent gets investigated. According to the State's own statistics, less than one per cent of all crime in Honduras is subject to a police investigation. Procedural flaws are evident throughout the system. Police often say an investigation is underway when there is none; the office of the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights (Fiscala Especial de Derechos Humanos) does not have the jurisdiction to try those responsible for the murders of journalists, and lacks resources to conduct even the most basic investigations into other human rights violations. On the other hand, while some legal initiatives are under-resourced, there is also a proliferation of competing agencies that notionally address the same problem. This has created a situation in which institutional responsibility has been so widely diffused that no one is ultimately accountable for the high level of impunity. With current levels of funding, the office of the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights, which was nominally responsible for over 7,000 investigations in 2012, can only investigate a small percentage of these cases each year. While the office continues to operate with a serious shortage of funds, the Honduran state is able to argue that it has made progress in addressing human rights violations through the establishment of a Special Prosecutor for Human Rights. Given these crises, this report finds that the Honduran judiciary faces significant challenges in establishing an independent legal culture capable of ensuring accountability for human rights abuses. Furthermore, legal mechanisms to protect journalists are needlessly complicated and often confusing. Even international mechanisms such as the precautionary measures issued by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (iachr) are poorly understood by local police and, at least as currently implemented, offer little real protection. Deep divisions among the journalists themselves hinder the fight against impunity. A striking absence of camaraderie within the profession has impaired its ability to collaborate effectively in protesting violence against journalists and in promoting protection mechanisms. Mutual suspicion is evident in many journalists' scepticism towards the official Association of Journalists of Honduras (Colegio de Periodistas de Honduras - cph) - an institution that has noticeably failed in its legislative mandate to "promote solidarity and mutual assistance among the media." This failure has meant that there is no united front pressing for greater accountability and an end to the violence. The coup that unseated President Zelaya in 2009 brought these problems into the spotlight, but the roots of the crisis lie further back in Honduras' history, notably in its failure during the demilitarization process that began in the 1980s to hold those who had committed serious human rights violations accountable for their actions. A legacy of failed reforms left the state incapable of dealing with rights violations that took place during and after the 2009 coup. As a result, the recent wave of murderous violence has been met with a familiar mixture of inadequate resources, bureaucratic ineptitude, blame-shifting and denial. The coup interrupted the demilitarization of Honduras. One human rights worker we interviewed spoke of the return of a security-state mindset in which peaceful dissent is often met with reflexive violence. Others noted that the re-emergence of the security state had been justified - as in Colombia and Mexico - as an antidote to pervasive corruption and organized crime. But the real lesson to be drawn from the use of force to compensate for the failures of transitional justice is that state actors no longer need to fear being held to account for their actions. As Bertha Oliva, co-ordinator of the Committee of Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared in Honduras (Comite de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos en Honduras - cofadeh) put it: "When we allow impunity for human rights violations, we see the crimes of the past translated into the crimes of the future." Details: Toronto: PEN Canada; London: PEN International, 2014. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 7, 2014 at: http://www.pen-international.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Honduras-Journalism-in-the-Shadow-of-Impunity1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.pen-international.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Honduras-Journalism-in-the-Shadow-of-Impunity1.pdf Shelf Number: 132630 Keywords: Drug CartelsHomicidesHuman Rights AbusesJournalistsOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionViolence Violence Crime |
Author: Schanzer, Jonathan Title: Terrorism Finance in Turkey: A Growing Concern Summary: The Financial Action Task Force, or FATF, the international body for setting the global standards to combat terrorist financing, held its plenary session in Paris in mid-February 2014. In the days before the meeting, Bloomberg reported that the Turkish lira weakened and stocks dropped resulting from concerns over a possible blacklisting. Realistically, Turkey was in little danger of joining the short FATF list of countries requiring "counter-measures" (Iran and North Korea). But the markets were jittery because of an ongoing corruption scandal in Turkey, which erupted on December 17, 2013. In the end, the corruption charges had no impact on FATF's ruling. Ankara was merely grey-listed by FATF, as it has been since 2007, due to deficiencies based on technical and legislative criteria. But the market's outsized anxiety underscored the fact that, amidst the corruption scandal, a troubling picture has come into focus. With the Syrian civil war raging just across Turkey's eastern border, reports continue to circulate that Turkey has turned a blind eye to the flow of money and weaponry to dangerous jihadi groups, including al-Qaeda. And while Ankara has been struggling to weaken Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, a client of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey was involved in a massive sanctions-busting scheme with Tehran. Now known as "gas-for-gold," the scheme helped the Iranian regime gain some $13 billion, even as Turkey's NATO allies sought to punish Tehran for its illicit nuclear program. Meanwhile, leaders of the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas have been meeting with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdooan in Ankara. In fact, one senior Hamas leader, Saleh Aruri, reportedly resides in Turkey, where he has been allegedly involved in the financing and logistics of Hamas operations. On top of this, in September 2013, Turkey surprised the West by entering into a controversial missile deal with a Chinese defense firm that was blacklisted for selling Iran items for its nuclear program. Many of these reports intersect with the recent corruption scandal. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has rejected most of the allegations, blaming outsiders (notably Israel and followers of the Pennsylvania-based Islamist leader Fethullah Gulen) for a "treacherous plot."[2] Rather than addressing the charges, the AKP has purged the investigators, prosecutors, and journalists involved, threatening the rule of law in Turkey. Washington, for its part, has remained on the sidelines, expressing relatively mild concern about the crackdowns on law enforcement officials and the jailing of journalists, while electing not to mention terrorism finance issues publicly. Washington's silence stems from fears of a fall-out with Turkey, which has been a crucial ally over the years, and is situated strategically at the intersection of Europe and the Middle East. But Turkey's actions constitute a direct challenge to Washington's sanctions regime. Built under two presidents, this layered and intricate sanctions infrastructure has become a crucial tool to combating illicit finance the world over. Moreover, with Iran, Hamas, and al-Qaeda in the picture, how long before elements within the U.S. government-whether the Treasury, State Department, or Congress-feel compelled to issue designations of individuals or institutions tied to terrorism in Turkey? How long before Turkey runs the risk of being viewed as a possible State Sponsor of Terrorism? Such steps seem drastic. But should these problems continue to mount, Washington will have a more difficult time maintaining this important alliance, both because of legal obligations and public perceptions. The window to address these problems is now. Details: Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2014. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 31, 2014 at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/stuff/uploads/documents/Schanzer_Turkey_Final_Report_3_smaller.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Turkey URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/stuff/uploads/documents/Schanzer_Turkey_Final_Report_3_smaller.pdf Shelf Number: 132852 Keywords: Political CorruptionTerrorism (Turkey)Terrorist Financing |
Author: Damnjanovic, Jelena Title: Organised Crime and State Sovereignty: The conflict between the Mexican state and drug cartels 2006-2011 Summary: Since December 2006, the government of Mexico has been embroiled in a battle against numerous criminal organisations seeking to control territory and assure continued flow of revenue through the production and trafficking of drugs. Although this struggle has been well documented in Mexican and international media, it has not received as much scholarly attention due to the difficulties involved with assessing current phenomena. This thesis seeks to play a small part in filling that gap by exploring how and why the drug cartels in Mexico have proved a challenge to Mexico's domestic sovereignty and the state's capacity to have monopoly over the use of force, maintain effective and legitimate law enforcement, and to exercise control over its territory. The thesis will explain how the violence, corruption and subversion of the state's authority have resulted in a shift of the dynamics of power from state agents to criminal organizations in Mexico. It also suggests implications for domestic sovereignty in regions experiencing similar problems with organized crime, perhaps pointing to a wider trend in international politics in the era of globalization. Details: Sydney: University of Sydney, Department of Government and International Relations, 2011. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 11, 2014 at: http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/8273 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/8273 Shelf Number: 132974 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Goredema, Charles Title: Crime networks and governance in Cape Town: the quest for enlightened responses Summary: The state cannot exercise its authority in many areas of Cape Town where organised crime wields significant power, has capitalised on economic opportunities, and can manipulate and corrupt the state. Solutions to eradicate organised criminal networks generally do not acknowledge the underlying context that sustains them and also stress stronger policing and repression, while paying insufficient attention to deficiencies in other state apacities. State interventions need to be more holistic, more carefully considered and should acknowledge that much organised crime reflects a dysfunctional society in Cape Town. Without an overarching strategy of reform, organised crime will continue to plague affected communities. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2014. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 262: Accessed August 14, 2014 at: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper262.pdf Year: 2014 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper262.pdf Shelf Number: 133053 Keywords: Criminal Networks Organized Crime (South Africa) Political Corruption |
Author: Thompson, Dennis F. Title: Two Concepts of Corruption Summary: To combat institutional corruption, we need to distinguish it clearly from individual corruption. Individual corruption occurs when an institution or its officials receive a benefit that does not serve the institution and provides a service through relationships external to the institution under conditions that reveal a quid pro quo motive. Institutional corruption occurs when an institution or its officials receive a benefit that is directly useful to performing an institutional purpose, and systematically provides a service to the benefactor under conditions that tend to undermine procedures that support the primary purposes of the institution. Institutional corruption does not receive the attention it deserves partly because it is so closely (and often unavoidably) related to conduct that is part of the job of a responsible official, the perpetrators are often seen as (and are) respectable officials just trying to do their job, and the legal system and public opinion are more comfortable with condemning wrongdoing that has a corrupt motive. Yet institutional corruption, which is usually built into the routines and practices of organizations, is usually more damaging to the institution and society than individual corruption, which in advanced societies typically consists of isolated acts of misconduct with effects limited in time and scope. Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, 2013. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Edmond J. Safra Working Paper, No. 16: Accessed August 28, 2014 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304419 Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304419 Shelf Number: 131257 Keywords: Institutional Corruption Political CorruptionProfessional Ethics |
Author: Salamanca, Luis Jorge Garay Title: Understanding the Structure of Transnational Criminal Networks Operating in the U.S./Mexico Border and the Southeastern Border of the European Union Summary: Systemic crime and systemic corruption, much like any other activity, require the interaction of different agents. Some of those interactions are sporadic and some are permanent. In general, there are "many situations that social actors create and must negotiate in their behavior" (Radil, Flint, & Tita, 2010, p. 308), and it is possible to model and analyze those situations when arranged as a social network. Additionally several States and multilateral agencies acknowledge Transnational Criminal Networks (TCNs) as one of the most important threats for the domestic and transnational stability. Bearing this in mind, the purpose of this document is to model and analyze situations of crime consisting on Transnational Criminal Network (TCNs) operating in the southern border of The United States and the Southeastern border of the European Union, both regions concentrating some of the most dangerous and powerful TCNs on a global scale. The present document consists of eight sections. The first is the methodological and theoretical framework. The second is an introduction to the current situation of crime in Mexico. The third is the model and analysis of a TCN operating across Mexico and the United States, in which members of "Los Zetas" and "La Familia Michoacana" participate on activities of drug and hydrocarbons trafficking. The fourth section is an analysis of how the modeled Mexican TCN operates inside the United States. Implications for the stability and national security of the United States are also explored in the fourth section. The fifth section is an introduction to the situation of crime and corruption in Bulgaria, herein interpreted as the southeastern border of the European Union. In the sixth section four TCNs are modeled and analyzed: two consisting on crime transiting through Bulgaria, related to Drug Trafficking, and two consisting on exporting human trafficking from Bulgaria to Western Europe and a Skimming network. The final section is a summary of recommendations for improving the confrontation of TCNs. Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex Foundation; Sophia, Bulgaria: Risk Monitor, 2013. 235p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 27, 2014 at: http://www.informeescaleno.com.ar/images/Understanding_the_Structure_Bulg_grant.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.informeescaleno.com.ar/images/Understanding_the_Structure_Bulg_grant.pdf Shelf Number: 133820 Keywords: Border SecurityCriminal NetworksDrug TraffickingGang ViolenceGangsHuman TraffickingOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Bruce, David Title: Political Killings in South Africa: The Ultimate Intimidation Summary: This policy brief provides a summary of current information on the nature and extent of the problem of political killings in South Africa. The province of KwaZulu-Natal accounts for the overwhelming majority of these killings and in recent years these have been increasingly localised to specific areas, such as the Umtshezi (Estcourt) municipal area, Ulundi and KwaMashu. Though Mpumalanga was also associated with these killings, there appear not to have been any in the province since early 2011. Whereas during the apartheid period political killings took place in a diversity of circumstances, they now tend to be targeted assassinations, though some also occur in other circumstances. Available information suggests that less than 10% of these killings have resulted in convictions. There is a need for in-depth research and a better understanding both of the obstacles to a more effective criminal justice response, as well as why the problem continues. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2014. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 64: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PolBrief64.pdf Year: 2014 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PolBrief64.pdf Shelf Number: 134125 Keywords: Assassinations (South Africa) Homicide Political Corruption |
Author: Gberie, Lansana Title: State Officials and their Involvement in Drug Trafficking in West Africa. Preliminary Findings Summary: This paper examines a controversial problem in West Africa: the alleged complicity of state security and political officials in drug trafficking. It builds on the assumption, borne out of experiences in Latin America and the Caribbean, that drug traffickers gain a foothold in a country only through the complicity of senior state political and security officials. Yet, as noted in an earlier WACD paper, it is also informed and facilitated by "the multiple and multi-layered governance deficits in the sub-region that have made it relatively susceptible to external penetration and capture by powerful, well-endowed and tightly-organized drug trafficking networks." The low number of convictions of senior state officials for their direct or indirect involvement in drug trafficking, whether in West Africa or elsewhere, makes it difficult to research these issues. Yet, a growing number of cases in which effective investigations and collaboration between states have led to important convictions and which have clearly identified the degree of collusion required to traffic drugs through a state are rendering this task less complex. Indeed, case files or reports from administrative inquiries into trafficking incidents can provide important insights into the depth and scope of the trafficking enterprise, and the degree of involvement or complicity of state officials. Open source material, such as the leaked US diplomatic cables, can be extremely insightful, as can interviews with national and foreign intelligence personnel, judges, and customs officials and similar. Studying non-action by state actors, including the police, the judiciary, internal oversight mechanisms, and even the highest levels of government in response to mounting allegations of state involvement in drug trafficking can also shed light on who might be involved in drug trafficking, colluding with traffickers or blocking investigations into such illicit activity, as can monitoring of some of the pitched media battles that have emerged between political parties regarding illicit sources of party and election campaign funding. In a region where high political office often immunes its holders from judicial sanctions it may well indicate that in some cases this complicity, passive or active, may involve people who are very high indeed in the political hierarchy. This background paper was developed using a range of these sources. Combined with information on the significant seizures of cocaine and heroin that have been recorded in the region, the paper suggests that the trafficking of hard drugs is indeed a pernicious problem provoking or exacerbating existing governance challenges such as corruption across West Africa. An open acknowledgement of the problem by West African leaders and political actors (whether in office or in the opposition) is urgently needed in order to bolster on-going efforts to tackle drug trafficking. The paper focuses principally on hard drugs such as cocaine and heroin which are produced in other regions and which are trans-shipped through West Africa to Europe and North America, particularly the US. It, therefore, does not discuss marijuana or cannabis - which is widely cultivated, used, and trafficked in West Africa, and is in effect traditional to the region - in the category of illicit drugs that could lead to serious governance and security problems. Neither does it discuss the emerging trend in methamphetamine production and trafficking in the region, although the author recognizes the latter as representing an important emerging challenge, and one that will also have important governance, security and health implications in the coming years. Details: West Africa Commission on Drugs, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: WACD Background Paper No. 5(1): Accessed November 26, 2014 at: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/State-Officials-and-Drug-Trafficking-2013-12-03.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/State-Officials-and-Drug-Trafficking-2013-12-03.pdf Shelf Number: 134257 Keywords: Drug ControlDrug Trafficking (West Africa)Organized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Miklian, Jason Title: Illicit Trading in Nepal: Fueling South Asian Terrorism Summary: A tight-knit network of informal traders is exploiting a vacuum of law enforcement in southern Nepal to generate significant operating capital for the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The traders employ the same money laundering techniques as others in Nepal did a decade before, as the legal loopholes, lack of infrastructure, and widespread corruption that created these opportunities were not addressed. Nepal and India continue to focus on individual criminals in their attempts to shut down the networks, rather than reforming the structural conditions allowing the networks to operate. As a result, the traders operate in an environment conducive for the creation of vast sums of informal wealth with few barriers to operation and at little risk. Short-Term Suggestions 1) Arrest the criminals without destroying the hawala system. Large scale raids are counterproductive, as most overseas workers require hawala to support their families. Reform can be achieved by integrating legitimate hawaldars into the formal banking sector, provided they comply with transparency and recordkeeping guidelines designed to decrease the likelihood that they are unknowingly laundering money. 2) Improve Indo-Nepal bilateral relations through border security. India and Nepal should jointly consider how border security policy can be more than a zero-sum game. Mutual cooperation on border security strategy benefits both bilateral relations and internal stability. Frameworks whereby either country could propose a joint operation on an ad hoc basis, keeping authority clearly under control of the host country, can build trust without encroaching upon sovereignty. Further, the link between corruption and national security needs to be recognized and problematized. 3) International actors can contribute to Nepal's security at border points by providing logistical support, providing equipment and securing directed funding to modernize and bolster existing checkpoints. The United Nations should maximize Nepal's request for increased border security assistance. Countries hosting direct flights to/from Kathmandu should increase scrutiny of incoming passengers for illicit materials. Long-Term Suggestions 1) Roll back the growing culture of corruption. Nepal's culture of corruption is pervasive at the individual, local, regional, and national levels. Practical measures can reduce demand, but punitive approaches may backfire in a society where the judicial system is itself corrupt. Nepal has steadily deteriorated in both real and comparative terms regarding corruption indicators, but leadership-by-example can be a powerful attitudinal tool for change, and need not involve massive bureaucratic undertakings. 2) Comprehensive banking sector reform would include a trident of reforms to prevent graft, institutionalize checks and balances for day-to-day operations, and increase the availability of services in areas currently underrepresented. However, opening more bank branches catering to microcredit needs can be counterproductive. Indian efforts to push more money flows through the formal sector could also be adopted by other countries. 3) Create and enforce anti-corruption and pro-transparency laws. The challenge of prosecuting transgressors is immense, as suspects are put into the hands of a poorly-paid, corrupt judicial system that lacks legal precedent and impartiality for its most difficult cases. Solutions must also incorporate Nepal's youth population as stakeholders, emphasizing rule of law over militancy, informal trade and corruption. 4) International donors should continue to tie funding to the implementation of banking, money laundering and counter-terrorism measures that raise Nepal's laws and oversight to international standards. Although conditionalities are unpleasant, they have a proven track record in Nepal of forcing needed legislation on the agenda in Kathmandu. Details: Oslo: International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), 2009. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: PRIO South Asia Briefing Paper #3: Accessed January 28, 2015 at: http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/Illicit%20Trading%20in%20Nepal%20(South%20Asia%20Briefing%20Paper%203).pdf Year: 2009 Country: Nepal URL: http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/Illicit%20Trading%20in%20Nepal%20(South%20Asia%20Briefing%20Paper%203).pdf Shelf Number: 134446 Keywords: Black MarketsIllegal Trade (Nepal)Illicit TradePolitical CorruptionTerrorist Financinc |
Author: Zechmeister, Elizabeth J., ed. Title: The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas, 2014: Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer Summary: he 2014 Americas Barometer data and the corresponding regional report mark an important milestone for the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP): we are now able to assess over a decade of values, assessments, and experience as that have been reported to us though first-hand accounts by citizens across the region. The Americas Barometer surveys, spanning from 2004 to 2014, allow us to capture both change and continuity in the region on indicators that are vital to the quality and health of democracy across the Americas. In looking back over the decade, one trend is clear: citizens of the Americas are more concerned today about issues of crime and violence than they were a decade ago. We take this fact as a cornerstone for this report, and devote the first three chapters to an assessment of citizens - experiences with, evaluations of, and reactions to issues of crime and insecurity. We then proceed in the subsequent four chapters to address topics that are considered "core" to the Americas Barometer project: citizens - assessments of the economy and corruption; their interactions with and evaluations of local government; and, their democratic support and attitudes. In each of these cases we identify key trends, developments, and sources of variation on these dimensions and examine links between these core issues of crime and insecurity. Thus, the goal of this report is to provide a comparative perspective - across time, countries, and individuals - on issues that are central to democratic governance in the Americas, with a particular focus on how countries, governments, and citizens are faring in the face of the heightened insecurity that characterizes the region. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2014. 325p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 9, 2015 at: http://seguridadcondemocracia.org/administrador_de_carpetas/biblioteca_virtual/pdf/AB2014_Comparative_Report_English_V3_revised_120514_W.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Latin America URL: http://seguridadcondemocracia.org/administrador_de_carpetas/biblioteca_virtual/pdf/AB2014_Comparative_Report_English_V3_revised_120514_W.pdf Shelf Number: 135204 Keywords: Economic Conditions and CrimeFear of CrimePolitical CorruptionPublic OpinionSecurityViolence |
Author: Santamaria, Gema Title: Drugs, gangs and vigilantes: how to tackle the new breeds of Mexican armed violence Summary: Since 2007 Mexico has experienced a steady increase in lethal and non-lethal forms of violence, including kidnappings, extortion, extra-judicial killings and forced disappearances. This spiral of violence has been driven by the consolidation and expansion of non-conventional armed actors operating in an institutional and political climate characterised by pervasive levels of corruption, impunity and criminal collusion. Public indignation over this state of affairs reached a high after the disappearance of 43 trainee teachers in the town of Iguala in September 2014. This report analyses the objectives, structures and impact of non-conventional armed actors in Mexico, focusing on drug-trafficking organisations, street gangs and so-called self-defence forces. It examines the pitfalls and lessons learned from the country's past and present security strategies, and lays out the basis for an alternative approach to understanding and tackling non-conventional armed violence. Based on a careful analysis of the dynamic and hybrid character of these groups, the report argues for an approach that prioritises the fight against corruption and the protection of embattled communities through localised prevention, geographic sequencing and knowledge-based policing. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2014. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 2, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Santamar%C3%ADa_NOREF_Drugs%2C_gangs_and_vigilantes_December%202014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Santamar%C3%ADa_NOREF_Drugs%2C_gangs_and_vigilantes_December%202014.pdf Shelf Number: 135843 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHomicidesKidnappingOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: New York State. Commission to Investigate Public Corruption Title: Commission to Investigate Public Corruption: Preliminary Report Summary: By Executive Order issued on July 2, 2013, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo established this Commission to investigate public corruption in the State of New York. Governor Cuomo appointed twenty-five Commissioners and three Special Advisors from across our State, including three co-chairs: Onondaga County District Attorney William Fitzpatrick, Nassau County District Attorney Kathleen Rice, and attorney Milton Williams, Jr. of New York City. To strengthen and expand the Commission's investigatory authority, the Commissioners and senior investigative attorneys were, in accordance with the terms of the Executive Order, deputized by Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman and thereby invested with broad powers to issue subpoenas and compel testimony. Through his Executive Order, the Governor tasked this Commission with investigating the management and affairs of our State Board of Elections; the effectiveness of our campaign finance laws; the weaknesses in our laws relating to lobbying, conflicts of interest, and public ethics; the use of tax-exempt organizations to influence public policy and elections; and the strength and effectiveness of our criminal laws with respect to public corruption and abuses of the public trust. These investigations are guided by the Executive Order's twin propositions that "abuse of office by public officials and misconduct while in office, criminal or otherwise, undermines the trust of the People and diminishes the ability of government to function," and that "the laws, regulations, and procedures involving our electoral process, including the nomination of candidates, and the financing of campaigns and elections, must further the public trust and promote democracy and the accountability of elected officials to the voters and the selection of ethical public servants." The Commission's investigations and fact-finding to date have yielded more than enough information to warrant sounding the alarm for immediate legislative action to help stem the tide of corruption in the New York. Reform of our dysfunctional electoral and political systems must include: a revamped and strengthened campaign finance system that includes a small-donor matching system of public financing to help reduce the impact of massive donations from wealthy and powerful interests; an independent agency for enforcing election and campaign finance laws; more robust disclosure of election spending by independent groups and of possible conflicts of interest by elected officials; and more effective tools for state prosecutors to uncover and prosecute acts of corruption by public officials. Details: Albany, NY: The Commission, 2013. 101p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 4, 2015 at: http://publiccorruption.moreland.ny.gov/sites/default/files/moreland_report_final.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://publiccorruption.moreland.ny.gov/sites/default/files/moreland_report_final.pdf Shelf Number: 135892 Keywords: Political CorruptionPublic Corruption |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Summary: Between 2002 and 2008, army brigades across Colombia routinely executed civilians. Under pressure from superiors to show "positive" results and boost body counts in their war against guerrillas, soldiers and officers abducted victims or lured them to remote locations under false pretenses - such as with promises of work - killed them, placed weapons on their lifeless bodies, and then reported them as enemy combatants killed in action. Committed on a large scale for more than half a decade, these "false positive" killings constitute one of the worst episodes of mass atrocity in the Western Hemisphere in recent decades. In September 2008, a media scandal over army troops' killings of young men and teenage boys from the Bogota suburb of Soacha helped force the government to take serious measures to stop the crimes, including by dismissing three army generals. Prosecutors are now investigating more than 3,000 alleged false positives by military personnel. Upwards of 800 army members have been convicted for extrajudicial killings committed between 2002 and 2008, most of them low-ranking soldiers. The convictions have covered a handful of former battalion and other tactical unit commanders, but not a single officer who was commanding a brigade or holding a position higher up the chain of command at the time of the crimes. Of the 16 active and retired army generals under investigation, none have been charged. This report provides the most detailed published account to date of criminal investigations into many specific brigades and battalions responsible for large numbers of alleged false positive killings, lays out the now substantial evidence that senior army officers were responsible for many of the killings, and assesses the obstacles that so far have impeded such officers from being held accountable. The report is based on our extensive review of criminal case files, judicial rulings, and data on prosecutors' investigations into false positives; witness testimony, much of it previously unpublished; and our interviews with more than 40 prosecutors, witnesses, victims' family members, and lawyers, among others. Our analysis of the Attorney General's Office's work shows that prosecutors have identified more than 180 battalions and other tactical units, attached to 41 brigades, operating under all of the army's then-seven divisions, which allegedly committed extrajudicial killings between 2002 and 2008. The patterns in these cases strongly suggest that commanders in tactical units and brigades responsible for a significant number of cases at least knew or should have known about the wrongful killings, and therefore may be criminally liable as a matter of command responsibility. This report profiles 11 such brigades and many of the specific tactical units operating under them implicated in the killings. Some of the commanders of those 11 brigades subsequently rose to the top of the military command. For example, Attorney General's Office data shows prosecutors are investigating: - At least 44 alleged extrajudicial killings by 4th Brigade troops during the period retired General Mario Montoya commanded it. He became the armys top commander in 2006-2008; - At least 113 alleged extrajudicial killings by 4th Brigade troops during the period retired General Oscar Gonzalez Pena commanded it. He became the army's top commander in 2008-2010; - At least 28 alleged extrajudicial killings by 4th Brigade troops during the period General Juan Pablo Rodriguez Barragan commanded it. As the current commander of the armed forces, he is now Colombia's top military official, and oversees all three military branches, including the army; and - At least 48 alleged extrajudicial killings by 9th Brigade troops during the period General Jaime Lasprilla Villamizar commanded it. He is now the armys top commander. Human Rights Watch also identified witness testimony and prosecutor files naming three of these, as well as other, generals and colonels who allegedly knew of, or planned, ordered, or otherwise facilitated false positives. Their positions at the time of the crimes included battalion, brigade, and division commanders, as well as one head of the army. Indeed, the apparently widespread and systematic extrajudicial killings by troops attached to virtually all brigades in every single division across Colombia point to the conclusion that the highest levels of the army command at least should have known about the killings, and may have ordered or otherwise actively furthered their commission. Our research also shows that prosecutors pursuing false positive cases confront serious obstacles, ranging from military authorities' lack of cooperation with investigations, to threats and attacks on key witnesses. Furthermore, many cases remain in military courts. This undercuts accountability because military justice system personnel have historically failed to investigate the crimes, and continue to lack independence and credibility. There have also been shortcomings within the Attorney General's Office, including what some prosecutors describe as overwhelming caseloads. Moreover, cases from the same army unit are generally distributed among different prosecutors, which prevents them from conducting the kind of contextualized and systematic investigations necessary to identify high-ranking perpetrators. Attorney General's Office officials said they are in the process of adopting measures to remedy these internal problems. Seven years after the false positives scandal erupted, there is abundant evidence indicating that numerous senior army officers bear responsibility and it is imperative that the government do more to ensure they are held accountable. Important steps include ordering military authorities to cooperate with false positive investigations, assigning sufficient prosecutors to pursue them, protecting witnesses and their families, and making sure that any transitional justice legislation implemented as part of a peace agreement with guerrillas does not hinder accountability for the crimes. Bringing to justice those most responsible for one of the darkest chapters in Colombia's long war will not be easy, but it is entirely within the government's control to do so. Details: New York: HRW, 2015. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/colombia0615_4up.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Colombia URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/colombia0615_4up.pdf Shelf Number: 136001 Keywords: Extrajudicial KillingsHomicidesPolitical Corruption |
Author: Kavanagh, Camino Title: Getting Smart and Scaling Up: Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Governance in Developing Countries Summary: Tackling organized crime is listed as a priority for the UK Government under its National Security Council and Strategic Defense and Security Review. It is, first, a clear domestic threat to the UK, causing economic and social costs of between L20 and L40 billion per year. It also impacts the UK's development assistance as many sources suggest that organized crime has a significantly detrimental impact on governance in many developing countries. In some states, circumstantial evidence suggests deep interdependent links between organized crime, politics, and the public sector, fostering, in some cases, a form of symbiosis between the state and criminal organizations, and in more extreme cases, both deep or transitory links between crime, terror, and militant groups. Despite these disconcerting signs, investment in academic research on the effects of organized crime on governance remains limited. There is a wide range of criminological literature, and some relevant work on the fringes of the governance and conflict field, but few, policy-oriented studies specifically examining the impact of organized crime on governance exist. The World Bank's World Development Report 2011 cited organized crime as one factor linked to post-conflict violence in fragile states and hinted at the role weak institutions and corruption play in this regard, but did not provide any detailed analysis of these links. This report presents an overview of the research team's findings and is divided into four parts: Section I presents the main Policy Summary. Section II presents the main findings and lays out five areas for targeted action as the basis of an 'organized crime-sensitive' programming framework. Section III provides donors with options for assessing when to engage on organized crime-related issues and, depending on the nature of relations between organized crime and political and governance institutions, an analysis framework to help determine what specifically within the five areas of action to focus on. The final section provides concluding remarks and a suggested programming framework, combining elements of sections II and III. Details: New York: New York University, Center on International Cooperation, 2013, 242p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2015 at: http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/kavanagh_crime_developing_countries_report_w_annexes.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/kavanagh_crime_developing_countries_report_w_annexes.pdf Shelf Number: 131146 Keywords: Developing CountriesOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionTerrorism |
Author: Gradel, Thomas J. Title: Patronage, Cronyism and Criminality in Chicago Government Agencies Summary: Chicago's political history has been marked by scandal for 150 years; when the first political machine was created. Since then, machine politics have made it possible for public officials and business people to use public resources for personal gain. Our previous reports have focused on aldermanic corruption and major scandals in Illinois and Cook County. In this report we examine corruption in the city of Chicago government. We study certain public agencies throughout the city and their distinct patterns to better understand these hot spots of corruption. We have relied primarily on a thorough analysis of city newspapers as well as memoirs and books. In this report we focus primarily on the Department of Fleet Management, Fire Department, City Treasurers Office, Chicago Park District, Building and Zoning Department, O'Hare Airport, McCormick Place, and Procurement. However, the patterns of patronage, waste, and corruption are so pervasive as to suggest that corruption exists in most city agencies. As long as Chicago is run by "machine politics," corruption will be a hallmark of city government. The cost is high. In Chicago and Cook County there have been more than 340 convictions of public officials and business people since 1970, including three governors, 31 aldermen, more than 40 city employees in the "Hired Truck" scandal, 21 people in building inspection payoffs, and dozens of park district employees. Many of these lawbreakers have been convicted of multiple crimes. These are only some of the best-known scandals. In the roster of crooked city employees and their business associates at the end of this report we detail them along with their crimes and sentences. These felons and the many people who were also guilty but not caught have cost Chicago, Cook County and Illinois taxpayers an estimated 500 million dollars a year. This report contains three sections. First, a summary of the patterns of abuse present in each agency. Second, a roster naming more than 340 convicted city officials involved in public corruption scandals in city government offices. The report also includes the names of private citizens who were indicted and/or convicted in connection with these public corruption cases. The third section, we recommend specific reforms to end this "culture of corruption" and draft city ordinances to correct some of the worst problems. The main focus of this report covers the period of time from 1989 until the end of the administration of Richard M. Daley in 2011. However, corruption and criminal prosecution of it dates back to the public conviction of aldermen and county commissioners for a crooked contract in 1869 - almost 150 years ago. Throughout the agencies examined in this report, we see patterns of bribery, patronage, contract rigging, conflict of interest, nepotism/family ties, clout, and theft. These problems are not confined to one specific agency but occur in many government offices. Details: Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of Political Science, 2011. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Anti-Corruption Report no. 4: Accessed August 27, 2015 at: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/anticorruptionreport_4.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/anticorruptionreport_4.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Shelf Number: 136602 Keywords: BribesPatronagePolitical Corruption |
Author: Gradel, Thomas J. Title: Corruption in Cook County: Anti-Corruption Report Number 3 Summary: Cook County government has been a dark pool of political corruption for more than 140 years. The first public corruption scandal occurred in 1869 when a number of Cook County Commissioners accepted bribes to approve a fraudulent contract to paint city hall.1 During the last several decades, Cook County has been a center of corruption with scandals emerging in many different units of county government. By chronicling the cases we hope to call attention to the need for meaningful reform. When county government such as Cook County Clerk David Orr's office or Assessor James Houlihan's office do undertake meaningful reform, others sink back into the mire. Public or political corruption occurs when government officials use their public office for private gain or benefit. In Cook County government this includes outright bribes as well as campaign contributions made by individuals or corporations in exchange for jobs, inflated contracts or political favors. It includes ghost payroll jobs in which individuals get a paycheck but do no work. With an annual budget of more than $3 billion-dishonest public servants find many different ways to profit illegally. The purpose of this report is to summarize the many different forms of corruption and to recommend basic reforms that need to be enacted to clean up Cook County government. This report provides a roster of nearly 150 convicted Cook County politicians and government officials along with descriptions of each of their illegal schemes. It includes private citizens and businessmen who were also convicted in connection with public corruption scandals. There are eight individuals named who are under investigation or have been indicted but not yet convicted. Most of the information came through a careful search of newspaper articles and public records since 1970. The actual total of corrupt officials and their cohorts may be greater than the number we have listed. We are still working to document the many other grafters, crooks and cheats who work for the county or receive county contracts. Criminal convictions are just the tip of the iceberg in Cook County. For each corrupt official who is convicted-there may be dozens more who are involved in the same or similar schemes but escape prosecution. The pattern of political corruption in county government is widespread and not confined to a single unit of government. This report documents graft and corruption in the Cook County Board President's office, his Office of Employment and Training, the Highway Department and in the offices of the sheriff, assessor and treasurer as well as the Clerk of the Circuit Court. It details outright theft and bribery, as well as endemic patronage, nepotism, and cronyism. An especially egregious example was Judge Thomas J. Maloney. He was convicted in Operation Gambat of accepting thousands of dollars in bribes to fix felony cases including murder trials. Another outrageous example was Marie D'Amico convicted in Operation Haunted Hall of having three no-work jobs. D'Amico is the daughter of Alderman Tony Laurino and wife of then Deputy Commissioner of Chicago's Department of Streets and Sanitation John D'Amico, who did 2 years in federal prison for his involvement in the ghost payroll scheme. Finally, in addition to systemic corruption, county government is infested with conflicts of interest that often result in contracts being awarded to the friends, family and political cronies of public officials. These are not cases involving outright bribery but in Chicago parlance, they are evidence of the "culture of clout" and result in hiring unqualified candidates and awarding contracts with "theft written between the lines." It is a pattern of pervasive corruption and a culture of deceit that must be changed if county government is to provide honest, transparent, efficient and effective government to taxpayers at a cost we can afford. Details: Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of Political Science and the Better Government Association, 2010. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Anti-Corruption Report no. 3: Accessed August 27, 2015 at: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/anti-corruptionreportnumber3.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/anti-corruptionreportnumber3.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Shelf Number: 136603 Keywords: BribesCorruptionPatronagePolitical Corruption |
Author: Gradel, Thomas J. Title: The Depth of Corruption in Illinois: Anti-Corruption Report Number 2 Summary: Public corruption in Illinois has a long history dating from the first scandal involving Chicago aldermen and Cook County commissioners in the 1860s. At that time they participated in a crooked contract to paint city hall. Today, nearly a century and a half later, crooked contracts still cost the taxpayers millions of dollars a year and crooked politicians still go to jail. As we continue our study of public corruption, we have discovered that our original findings underestimated the level of corruption in recent years. We now know that more than 1500 individuals have been convicted of myriad forms of public corruption since 1970. Based upon the testimony before the Illinois Reform Commission and our own research, we now believe that the cost of corruption, or "corruption tax," for the Chicago and Illinois taxpayer is at least $500 million a year. This is based upon testimony before the commission that about 5% of state government contracts are given out to political cronies and campaign contributors and on our own tallies of the costs of the major scandals over the last four decades. In our last report we provided a detailed analysis of the 30 aldermen and former aldermen convicted of public corruption since 1970. In this report we describe some of the major scandals of the last four decades, a timeline of more than 375 convicted individuals at all levels of government, and a further analysis of some of the costs of corruption which have caused us to revise our estimate of the corruption tax. The details of these scandals and their costs are included in the appendices of this report. Our research on all aspects of corruption is continuing. But we provide this update to support the report of the Illinois Reform Commission and to contribute to the ongoing debate in the state legislature. Only comprehensive reforms can lessen the level of corruption in Chicago and Illinois, currently the capitals of corruption in the United States. Given the high cost of corruption, we cannot hope to adopt a prudent city, county, or state budget without reform. Otherwise we will continue to pay too much for government services; we will keep honest businesses from locating here; and we will slow economic recovery from the current recession. Citizens will continue to distrust government at all levels and consider tax increases unfair. Here are a few examples of some of the costs of corruption in a selection of major scandals. The costs of the Jon Burge police brutality scandal has already reached $33.2 million dollars and counting; the Governor Rod Blagojevich related scandals called "Board Games" have already cost taxpayers $22. million; the Governor George Ryan driver licenses scandals were $4.9 million; the ghost payroll scandals in "Haunted Hall" were $3 million; the "Incubator" bribery cases involving Chicago aldermen have cost more than $239,000; and bribery cases with building inspectors more than $23,000. These costs do not include tens of millions of dollars for investigating, prosecuting, and imprisoning these various public criminals. Since there have been 1500 convictions since 1970 for bribery, tax evasion, lying to the FBI, and obstructing justice, the costs of corruption have been enormous. Curbing public corruption is the first step in reestablishing trust and pride in our government. We support the reforms recommended by Governor Quinn's Illinois Reform Commission Proposals. Any hope of curing the "culture of corruption" or the "Chicago Way" which has prevailed since the 1860s requires a comprehensive program of mutually reinforcing reforms. These must include a mix of corruption prevention and enforcement measures along with public involvement and education. To pass these reforms and to implement them requires the development of a broad coalition of support. In this regard the recent Joyce Foundation public opinion poll shows more than 60% of Illinois residents name corruption as one of their top concerns (even more than the economy or jobs). And the survey reveals that more than 70% favor a number of specific reforms, such as limiting the campaign money that legislative leaders can contribute to other legislative candidates. These findings indicate that there is a greater possibility now - at this moment, as President Obama would say -- to build a broad coalition around a comprehensive reform program than ever before in the past half century. Efforts at reform should occur in all units of government and should move forward quickly while the level of public support, following the impeachment and removal of former Governor Rod Blagojevich, is at such a high level. Details: Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of Political Science, 2009. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Anti-Corruption Report No. 2: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/anti-corruptionreportnumber2.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/anti-corruptionreportnumber2.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Shelf Number: 136604 Keywords: BribesCorruptionPolitical CorruptionTax Evasion |
Author: Litina, Anastasia Title: Corruption and Tax Evasion: Reflections on Greek Tragedy Summary: We provide empirical support and a theoretical explanation for the vicious circle of political corruption and tax evasion in which countries often fall into. We address this issue in the context of a model with two distinct groups of agents: citizens and politicians. Citizens decide the fraction of their income for which they evade taxes. Politicians decide the fraction of the public budget that they peculate. We show that multiple self-fulfilling equilibria with different levels of corruption can emerge based on the existence of strategic complementarities, indicating that "corruption" may corrupt. Furthermore, we find that standard deterrence policies cannot eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria. Instead, policies that impose a strong moral cost on tax evaders and corrupt politicians can lead to a unique equilibrium. Details: Athens: Back of Greece, Economic Analysis and Research Department, 2015. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 193: Accessed August 28, 2015 at: http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/Paper2015193.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Greece URL: http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/Paper2015193.pdf Shelf Number: 136614 Keywords: CorruptionFinancial CrimesPolitical CorruptionTax Evasion |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Curbing Violence in Nigeria (III): Revisiting the Niger Delta Summary: Violence in the Niger Delta may soon increase unless the Nigerian government acts quickly and decisively to address long-simmering grievances. With the costly Presidential Amnesty Program for ex-insurgents due to end in a few months, there are increasingly bitter complaints in the region that chronic poverty and catastrophic oil pollution, which fuelled the earlier rebellion, remain largely unaddressed. Since Goodluck Jonathan, the first president from the Delta, lost re-election in March, some activists have resumed agitation for greater resource control and self-determination, and a number of ex-militant leaders are threatening to resume fighting ("return to the creeks"). While the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East is the paramount security challenge, President Muhammadu Buhari rightly identifies the Delta as a priority. He needs to act firmly but carefully to wind down the amnesty program gradually, revamp development and environmental programs, facilitate passage of the long-stalled Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and improve security and rule of law across the region. The Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, a special body mandated in 2008 to advance solutions to the region's multiple problems, proposed the amnesty program, whose implementation since 2009, coupled with concessions to former militant leaders, brought a semblance of peace and enabled oil production to regain pre-insurgency levels. However, the government has largely failed to carry out other recommendations that addressed the insurgency's root causes, including inadequate infrastructure, environmental pollution, local demands for a bigger share of oil revenues, widespread poverty and youth unemployment. Two agencies established to drive development, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), have floundered. Two others mandated to restore the oil-polluted environment (particularly in Ogoni Land) and curb or manage hundreds of oil spills yearly, the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP) and the National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), have been largely ineffective. The PIB, intended to improve oil and gas industry governance and possibly also create special funds for communities in petroleum-producing areas, has been stuck in the National Assembly (federal parliament) since 2009. In sum, seven years after the technical committee's report, the conditions that sparked the insurgency could easily trigger a new phase of violent conflict. The outcome of the presidential election has also heightened tensions. While most people in the region acknowledge that Jonathan lost, some former militant leaders and groups accept Buhari only conditionally. For instance, the Niger Delta People's Salvation Front (NDPSF), the civil successor to the militant Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), claims Jonathan's ouster was the product of a conspiracy by northerners and the Yoruba from the South West against the Delta peoples and the South East. Apparently influenced by that view, some groups are resuming old demands, hardly heard during the Jonathan presidency, for regional autonomy or "self-determination". Local tensions generated by the polls also pose risks, particularly in Rivers state, where Governor Nyesom Wike (of ex-President Jonathan's People's Democratic Party, PDP) and ex-Governor Rotimi Amaechi (of President Buhari's All Progressives Congress, APC) are bitter foes. With many guns in unauthorised hands, politically motivated assassinations and kidnappings for ransom, already common, could increase. Policy and institutional changes are necessary but, if not prepared and implemented inclusively and transparently, could themselves trigger conflict. Buhari has declared that the amnesty program, which costs over $500 million per year, is due to end in December. He has terminated petroleum pipeline protection contracts that Jonathan awarded to companies owned by ex-militant leaders and the Yoruba ethnic militia, O'odua People's Congress (OPC), and may streamline the Delta's inefficient development-intervention agencies. He may also withdraw the PIB from parliament for revision. Some of this is desirable, even inevitable, but a number of former militant leaders and other entrenched interests threaten resistance and a possible return to violence. A perception that the government's actions are reversing the Delta's gains could aggravate local grievances and precipitate armed violence. At its peak in 2009, the insurgency in the Niger Delta was claiming an estimated 1,000 lives a year, had cut Nigeria's oil output by over 50 per cent and was costing the government close to four billion naira (nearly $19 million) per day in counter-insurgency operations. A resurgence of violence and increased oil-related crime in the Delta could seriously undermine national security and economic stability, which is already weighed down by the Boko Haram insurgency and dwindling oil revenues. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 231: Accessed September 30, 2015 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/231-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-iii-re-visiting-the-niger-delta.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/231-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-iii-re-visiting-the-niger-delta.pdf Shelf Number: 136897 Keywords: Boko HaramHuman Rights Oil IndustryPolitical Corruption PollutioniViolence Violent Crimes |
Author: Marshall, Andrew Title: What's Yours Is Mine: New Actors and New Approaches to Asset Recovery in Global Corruption Cases Summary: This study is about recovering money stolen by corrupt politicians and officials. Asset recovery is a key element in deterring and punishing the corrupt, and the reduction of corruption is critical to development. The money can be put to better uses once recovered, and it amounts to billions. But there's another reason why this is significant for those who are primarily focused on development: among the key issues in asset recovery are greater accountability and transparency, which are also increasingly regarded as key to long-term development success. The main argument of this study is that corruption investigations and asset recovery are being tackled in new ways by new actors from the private sector, civil society, and media, and that this can help improve the prospects for justice. It would be too much to call this a revolution: it's an evolutionary process. It needs long-term support if it is to prosper as a policy choice, and it raises some issues for policymakers and those who carry out the recoveries. But if the agenda for accountability is to advance at the same pace as transparency, the prosecution of the corrupt and the return of the money they stole is critical. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2013. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: CGD Policy Paper 018: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/whats-yours-is-mine_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/whats-yours-is-mine_0.pdf Shelf Number: 137702 Keywords: Asset ForfeiturePolitical CorruptionProceeds of Crime |
Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: The new criminal powers: The spread of illicit links to politics across the world and how it can be tackled Summary: Treating organized crime and corruption as a 'cancer' or a 'virus' has become shorthand in international policy circles. It is used as a diagnosis to explain how countries as diverse as Mali, Ukraine or Mexico have fallen under the influence of criminal rackets that exercise control over certain state bodies, politicians, judges, police forces or territory. However, in this web report it is argued that an approach rooted in the notion of institutional capture by an external criminal force is - despite its persuasive rhetoric - gravely mistaken. For various reasons, illicit activity has become part of the living organism of many countries' public and business affairs. It must be treated not as a foreign body, but as an integral part of governance and economic systems. It is therefore essential that policy responses are adapted to this reality. Organized crime has undergone fundamental changes in size and shape over the past two to three decades. The authors seek to explain how these changes in criminal patterns and effects have occurred, and what might be done to respond to them in a way that would emphasize the protection of democracy, good governance and human welfare. Details: The Hague: Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations), 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/new-criminal-powers Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/new-criminal-powers Shelf Number: 137706 Keywords: Organized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Sundstrom, Aksel Title: Violence and the Costs of Honesty: Rethinking bureaucrats' choice to take bribes Summary: Explanations for bureaucrats' decisions to take bribes have evolved from accounts of incentives to focusing on expectations of others' behavior. However, there are plausibly more considerations when making such choices in contexts of widespread violence, where refusal to take bribes may be associated with high costs. Yet, current insight into this topic is limited. This article investigates how violence upholds bribery through interviews with South African officials that enforce resource regulations in communities where gangs run poaching operations. The findings suggest that while citizens commonly give bribes to enable rule violations, this is a process of both temptations and threats: officials that do not take bribes face violent intimidations by citizens and corrupt col-leagues. Through reducing direct costs in such settings, bribe taking is partly a strategy of social protection. This suggests that, besides incentives and expectations, administrative reforms may benefit from 'fixing the security' of bureaucrats in violent contexts. Details: Goteborg: QOG, The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, 2015. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series 2015:2: Accessed February 5, 2016 at: http://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1515/1515130_2015_2_sundstro--m.pdf Year: 2015 Country: South Africa URL: http://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1515/1515130_2015_2_sundstro--m.pdf Shelf Number: 137772 Keywords: BribesPolitical Corruption |
Author: Banfield, Jessica Title: Tell It Like It Is: The role of civil society in responding to serious and organised crime in West Africa Summary: The challenges posed by serious organised crime (SOC) in west Africa are significant and wide ranging. The spectrum of consequences threatens to reverse democratic and development gains of past decades. Such consequences include worsening development indicators, risk of violent conflict, deteriorating governance contexts and mounting fragility, major public health and safety threats, as well as environmental damage. The expansion of organised crime is a direct function of the political economy of governance in the region and needs to be understood as a structural phenomenon. Serious organised crime in west Africa is likely to be a critical development and security factor for generations to come. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, as well as other major multilateral and bilateral institutions and partners, have established a series of policy frameworks and interventions designed to curtail the pernicious effects of organised crime. However, despite some successes, the region continues to be used as a transit point for trafficking to Europe, regional domestic consumption rates of drugs are rising, and the corrosive effects of organised crime on national governance and security settings is deepening. A brief review of response initiatives immediately conveys that an emphasis on security, as well as strengthened law and order, lies at the heart of the collective policy response. This emphasis assumes that the political and operational will exists across government to run with the anticrime agenda, when evidence conclusively confirms that this is not always the case in practice. Arguments for more strategic and holistic responses highlight how law and order approaches may overlook problems of state legitimacy that exist in many of the affected countries and how political actors may themselves be complicit in aspects of organised crime. Collusion in organized criminality by government officials, traditional authorities, political parties, as well as justice, law and order sector (JLOS) officials, significantly undermines formal efforts to tackle it. Details: London: International Alert, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/CVI_CivilSocietyWestAfrica_EN_2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/CVI_CivilSocietyWestAfrica_EN_2015.pdf Shelf Number: 137997 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Political CorruptionTrafficking in Arms |
Author: Great Britain. National Audit Office Title: Fraud landscape review Summary: The exact scale of fraud within government is unknown but excluding tax credit and benefit fraud, detected fraud in 2014-15 across government was equivalent to only 0.02% ($72.9 million) of total expenditure ($306 billion) according to a report by the National Audit Office. However there is a large disparity between what fraud and error is reported and what other available estimates suggest might be occurring which needs explaining. The UK government detected fraud figure of 0.02% of expenditure is significantly lower than some estimates of 3-5% in the EU and US. While these comparisons need to be treated with caution, it suggests there could be significant fraud and error which is unreported or undetected and losses which are not being adequately addressed. Given current fiscal challenges, reducing the level of fraud is one potential way of making savings while protecting services. Government lacks a clear understanding of the scale of the fraud problem and departments vary in their ability to identify and address fraud risks. The data that does exist is patchy, inconsistent and of variable quality. The most comprehensive data relates to areas of known risk - tax credit and benefit fraud - but information across the rest of government is clearly incomplete. It is difficult to formulate solutions if the scale and nature of the problem is unknown. The Cabinet Office has recently started collecting fraud returns from departments but there are gaps and inconsistencies in the data sets. What the data does indicate though is that departments are reporting less fraud loss than expected given the scale of expenditure and range of activities. Some submitted nil returns despite reporting cases of fraud elsewhere. The Cabinet Office is attempting to improve the quality of fraud information and raise departments' ability to address fraud risks. It is difficult to assess if government action is improving fraud detection or prevention because of the lack of data and absence of measures to evaluate performance. Most central activity to date has focussed on getting departments to recognise the risks and establish governance structures and processes to better identify and address fraud, which is a necessary first step to being able to evaluate success. Among the NAO recommendations are that departments should undertake thorough fraud risk assessments of all new policies/programmes and also improve the quality and completeness of fraud data. Once Cabinet Office is confident about the quality of this data, it should publish an annual report on fraud losses across government to improve transparency and raise awareness of fraud. Details: London: NAO, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: HC 850, Session 2015-16: Accessed March 2, 2016 at: https://www.nao.org.uk/report/fraud-landscape-review/ Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.nao.org.uk/report/fraud-landscape-review/ Shelf Number: 138019 Keywords: Corruption and FraudFraudPolitical Corruption |
Author: Moser, Caroline Title: Urban Poor Perceptions of Violence and Exclusion in Colombia Summary: A society in crisis presents both a challenge and an opportunity. This is certainly the case in the context of Colombia, now in the fifth decade of its bitter civil war. The crisis in which Colombia finds itself today represents an integral challenge to the economy, the institutions, and the values of its society. At the same time, it provides an opportunity for changing structures that no longer work. Although this may vary according to different interests in society, the needs of the most excluded and poorest are often marginalised. Yet, as this study shows, they have very clear perceptions of those structures that they consider important to change The elusive concept of crisis that underpins this study has long been an important concern. The German philosopher Jurgen Habermas for instance, provides a useful taxonomy of systemic crisis comprising a fourfold classification of (a) economic crisis, (b) rationality crisis, (c) legitimation crisis, and (iv) motivation crisis (Habermas 1972). An economic crisis, termed a "realization crisis" by Habermas, may be a recession, an economic depression, or an inflationary phenomena; a rationality crisis, in Habermas's words, is a breakdown of the "rational administrative" practices necessary to maintain the economy in due course. This can be interpreted as the inability of the government in a crisis situation, to properly manage and regulate the economic system. A legitimation crisis, in turn, is characterized by a breakdown in the level of public support, credibility, and trust on existing institutions. A motivation crisis is a crisis in the realm of values, traditions, and norms in society. Both economic and rationality crises belong to the economic sphere, legitimation crises are political in essence and motivational crises belong to the sociocultural realm. The boundaries may shift, in turn, depending on the specific nature of a crisis in a country during a given historical period. Thus, a societal crisis is a comprehensive phenomena occurring simultaneously at an economic, political, socio-cultural (value-system) level. It is a systemic, rather than a partial or local, phenomena in which institutions become dysfunctional in terms of their ability to process internal societal conflicts, as both the formal and informal rules that mediate social interaction collapse. Such a breakdown often has far-reaching, mostly negative, effects. At the economic level, the investment climate deteriorates in an environment without well-defined rules (e.g., property rights may not be enforced), with ensuing adverse effects in terms of economic growth and employment creation. Countries in crisis rarely experience economic growth and development is postponed. At the social level conflict erodes trust and social cohesion-the social capital so important in development processes. Another manifestation of crisis is the emergence of violence, a phenomena linked to a breakdown in rules of behavior (see below). High levels of violence and insecurity not only deteriorate the investment climate, but have economic as well as human, social, and political costs which exacerbate the crisis. In a crisis situation, public objectives may start to be replaced by private interests. Accountability and monitoring of the "agent" (e.g. governments or public officials) by "principals" (parliament, judiciary system, the people) weaken substantially. Often the result is corruption, a phenomenon that has received substantial attention in the 1990s, particularly in the development community. Corruption has a demoralizing effect on the public (and on honest officials in the public sector institutions), eroding social creditability in institutions. In Habermas's framework, corruption, and, to an extent, violence, can be understood from several angles. At one level, corruption is a manifestation of a "rationality crisis". In this sense common administrative practices of sound governments weaken to such an extent that conditions prevail for the acquisition of public assets for private benefit. In turn, when corruption reaches significant proportions a legitimation crisis may develop, eroding trust and confidence in government and other public institutions. Finally, if corruption became an ingrained social practice, affecting the norms and values of society, this then contains the typical features of a motivational crisis. Thus Colombia is experiencing a dirty war, economic recession and high levels of corruption, all of which are affected by and in turn affect the current crisis. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 11, 2016 at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15182/multi_page.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2000 Country: Colombia URL: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15182/multi_page.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 138178 Keywords: Political CorruptionPublic Attitudes Public Opinion Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Violence Violent Crime |
Author: Jakobsson, A. Title: From Gold Coast to Coke Coast: Politicians, Militaries and Large-Scale Trafficking of Cocaine in Guinea-Bissau Summary: The tiny West African nation of Guinea-Bissau made the news as the first narco-state in Africa during the mid-2000s. Guinea-Bissau had out-of-the-blue become a key transit point for cocaine out of South America on route to Europe. What's more, high-ranking government and military officials were supposedly deeply complicit in the illicit drug trafficking. This master's thesis applies the state crime theory of Penny Green and Tony Ward in order to explain the emergence of Guinea-Bissau as a predatory state. No previous criminological studies have ever revealed the reasons for these dynamics. In this thesis, I illustrate how weak institutions, corruption, unsustainable economy, porous borders, and a lack of military legitimacy have conspired to facilitate the development of the predatory state in this country. State power has become fundamental to individual gain, as state elements fused with crime. Consequently, I demonstrate that the large-scale trade of cocaine has greatly contributed to the rise of Guinea-Bissau as a predatory state. Details: Stockholm: Stockholm University, Kriminologiska institutionen, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2016 at: http://www.criminology.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.257044.1448011357!/menu/standard/file/2015m_15_Jakobsson_Angelina.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Guinea-Bissau URL: http://www.criminology.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.257044.1448011357!/menu/standard/file/2015m_15_Jakobsson_Angelina.pdf Shelf Number: 138594 Keywords: CocaineDrug TraffickingNarcoticsPolitical Corruption |
Author: Merino, Mauricio Title: Mexico: The Fight against Corruption. (A Review of onging reforms to promote transparency and curtail corruption) Summary: Though neither of the two recent episodes that sparked Mexico's largest public-awareness movement since the beginning of this century were anything out of the ordinary, they marked a tipping point in Mexican politics. First off, the forced disappearance of 43 students in Iguala, Guerrero, on September 26, 2014, caused a wave of protests against human rights violations and impunity. Soon after, leading journalist Carmen Aristegui published a report on First Lady Angelica Rivera's dubious acquisition of the "Casa blanca," a high-end residence in Mexico City. Aristegui pointed out that Grupo Higa, which built the residence for Rivera "according to her specifications," had been awarded several public-works concessions during Enrique Pena Nieto's governorship of the State of Mexico, as well as during his presidency, provoking widespread public discontent toward corruption in Mexico. In less than 45 days, the social discontent that had accumulated over the course of almost 15 years came to the forefront, with collective outrage focusing on two main issues: impunity and corruption. With Ayotzinapa in the backdrop, the disclosure of First Lady Angelica Rivera's tactics to increase her private wealth, coupled with the president and his wife's ambiguous and insufficient public response, which widely circulated in the media, only exacerbated public discontent - finally opening a window of opportunity to make in-depth modifications to Mexico's institutional design and fight corruption at its roots. The ongoing transparency and corruption reforms have been the subject of much public debate. These reforms have built upon academic and social organizations' years of research and dialogue to draft comprehensive, articulate, and coherent public policy on accountability as a way to fight the corruption that has plagued Mexico's public institutions. Corruption hinders institutions from performing as expected, deteriorates trust and social relationships, violates rights, wastes resources, limits economic growth, and stops income distribution. Corruption is the number one cause of inequality, impunity, and exclusion from Mexico's political regime. In this paper, Mauricio Merino discusses Mexico's fight against corruption and reviews the ongoing reforms to promote transparency and curtail corruption. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, 2015. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2016 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mexico_the_fight_against_corruption.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mexico_the_fight_against_corruption.pdf Shelf Number: 138800 Keywords: Human Rights AbusesPolitical Corruption |
Author: Global Witness Title: War in the Treasury of the People: Afghanistan, Lapis Lazuli and the battle for mineral wealth Summary: new investigation today reveals how Afghanistan's 6,500 year old lapis mines are driving corruption, conflict and extremism in the country. Global Witness has found that the Taliban and other armed groups are earning up to 20 million dollars per year from Afghanistan's lapis mines, the world's main source of the brilliant blue lapis lazuli stone, which is used in jewellery around the world. As a result, the Afghan lapis lazuli stone should now be classified as a conflict mineral. The lapis mines are in the Badakhshan region, once one of the more stable areas in Afghanistan, even at the height of Taliban control. However, violent competition for control of the lucrative mines and their revenue, between local strong men, local MPs and the Taliban has deeply destabilised the province and made it one of the hotbeds of the insurgency. With the Taliban on the outskirts of the mines themselves, as well as controlling key roads into the mining areas, there is now a real risk that the mines could fall into their hands. Global Witness' investigation also includes evidence that the Badakhshan mines are a strategic priority for the so-called Islamic State. Unless the Afghan government acts rapidly to regain control, the battle for the lapis mines is set to intensify and further destabilise the country, as well as fund extremism. The lapis mines in Afghanistan's Badakhshan region are a microcosm of a problem that is replicated across the country, where mining is the Taliban's second biggest source of income. Money from Afghanistan's mines should be an important source of wealth to fund essential services, including security, health and education. Afghanistan sits on over a trillion dollars' worth of mineral, oil and gas deposits, which could provide the government with over $2 billion in revenue a year, if developed properly. But rampant corruption and a failure to secure mining sites means that mines have been targeted by insurgent groups and are now a major contributor to conflict and extremism. The new Afghan mining law, which is currently being amended by the government, fails to include the actions needed to counter this threat, the report warns. Details: London: Global Witness, 2016. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2016 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en-gb/campaigns/afghanistan/war-treasury-people-afghanistan-lapis-lazuli-and-battle-mineral-wealth/ Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://www.globalwitness.org/en-gb/campaigns/afghanistan/war-treasury-people-afghanistan-lapis-lazuli-and-battle-mineral-wealth/ Shelf Number: 139368 Keywords: Conflict MineralsPolitical CorruptionPrecious MineralsTalibanTerrorist Financing |
Author: Baba, Yahaya Tanko Title: Political Parties and Violence in Nigeria: The Case of Sokoto State (2007-2013) Summary: In this article I examine how political parties in Sokoto state, Nigeria, used violence in electoral processes from 2007 to 2013. Using Tilly and Tarrow's concept of contentious politics, the concept of neo-patrimonialism and Schlichte's model of armed groups, I find that violence mostly assumed the form of clashes between rival party youths. While party elites manipulate youths, religious and traditional institutions are also dragged into partisan politics by the elites. However, I also find that as a result of changes in party platforms, intraparty conflicts instigated large-scale interparty violence. In conclusion it can be said that party elites make use of violence as a tool for mobilization either to wrestle power from the governing party or to defend the status quo. Details: Bielefeld, Germany: Universitat Bielefeld, 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Violence Research and Development Project - Papers - No. 10: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/docs/baba.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/docs/baba.pdf Shelf Number: 139376 Keywords: Political CorruptionPolitical ViolenceViolence |
Author: Gamba, Astrid Title: Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law Summary: When Legislators award amnesties to 'low-rank' criminals cooperating with the justice, top criminals may capture public officials to avoid being sanctioned. Optimal policies should anticipate this danger and fight it back by granting amnesties not only to low-rank criminals, but also to officials who plea guilty and report bribe givers. Even if the threat of being betrayed by their fellows may induce top-criminals to bribe prosecutors, these policies increase the conviction risk not only for top-criminals but also for low-rank ones, whereby increasing the risk premium that they require to participate in the crime. This domino effect can deter crime more than a policy based only on amnesties to low-rank criminals would: the bright side of subversion of law. Details: Milan: Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milan Bicocca, 2016. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper No. 326 : Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2776762 Year: 2016 Country: Italy URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2776762 Shelf Number: 139393 Keywords: Organized Crime Political Corruption |
Author: Musilli, Pietro Title: The Lawless Roads: An Overview of Turbulence Across the Sahel Summary: The political, economic and social crises that stretch across Africa's Sahel region are connected via trade routes that were established centuries ago. The Sahel is now the main area of conflict and desperate poverty on the continent, but with implications for countries thousands of miles away. For example, the conflict in Mali is undermining stability in oil- and gas-rich Nigeria and Algeria, respectively. The lack of jobs, education and health services is drawing more young people into a criminal-political economy. The links between drug lords and kidnappers, on the one hand, and opportunistic politicians and jihadists, on the other, mean that the proceeds of crime have become an important political resource. Civic leaders and independent activists in Mali say political dialogue and widely agreed reforms are necessary if this worsening social breakdown is to be stopped. They warn that attempts by the political class in Bamako, encouraged by Western governments, to organise a quick-fix election could reverse some of the tentative progress in recent months and prolong the conflict. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), 2013. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e2cc78a2ce149944b9a35b4ce42759b9.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mali URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e2cc78a2ce149944b9a35b4ce42759b9.pdf Shelf Number: 139819 Keywords: Drug TraffickingJihadKidnappingsPolitical CorruptionPoverty |
Author: Avis, Eric Title: Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians Summary: Political corruption is considered a major impediment to economic development, and yet it remains pervasive throughout the world. This paper examines the extent to which government audits of public resources can reduce corruption by enhancing political and judiciary accountability. We do so in the context of Brazil's anti-corruption program, which randomly audits municipalities for their use of federal funds. We find that being audited in the past reduces future corruption by 8 percent, while also increasing the likelihood of experiencing a subsequent legal action by 20 percent. We interpret these reduced-form findings through a political agency model, which we structurally estimate. Based on our estimated model, the reduction in corruption comes mostly from the audits increasing the perceived threat of the non-electoral costs of engaging in corruption. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper 22443: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22443.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22443.pdf Shelf Number: 139820 Keywords: Economic CrimesFinancial crimesPolitical Corruption |
Author: Maehler, Annegret Title: Oil in Venezuela: Triggering Violence on Ensuring Stability? A Context-Sensitive Analysis of the Ambivalent Impact of Resource Abundance Summary: This paper studies the causal factors that make the oil-state Venezuela, which is generally characterized by a low level of violence, an outlier among the oil countries as a whole. It applies a newly elaborated "context approach" that systematically considers domestic and international contextual factors. To test the results of the systematic analysis, two periods with a moderate increase in internal violence in Venezuela are subsequently analyzed, in the second part of the paper, from a comparative-historical perspective. The findings demonstrate that oil, in interaction with fluctuating non-resource-specific contextual conditions, has had ambiguous effects: On the one hand, oil has explicitly served as a conflict-reducing and partly democracy-promoting factor, principally through large-scale socioeconomic redistribution, widespread clientelistic structures, and corruption. On the other hand, oil has triggered violence - primarily through socioeconomic causal mechanisms (central keywords: decline of oil abundance and resource management) and secondarily through the long-term degradation of political institutions. While clientelism and corruption initially had a stabilizing effect, in the long run they exacerbated the delegitimization of the traditional political elite. Another crucial finding is that the impact and relative importance of oil with respect to the increase in violence seems to vary significantly depending on the specific subtype of violence. Details: Hamburg, Germany: German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2009. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: GIGA Working Paper, No. 112: Accessed August 30, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1534618 Year: 2009 Country: Venezuela URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1534618 Shelf Number: 140096 Keywords: Natural ResourcesOilPolitical CorruptionSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolence |
Author: Maehler, Annegret Title: Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil-Violence Link in the Niger Delta Summary: This paper studies the oil]violence link in the Niger Delta, systematically taking into consideration domestic and international contextual factors. The case study, which focuses on explaining the increase in violence since the second half of the 1990s, confirms the differentiated interplay of resource]specific and non]resource]specific causal factors. With regard to the key contextual conditions responsible for violence, the results underline the basic relevance of cultural cleavages and political]institutional and socioeconomic weakness that existed even before the beginning of the "oil era." Oil has indirectly boosted the risk of violent conflicts through a further distortion of the national economy. Moreover, the transition to democratic rule in 1999 decisively increased the opportunities for violent struggle, in a twofold manner: firstly, through the easing of political repression and, secondly, through the spread of armed youth groups, which have been fostered by corrupt politicians. These incidents imply that violence in the Niger Delta is increasingly driven by the autonomous dynamics of an economy of violence: the involvement of security forces, politicians and (international) businessmen in illegal oil theft helps to explain the perpetuation of the violent conflicts at a low level of intensity. Details: Hamburg, Germany: German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2010. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: GIGA Working paper No. 120: Accessed August 30, 2016 at: https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp120_maehler.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Nigeria URL: https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp120_maehler.pdf Shelf Number: 140097 Keywords: Natural ResourcesOilOil TheftPolitical CorruptionViolence |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Honduras Elites and Organized Crime Summary: Honduras is currently one of the most violent countries on the planet that is not at war. The violence is carried out by transnational criminal organizations, local drug trafficking groups, gangs and corrupt security forces, among other actors. Violence is the focal point for the international aid organizations, governments and multilaterals providing Honduras with assistance, and it is the central theme of media coverage inside and outside of of the country. There are good reasons for this focus. Violence disproportionately impacts people in poor and marginal areas and tends to remain concentrated in those communities, closing the circle on a vicious cycle that impoverished nations find hard to break. In addition, violence impedes economic development and disrupts lives across a wide socio-economic spectrum. It can lead to major demographic shifts and crises as large populations move to urban areas or try to migrate to other nations. It can undermine governance and democracy, and it can serve as a justification for repression and hardline security policies that divert resources away from much-needed social and economic programs, thus perpetuating the problem. Organized crime plays a role in this violence, but it is more like the gasoline than the engine: it provides an already corrupt system with the fuel it needs to run. That corrupt system is the focus of this study on Honduras. Its most visible manifestation is an inept and criminalized police force that a former security minister once called "air traffic control men" for drug flights coming into the country. Parts of this police force also work as custodians and assassins for criminal groups; rob drugs and resell them to the underworld; and, for a price, they can attack client's rivals and disrupt criminal investigations. But beneath this most obvious form of criminal connection to state officials is a more insidious brand of corruption. This is further from the headlines and much more difficult to tackle since it is embedded in the country's political, economic and social systems. It operates in a gray area, mixing legal and illegal entities, paper companies and campaign contributions, and sweeping its illicit acts under the rug using co-opted members of the justice system and security forces. What we are talking about, of course, is the elite connection to organized crime that this investigation exposes. The elites in Honduras are not like those in the rest of the region. The traditional, agro-export and industrial elites who rule in places like Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua are less prominent in Honduras, mostly because of the country's long history as an enclave economy dominated by multinational companies: the original Banana Republic. Instead, the country's most powerful economic elites have emerged from the service, banking, media, and telecommunications sectors. They are called transnational elites since many of them are first or second generation immigrants from the Middle East and Eastern Europe and depend on international business dealings to accumulate capital. Traditional, land-based elites are present in Honduras. But they have long been relegated to a second tier, forced to seek power through control of government posts, rather than using financial leverage. While the ruling elites in Honduras do not share the same origins or economic base as their counterparts elsewhere in the region, they do share their neighbors' penchant for employing the state for their own ends and systematically impoverishing it. Both the traditional and transnational elites have for years used the military and police to protect their personal land holdings and businesses. They have benefitted from the sale of public companies and lands, and they have enjoyed tax exonerations for their multitude of businesses. They have also pillaged its resources, and, as the government's importance to the economy has grown, relied on it to generate more capital. Their dependence on the state has opened the way for a third set of what we are calling bureaucratic elites, who have developed a power base of their own because of the government positions they occupy. Honduras, meanwhile, has become one of the poorest, most unequal and indebted countries in the world. Any attempts to change this system have been met with stern and often unified opposition from elites of all stripes. And attempts to exert more regulatory control over the activities of the elites are smothered before they begin. It is little surprise then that the country offers criminals, large and small, one of the most propitious environments from which to work. On one side, an ineffective justice system and corrupt security forces, long exploited by these elites, opens the way for large criminal groups to operate with impunity. On the other side, an impoverished populace - which sees and understands exactly how elites abuse a broken system - seeks to get its share by working directly with criminals in the illegal and legal enterprises these criminals operate. Crime, as it turns out, is one of the few forms of social mobility. It is within this gray area that the elites themselves also interact with organized crime. Far from being distant from illegal activities, the elites have long operated in this realm. From dealing in contraband goods and services to buying permission for their illegal dealings and "get-out-of-jail-free cards," those who do politics or business in Honduras understand that the laws governing the nation of eight million people are but a means to make money. Their connection to the underworld therefore is about societal, commercial and political interactions in the multiple spaces where business and politics happen in Honduras. The result is an organic relationship with organized crime that helps some elites reach the top and others stay there. Details: InsightCrime.org, 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 2, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Honduras_Elites_Organized_Crime Year: 2016 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Honduras_Elites_Organized_Crime Shelf Number: 140111 Keywords: Contraband BoodsOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Aulby, Hannah Title: Greasing the Wheels: The systemic weaknesses that allow undue influence by mining companies on government a QLD case study Summary: Between 2010 and 2015 the Liberal Party of Australia and the Queensland Liberal National Party accepted over 2 million dollars in political donations from mining companies seeking approval for six highly controversial mining projects in Queensland. While these companies sought approval and legislative changes primarily from the then Liberal National Party Queensland Government, most of the money donated by these companies went to the Liberal Party of Australia. The Queensland Liberal National Party accepted $308,000 dollars from companies associated with these projects, while the Liberal Party of Australia accepted $1.75 million. Although we know that over $3 million dollars was transferred from the Liberal Party of Australia to the Queensland Liberal National Party over this period, a lack of disclosure and transparency makes it impossible to discern the origin of these donations. At least one of the companies examined in this report made a substantial donation to the highly controversial Free Enterprise Foundation, the opaque Federal Liberal Party fundraising body that came under the scrutiny of the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption ICAC for allegedly concealing the origin of illegal political donations to the New South Wales Liberal Party. These mining projects all gained extraordinary access to government ministers and extraordinary outcomes. These outcomes included legislative changes to remove environmental protections, federal and state government approval of projects despite serious environmental concerns, and even retrospective approval of illegal mining activities. The commendable commitment by the Queensland government to institute real time disclosure of political donations can easily be circumvented if donations are be made to federal political parties who then transfer the money back to the state branches without disclosing the origin on those donations. Political donations are the tip of the iceberg of mining industry influence on our democratic process. As well as political donations, this report documents the influence of the mining industry through cash for access schemes, third party fundraising vehicles, private meetings, lobbyists, gifts and the revolving door between the government, bureaucracy and the mining companies they are responsible for regulating. It also highlights the extraordinary lack of transparency in lobbying, with very few lobbyist in Queensland even covered by the lobbying register. Details: Canberra: Australia Institute, 2016. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 2, 2016 at: http://www.tai.org.au/sites/defualt/files/P266%20Greasing%20the%20Wheels%20160726_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.tai.org.au/sites/defualt/files/P266%20Greasing%20the%20Wheels%20160726_0.pdf Shelf Number: 140125 Keywords: Fraud and CorruptionMining CompaniesNatural ResourcesOffenses Against the EnvironmentPolitical Corruption |
Author: Day, Christopher Title: The Bangui Carousel: How the recycling of political elites reinforces instability and violence in the Central African Republic Summary: The successful February 2016 election of President Faustin Archange Touadera marks a new beginning for the Central African Republic (CAR) and provides hope that the country is now stabilizing after three years of violence and political transition. Touadera has been endorsed by many of his political opponents, and the country remained largely peaceful in the weeks following the elections. But CAR is still a long way from political stability. If policymakers fail to address the structural issues that led to the crisis in CAR, the country is likely to repeat its violent past. Sworn in on March 30, Touadera, a former math teacher and prime minister, faces massive challenges. Armed groups and criminal gangs continue to destabilize the countryside, controlling valuable mining areas and commercial towns where they extort illicit taxes and trade diamonds and gold. More than 2 million people, or half of the country's population, are experiencing hunger; close to 415,000 people remain internally displaced, and 467,000 refugees are only slowly trickling back. Thousands of people have been killed since the March 2013 military coup by the Seleka alliance and the violence that followed. CAR has endured persistent violence and instability for decades. Institutional weakness, poverty, and exclusion do much to explain the country's history of disorder. But by significant measure, it is also the deliberate maintenance of such weakness by a small political elite that is at the root of CAR's endemic kleptocracy, a source of political instability, and a driver of violence in the country. Whether ushered in by coup or popular election, successive governments have proved unable to bring about meaningful change in CAR, in part because of the pattern of appointing many of the same people - often relatives and personal friends - to senior government offices. In sum, successive rulers in CAR have maintained authority largely by centralizing control where possible, and extended personal rule by dispensing patronage in return for political support, in particular by personally appointing to senior posts those who served in previous governments or trusted family members. This system has fostered division between the capital and the countryside, incubated the grievances of armed groups, and above all, created significant incentives to hijack the state through violence. This occurs as groups have competed for control of the state to access resources and privileges, instead of to benefit Central Africans. This elite recycling is a key component of what we present here as the "Bangui Carousel" to reflect the many people who rotate through the country's regimes, time and again. This pattern of elite recycling, which is not per se unique to CAR, is more critical in this country than elsewhere because it is interwoven with a near-complete lack of governance. There are few effective state or local government institutions, making the role and impact of the recycled individual leaders that much more potent. Unfortunately, it has been the complete dismantling of institutional checks and balances, the weakening of political parties and civil society organizations, and the use of violence to suppress opposition that have been the hallmark of many of these leaders. This combination of elite recycling on top of a governmental and civic system with little to no capacity and that often reinforces its hold on power through violence defines the Bangui Carousel. It is at the heart of what passes for Central African governance. The recycling and maintenance of a small group of elites - regardless of leadership at the top - combined with the absence of effective state institutions is a fundamental feature of government in CAR. Understanding this matters most to address the structural roots of the country's persistent instability and eventually stop the Bangui Carousel from spinning, so that government can bring about the change the country desperately needs. The recycling of elites is present throughout much of CAR's modern history. To illustrate patterns of elite recycling, the report focuses on appointments to government ministries since early 2013. To gather information and supplement field research, the authors analyzed hundreds of presidential decrees, 15 of which provided information about government reorganizations ordered by former Presidents Francois Bozize, Michel Djotodia, and Catherine Samba-Panza. This was then used to develop an overview of the members in each government and their inter-connections. The report then focuses on some of the individuals who have participated in or benefited from the Bangui Carousel. Those in the report were selected for different reasons: their affiliations with different armed groups, their mere affiliation with past regimes, potential connections to corruption, or their family ties, each of which tends to undermine the possibility of good governance. The analysis has been done with the objective to understand how groups and individuals get access to the Bangui Carousel and how they often benefit from their political appointments at the expense of CAR's citizens or simply forfeit the government's ability to earn the public's trust. Reference to any particular individual in this report does not, in and of itself, mean the individual is responsible for the violence or corruption that typically flows from the Bangui Carousel system. Rather, we highlight these individuals simply to demonstrate how the elite recycling element of the Bangui Carousel has worked. Subsequent reports will examine the governance elements in more detail, as well as the role of foreign powers, such as France and Chad, in perpetuating the system. To disrupt, and eventually, stop the entirety of the Carousel, accountability and effective governance must exist in CAR. And in place of the Carousel, a system of principled governance and greater merit-based criteria for appointments responsive to the needs of ordinary Central Africans must be established. A way forward to accomplish this in part is addressed in a series of recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/bangui-carousel-how-recycling-political-elites-reinforces-instability-and-violence-central-a Year: 2016 Country: Central African Republic URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/bangui-carousel-how-recycling-political-elites-reinforces-instability-and-violence-central-a Shelf Number: 140150 Keywords: Gang ViolenceIllegal TradeMining IndustryPolitical CorruptionViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Guatemala Elites and Organized Crime Summary: Guatemala is Central America's most populous country and its largest economy. But an intransigent elite, an ambitious military and a weak state has opened the way for organized crime to flourish, especially since the return of democracy. During three decades of democratic rule since 1985, the longest such period in Guatemala's history, economic elites have sought to gain hegemonic control. In doing so they have tried to exercise power that is not sustained by military force, but rather by legitimacy and consensus, at least among the diverse group of elites who share power. Historically, there were two prominent power actors: ideologically conservative businessmen and high-ranking military officials from the middle classes who derived their influence by maintaining the army as an institution of social and political control. The political parties distinguished themselves between those that mobilized the social base to gain power and those who opposed them while at a disadvantage and under persecution. In contrast, almost all popular movements were opposed to the power groups, or openly challenged the established political system. Some of these popular movements eventually formed the core of insurgent groups which fought with the state between 1960 and 1996 in a brutal civil war that left more than 200,000 dead and 70,000 disappeared. Throughout, elites have remained central actors in Guatemalan politics, as their economic power is based on their influence within political circles. They employ diverse mechanisms -- formal and informal -- to influence public policy. They can differ in their interests, values and functions, and operate on an unequal plane of power relations, being simultaneously in conflict with and dependent on society. These actors exercise autonomy and can formulate as well as carry out projects at the local and national level. Details: InsightCrime.org, 2016. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Guatemala_Elites_Organized_Crime Year: 2016 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Guatemala_Elites_Organized_Crime Shelf Number: 140351 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug TraffickingHuistasOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Southern Africa Resource Watch Title: Congo's Golden Web: The People, Companies and Countries that Profit from the Illegal Trade in Congolese Gold Summary: In 2011, the Southern Africa Resource Watch (SARW) launched a regional monitoring and research project to assess the physical, social and economic security risks - as well as the socio-economic, humanitarian and commercial conditions - faced by gold mining communities in the provinces of North and South Kivu, Maniema and Orientale in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Two previous reports - From Conflict Gold to Criminal Gold (2012) and The High Cost of Congo's Gold (2013) - included detailed research and analysis on the changing nature of the gold industry in eastern Congo and its negative impact on miners, their families and communities. This report completes the ground breaking series by describing all aspects of the commercialization of Congolese gold - including gold that is produced by industrial, semi-industrial and artisanal mining operations, and gold that is traded and refined by small merchants, well-capitalised trading groups and powerful refineries. SARW initiated this research project at a time when Congo's mining environment was improving, propelled by a number of exceptional conditions, including a gold super cycle, which saw prices on world markets rise to over US$1950 per ounce in 2011 and 2012; the establishment of peace in most major gold mining regions in eastern Congo; and the restructuring of government agencies mandated to support gold mining and trading. However, in April 2013, while this report was being drafted, the gold price declined precipitously, eroding profit margins for all gold mining activities and disrupting the global gold production industry. The challenge faced by the DRC government to maximize benefits from the nation's gold resources has now become harder. Nevertheless, progress is visible with the inauguration of industrial gold production at Banro's Twangiza mine and at the Kibali project managed by Randgold Resources. Despite these positive developments, international investors in gold projects in Congo remain cautious due to its problematic political risk profile. This SARW report highlights issues that are most detrimental to the Congo's reputation and to the ability of the Congolese to benefit from their significant gold endowments, including: Widespread corruption at all levels of the Congolese government, which is a major enabler of activities that are either outrightly criminal or in violation of existing regulations governing industrial, small scale and artisanal gold extraction and trade; The illegal trade and exportation of gold, which accounts for most of the gold extracted by Congo's hundreds of semi industrial and hundred of thousands of artisanal miners - with traders not paying the appropriate fees and taxes, exporting gold without the required certification and payment of export duties, or only paying duties on a small portion of their total turn over by significantly underreporting the true scale of their gold trading; Routine contravention of their licences by semi industrial and industrial permit holders, which delay significant investments that they are contractually obliged to make so as to boost their stock market performance by inflating their gold reserve portfolio, which can be divested whenever the need arises; Aiding and abetting the smuggling and illegal trading of Congo's gold by neighbouring countries, specifically Burundi and Uganda, which continue to pretend that their actions have no impact on DRC's illegal gold trade, while their economies benefit; and The inadequacy of existing international and multilateral instruments, including UN sanctions, ICGLR protocols, OECD guidelines and other multi stakeholder initiatives, which have failed to encourage the necessary international collabouration to stop the criminal networks that are trading Congo's gold. Even where compelling evidence exists that trading and refining companies are implicated in the illegal trade of Congo's gold, no meaningful interventions or investigations occur - a grievous betrayal of various states' commitments under current UN sanctions and other international treaties. Details: Rosebank, South Africa: Southern Africa Resource Watch, 2014. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2016 at: http://www.sarwatch.org/sites/sarwatch.org/files/Publications_docs/congogold3web.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: http://www.sarwatch.org/sites/sarwatch.org/files/Publications_docs/congogold3web.pdf Shelf Number: 140359 Keywords: Gold MiningIllegal TradeIllicit TradeNatural ResourcesPolitical Corruption |
Author: Southern Africa Resource Watch Title: Conflict Gold to Criminal Gold: The New Face of Artisanal Gold mining in Congo Summary: Gold miners in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) no longer fear homicidal warlords and militias but they are still being ruthlessly exploited - by a plague of corrupt government officials, bureaucrats and security personnel, who all demand illegal taxes, fees and levies from the miners without delivering any meaningful services in return, according to a major research report released today. Produced by the Southern Africa Resource Watch (SARW), the report - Conflict Gold to Criminal Gold: The new face of artisanal gold mining in Congo - highlights the poor governance of the mining sector, which could be the driving force behind genuine socio-economic development in the region, and the daily battle for survival by thousands of artisanal and small scale gold miners, who produce nearly all of eastern DRC's gold. Details: Rosebank, South Africa: Southern Africa Resource Watch, 2012. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2016 at: http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/from_conflict_gold_to_criminal_gold.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/from_conflict_gold_to_criminal_gold.pdf Shelf Number: 140360 Keywords: Conflict MineralsGold MiningPolitical Corruption |
Author: Jashari, Dalina Title: Challenges of Local Government Units in the Fight Against Corruption: An Assessment of the Anti-Corruption System in 20 Municipalities of Albania Summary: This Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) report assesses the current capacities and preparedness of local-government units (LGUs) in the fight against corruption and identification of current capacities and knowledge of CSOs as regards their contribution to good governance at local level. The first section provides an overview of the country's legal framework, which sets the vision and regulates the fight against corruption at local level. Two other sections of this report provide an outline of the availability of instruments established by 20 targeted municipalities to fight corruption and increase/enable citizens' participation in decision-making. In addition, in terms of human and management resources, these sections assess the needs of both LGUs and local CSOs to improve their efforts to combat corruption at the local level. The report was published in the framework of the "CIVILISC Civil Society Instruments against Corruption" Project, which aims to empower and develop capacities of civil society in small/medium municipalities to promote good governance and fight corruption. This assessment concludes the first phase of the project and contributes to its subsequent capacity development phase as it lays the foundations for designing the relevant, evidence-based and effective CSO capacity development. The data and information obtained in the assessment will also set the baseline for future continuous monitoring and evaluation of anti-corruption efforts undertaken by the LGUs. Details: Tirana, Albania: Institute for Democracy and Mediation, 2016. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2016 at: http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/LGU-Anticorruption-English.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Albania URL: http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/LGU-Anticorruption-English.pdf Shelf Number: 140363 Keywords: CorruptionPolitical Corruption |
Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: Illicit Networks and Politics in Latin America Summary: Organized criminal networks are global phenomena that distort local and global economic markets, bring violence and blur the role of the state in providing basic services, all in the interest of increasing their wealth. The main weapon used by such networks is corruption - of politicians and of many of the state apparatuses in the countries in which they operate. This undermines the basic principles of democracy and puts the state at the mercy of illicit economic interests. This is a global challenge. Latin America has particularly suffered from these issues for a number of reasons. The strong presence of illicit networks dedicated to illegal mining, the trafficking of exotic species, arms trafficking and, in particular, the production and sale of illegal drugs such as cocaine has created a massive inflow of illicit money. Together with the high cost of political activity in the region and difficulties in controlling political contributions, this has allowed organized crime to penetrate the political landscape. However, efforts made in different Latin American countries to confront these networks have seen significant achievements. There is a wealth of positive and negative experience on how these problems can be confronted that will be useful for countries in the same region and on other continents. This book focuses on experiences in Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru. The authors draw on research that illustrates how relationships are forged between criminals and politicians. They identify numerous mechanisms for tackling these relations, and discuss both the achievements and the challenges concerning their practical application. Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) and Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), 2014. 305p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2016 at: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics-in-latin-america/en.cfm Year: 2014 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics-in-latin-america/en.cfm Shelf Number: 140463 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug TraffickingIllegal MiningIllicit NetworksMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionWildlife Trafficking |
Author: Kruijt, Dirk Title: Drugs, Democracy and Security: The impact of organized crime on the political system of Latin America Summary: This study is a comparative analysis about the impacts of organized crime - and specifically drugs related crime - on the Latin American and Caribbean political systems. According to the terms of reference, the focus of the study is on Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia and Bolivia. A first draft of this paper was presented at a conference organized by New York University (NYU), International IDEA, the Open Society Institute (OSI) and NIMD and held in Lima from 8 to 11 February 2011. While travelling and collecting data I added information about additional countries in order to facilitate a more general overview of the problem. During previous missions in 2010 I had also accumulated information about organized crime and drugs in Central America and the Andean countries. The result is that in this study comparative data are presented about the three major Andean coca-producing countries and the most affected Meso-American transition countries (namely, Mexico and the northern triangle of Central America). The seven countries analysed in this study have different profiles with respect to their internal stability; the level of crime related violence; the strength of political institutions, security apparatus and the judiciary; and the national policies with respect to coca cultivation, cocaine production and crime prevention. The effects on the political system, key institutions and political parties also differ by country. Colombia and Mexico are heavily affected by crime-related violence. One characteristic of these two countries is the fact that coca cultivation and cocaine production are strictly illegal and penalised. The prevailing strategy in both countries is a militarised countering strategy, with strong financial and intelligence support from the United States' government agencies. By contrast, Peru and Bolivia are substantially more tolerant with respect to the cocaleros, the generally poor peasants who cultivate coca. These two countries are less affected by crime-related violence. While the level of violence directly associated with coca cultivation and cocaine production is extremely high in Colombia, it is remarkably moderate in Peru, and considerably low in Bolivia. Contrary to the opinion of some participants in the debate about organized crime and the state, there are no failed states in Latin America, though areas exist where effective state control is not in place. Even in Colombia and Mexico the core regions and cities are relatively unaffected by the drug wars and the associated violence. In Central America, and in particular Guatemala, the security forces are on the defensive. In all countries the police are the weakest link in the cluster of institutions involved in countering strategies. In all countries the armed forces appear to be less infiltrated by crime. With the exception of Honduras, the armed forces in Latin American or Caribbean countries do not act as political players with ambitions of participating in the political arena. In Guatemala, the national government decided in the mid-2000s that its security institutions and judicial system were so frail and vulnerable that the country was in need of an international commission, the Comision Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG) to supervise the functioning of these vital institutions. No other government has felt the need to request this sort of international assistance or supervision. I also maintain that theses about 'state capture' by organized crime are not based on strong empirical studies. In this study I make a comparison with the former guerrilla organizations and the counterinsurgency strategies that prevailed in Latin America between the 1960s and the late 1980s. Present countering strategies in the region have some resemblance to the more or less classical counterinsurgency strategy and tactics used during the anti-guerrilla campaigns, which were then generally designed and procured by military dictatorships. There are, of course, also fundamental differences: previously, guerrilla movements were 'politico-military' organizations whose ideologies were explicitly aimed at overthrowing dictatorships and establishing more democratic and socialist governments. The criminal organizations of the present day are 'economic-military' rather than 'politico-military' organizations, aiming not for the overthrow of the state but for an uninterrupted and easily obtained economic surplus. This is to be achieved through violence and corruption - either via the easy way (by corrupting authorities) or the hard way (by guns and gangs). Their strategy is to control territories or commercial corridors which act as leeways for production and trafficking and which guarantee uninterrupted profits. Their final objective is surplus, a 'good life' and their incorporation within elite segments of society and politics. Defining 'state capture' as a final objective tends to obscure the perverse effects of organized crime, including long-term corruption of key institutions of law and order and a semi-permanent state of impunity and immunity with respect to law enforcement. More specifically, we can identify four main effects: 1 Impunity has as a long-lasting effect in the form of the de-legitimisation of national security and the judicial and penitentiary system, an avalanche process in which political parties and social movements are also affected. 2 A second perverse effect is the phenomenon of the widespread infiltration, at the local and regional level, of political parties and political representatives. In Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico and other countries the corruption and intimidation of 'tame' politicians has been ironically dubbed the system of 'para-politica' or 'para-politicos'. 3 A third perverse effect is the deteriorating reputation of local politicians. Populist presidents, from Menem in Argentina to Fujimori in Peru, have used the stereotype of easy-to-corrupt magistrates and politicians to launch themselves as the 'true defenders of the poor' against parliament and the courts. 4 A fourth perverse effect is the confusion between hard-core crime organizations, operating with military-like enforcers or paramilitary organizations, and the 'normal' but much more visible groupings of criminal youth gangs or maras in Central America and several metropolitan areas in Latin America and the Caribbean. In Central America this has resulted in mano dura (zero tolerance) presidential campaigns, aimed not at a solution to organized crime but at the elimination or imprisonment of the highly visible (and tattooed) mara members. It is my conviction that political parties in particular need to be responsible for adequate security agendas. However, in most Latin American and Caribbean countries, politicians are inclined to delegate this all-important agenda to 'experts': that is, former generals and commanders of specialised police task forces. One recommendation I would therefore make is that donor organizations such as NIMD should provide policy research and assist in the design of integral security agendas and related policies, making them accessible to political parties and civil society in general. Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 2011. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: http://nimd.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Drugs_democracy_and_security_english_-_nimd_june_2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Latin America URL: http://nimd.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Drugs_democracy_and_security_english_-_nimd_june_2011.pdf Shelf Number: 140490 Keywords: CocaineDrug-related ViolenceOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Villaveces-Izquierdo, Santiago Title: Illicit Networks and Politics in the Baltic States Summary: One of the biggest threats to democracy today is infiltration of political processes by transnational organized crime. It undermines constitutional frameworks and the rule of law, it violates the integrity of the electoral process, and it corrupts political parties and the very principle of democratic representation. This study explores how the Baltic States are affected by illicit interests. It looks into how illicit networks and political actors forge relations in this region, from illicit financing of political campaigns, to intimidation of voters, establishment of new political parties, joint economic enterprises and money laundering operations. The authors identify policy responses to this phenomenon, highlighting challenges in implementing them and proposing options on how to strengthen these responses. Details: Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 2013. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics/index.cfm Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics/index.cfm Shelf Number: 146117 Keywords: Criminal NetworksIllicit NetworksOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: Protecting Politics: Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Elections Summary: Elections are essential elements of democratic systems. Unfortunately, abuse and manipulation (including voter intimidation, vote buying or ballot stuffing) can distort these processes. However, little attention has been paid to an intrinsic part of this threat: the conditions and opportunities for criminal interference in the electoral process. Most worrying, few scholars have examined the underlying conditions that make elections vulnerable to organized criminal involvement. This report addresses these gaps in knowledge by analysing the vulnerabilities of electoral processes to illicit interference (above all by organized crime). It suggests how national and international authorities might better protect these crucial and coveted elements of the democratic process. Case studies from Georgia, Mali and Mexico illustrate these challenges and provide insights into potential ways to prevent and mitigate the effects of organized crime on elections. Details: Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance; The Hague: Clingendael, 2016. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 14, 2016 at: http://www.idea.int/publications/protecting-politics-organized-crime-elections/index.cfm?css=new2013 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.idea.int/publications/protecting-politics-organized-crime-elections/index.cfm?css=new2013 Shelf Number: 144810 Keywords: ElectionsOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionPolitics |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Boulevard of Broken Dreams: The "Street" and Politics in DR Congo Summary: The Democratic Republic of Congo's Joseph Kabila is dragging his feet on kick-starting the country's constitutionally-mandated presidential elections. By pursuing his own interests, Kabila is running the risk of triggering violent popular anger in the country's urban centers and a heavy-handed response by security forces. This ICG report lays out what should be done to work through the current political impasse. Details: Brussels/Narobi: International Crisis Group, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 8, 2016 at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/57ff4d3a4.html Year: 2016 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: Shelf Number: 146286 Keywords: Political CorruptionProtest MovementsUrban Violence |
Author: Chioda, Laura Title: Stop the Violence in Latin America: A Look at Prevention from Cradle to Adulthood. Overview booklet. Summary: For a long time, the logic seemed unassailable: Crime and violence were historically thought of as symptoms of a country’s early stages of development that could be "cured" with economic growth and reductions in poverty, unemployment, and inequality. More recently, however, our understanding has changed. Studies now show that economic progress does not necessarily bring better security to the streets. Developments in Latin America and the Caribbean exemplify this point. Between 2003 and 2011, average annual regional growth in Latin America and the Caribbean, excluding the global crisis of 2009, reached nearly 5 percent. What’s more, the growth rate among the bottom 40 percent of the population eclipsed that of the same group in every other region of the world. During that same decade, the region experienced unprecedented economic and social progress: extreme poverty was cut by more than half, to 11.5 percent; income inequality dropped more than 7 percent in the Gini index; and, for the first time in history, the region had more people in the middle class than in poverty. Despite all this progress, the region retained its undesirable distinction as the world’s most violent region, with 23.9 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. The rate of homicide actually accelerated during the latter half of the decade. The problem remains staggering and stubbornly persistent. Every 15 minutes, at least four people are victims of homicide in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2013, of the top 50 most violent cities in the world, 42 were in the region. And between 2005 and 2012, the annual growth rate of homicides was more than three times higher than population growth. Not surprisingly, the number of Latin Americans who mention crime as their top concern tripled during those years. Violence makes people withdraw, hide behind closed doors, and avoid public spaces, weakening interpersonal and social ties that bind us as a community. Insecurity is the result of a combination of many factors, from drug trafficking and organized crime, to weak judicial and law enforcement systems that promote impunity, to a lack of opportunities and support for young people who live in deprived communities. Youth bear a disproportionate share of the risk of committing and falling victim to violence, with important repercussions for their life trajectories and society as a whole. The complexity of the issue (and multiplicity of its causes) is one of its defining characteristics and the main reason why there is no magic formula or a single policy that will fix the violence in our region. We will not solve the problem by relying only on greater police action or greater incarceration, or through more education or employment. We must do all this and do it in a deliberate way, based on reliable data and proven approaches, while continuously striving to fill existing knowledge and data gaps to improve policy design. To that end, Stop the Violence in Latin America: A Look at Prevention from Cradle to Adulthood is a significant contribution. This report takes a new and comprehensive look at much of the evidence that now exists in preventing crime and violence. It identifies novel approaches —both in Latin America and elsewhere—that have been shown to reduce antisocial behavior at different stages in life. Effective prevention starts even before birth, the report argues, and, contrary to common perceptions, well-designed policies can also be successful later in life, even with at-risk individuals and offenders. The report emphasizes the importance of a comprehensive approach to tackle violence, and it highlights the benefits and cost-effectiveness of redesigning existing policies through the lens of crime prevention. This will require substantial coordination across ministries, as well as accountable and efficient institutions. While economic and social development do not necessarily lead to a reduction in crime and violence, high levels of crime and violence do take a toll on development. And in that regard, we at the World Bank are fully aware that in order to succeed in our goals to eradicate extreme poverty and boost prosperity, the unrivaled levels of crime and violence in the region need to come to an end. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2017. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25920/210664ov.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Latin America URL: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25920/210664ov.pdf Shelf Number: 144833 Keywords: Crime PreventionDrug TraffickingHomicidesOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation Summary: he crisis that has plagued the Central African Republic (CAR) since December 2012, particularly predation by both authorities and armed groups, has led to the collapse of the state. Under the Seleka, bad governance inherited from former regimes worsened. Its leaders looted state resources and controlled the countrys illicit economic networks. Ending this cycle of predatory rule and moving peacefully to a state that functions and can protect its citizens requires CAR’s international partners to prioritise, alongside security, economic revival and the fight against corruption and illegal trafficking. Only a close partnership between the government, UN and other international actors, with foreign advisers working alongside civil servants in key ministries, can address these challenges. Governance under the short Seleka rule (March-December 2013) was deceptive: the regime proclaimed its positive intentions while, like its predecessors, plundering public funds and abusing power for self-enrichment. Though Seleka fighters were involved in illicit activities even before, once in power the movement asserted control of lucrative trafficking networks (gold, diamond and ivory). Their systematic looting destroyed what was already a phantom state. Retaliation by anti-balaka fighters against Muslims – the majority of traders are Muslim – aggravated the economic collapse. The economy fell apart even before the state; yet the current international intervention spearheaded by the G5 (African Union, UN, European Union, the U.S. and France) focuses for the most part on security. Troops are being mobilised, but if a principal cause of the conflict – entrenched predation – is left unaddressed, the international community will repeat the failures of its past interventions. Protecting citizens is important; but so too is rekindling economic activity and improving financial public management to help build an effective public governance system delivering services for all CAR citizens, both Muslim and Christian. A new UN mission (MINUSCA) will be deployed in September 2014. In addition to its current mandate – protecting civilians, assisting a political transition, supporting humanitarian work and monitoring human rights – it must change the incentive structure for better governance. It should prioritise rebuilding the economy and public institutions and fighting trafficking. The region and relevant multilateral organisations should be involved too. Targeted sanctions against spoilers in and outside CAR should be embedded in a more comprehensive strategy to revive the economy. Some politicians with ties to armed groups or who are eyeing what are for the moment hypothetical presidential elections could resist a tight partnership between the state and international community. But the transitional government's demand for strong international support offers an opportunity to forge such a partnership and adopt the policies essential to both stabilise the country and promote a change of governance. Details: Brussels: International crisis Group, 2014. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 219: Accessed March 8, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-central-african-crisis-from-predation-to-stabilisation.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-central-african-crisis-from-predation-to-stabilisation.pdf Shelf Number: 141376 Keywords: Illegal TradeIllegal TraffickingIllicit NetworksNatural ResourcesPolitical Corruption |
Author: Appleby, Gabrielle Title: A Federal Anti-Corruption Agency for Australia? Summary: Effective institutions to prevent, detect, expose and remedy official corruption are vital at all levels of government. Under Articles 6 and 36 of the UN Convention Against Corruption (2004), governments including Australia's have committed to ensuring they have 'a body or bodies or persons specialised' in combatting corruption, through prevention and enforcement. A crucial question for Australia's national integrity system is what shape these institutions should take at a federal level, moving forward. The question is made natural by Australia's long history of specialist anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) at State level, including the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW ICAC) (1988), Queensland Crime & Corruption Commission (1991), WA Corruption & Crime Commission (1992), Tasmanian Integrity Commission (2010), Victorian Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC, 2012) and SA Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (SA ICAC, 2012). However, the question is also more complex than might first appear. Despite their important achievements, State integrity systems including these agencies are confronting their own problems, including: - Variable and inconsistent legal definitions of official corruption; - Questions over whether ACA's efforts are properly prioritised, proactive and coordinated with other agencies; - Concerns over the action taken to deal properly with individuals who engage in or benefit from corrupt conduct, once exposed; - Debates over whether ACAs have the right powers, sufficient resources and necessary independence from government; and - The adequacy of accountability, oversight and performance assurance Details: Brisbane: Griffith University; Transnational International Australia, 2017. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion paper no.1 - Strengthening Australia’s national integrity system: priorities for reform: Accessed March 23, 2017 at: http://transparency.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Griffith-University-TIA-Discussion-Paper-A-Federal-ICAC-Integrity-of-Purpose-March-2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://transparency.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Griffith-University-TIA-Discussion-Paper-A-Federal-ICAC-Integrity-of-Purpose-March-2017.pdf Shelf Number: 144546 Keywords: Anti-CorruptionCorruptionPolitical Corruption |
Author: Shentov, Ognian Title: Shadow Power: Assessment of Corruption and Hidden Economy in Southeast Europe Summary: The current report, prepared by the Southeast European Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI) – the largest indigenous good governance initiative in SEE – makes an important contribution to the regional approach to anticorruption. It provides a civil society view of the state of corruption and comes in the wake of the 2014 SELDI comprehensive assessment of the various aspects of the legal and institutional anticorruption environments of nine SEE countries. In 2016, SELDI followed up on these assessments with an update of corruption monitoring and a special focus on state capture in the energy sector and the corruption– hidden economy nexus. The report underscores the need for broader political action for reform, which seems blocked or narrowing across the region. Inside pressure for such action has been suffocated by economic necessity and/or ethnic divisions, and the ossification of political and economic establishments. Outside pressure, delivered mostly by the European Union, has been seen as wanting in relation to the size of the problems in the past couple of years due to a succession of internal and external crises. In none of the countries in the region has there been a clear and sustained policy breakthrough in anticorruption, although efforts to deliver technical solutions and to improve the functioning of the law enforcement institutions, mostly with support from the EU, have continued and even intensified in some cases. This has led to further slow decline in administrative corruption levels but at the expense of waning public support for reforms and of declining trust in national and European institutions. SELDI's Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) – its analytical tool for measuring corruption – has identified three trends in the dynamics of corruption in the region: • Since the early 2000s when SELDI started its monitoring the overall levels of corruption in the SEE countries have gone down, and the public has become more demanding of good governance. • Yet, progress has been slow and erratic, and corruption continues to be both a major preoccupation for the general public and a common occurrence in the civil service and senior government. Specifically, in the 2014 – 2016 period corruption pressure – the primary quantitative indicator for the levels of corruption in a country – has relapsed in some countries, but the overall improvement in the region was negligible. • The combination of stubbornly high rates of rent-seeking from corrupt officials and rising expectations for good governance related mostly to EU accession aspirations in SEE have shaped negatively public expectations about potential corruption pressure. More than half of the population of the SELDI countries believe it is likely to have to give a bribe to an official to get things done. This indicates that the restoration of trust in institutions would be much more difficult than the mere reduction in the levels of administrative corruption. As a result, public trust in the feasibility of policy responses to corruption – a critical ally to successful anticorruption reforms – which reflects the share of the population who believe in the anticorruption efforts of their governments has stayed below the 50% threshold in 2016 for all SEE countries but Montenegro and Turkey. This further exacerbates the unwillingness of politicians to engage in anticorruption policies, and shows the need for a broad-based social movement to sustain an anticorruption focus. The overall conclusion from the 2016 round of the SELDI CMS is that the policies which target corrupt behaviour at administrative level and those seeking to change trust in government need to be pursued in concert. If not complemented by strengthened public demand for integrity in government and sustained improvement in economic well-being, stricter enforcement of penal measures cannot have a sustainable effect. Law enforcement would likely be seen either as useless repression when targeting lower government levels alone or as political witch-hunt when intermittently directed at higher levels. Conversely, intensifying awareness-building measures would only fuel cynicism and resignation in the public if it is not accompanied by visible efforts for cracking down on (high-level) rent-seeking officials Details: Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI); Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 24, 2017 at: http://www.clds.rs/newsite/SHADOW_POWER_final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.clds.rs/newsite/SHADOW_POWER_final.pdf Shelf Number: 144577 Keywords: AnticorruptionCorruptionEconomic CrimeFinancial CrimesFraudHidden EconomyPolitical Corruption |
Author: Dudley, Steven Title: Guatemala: The War of Paz y Paz Summary: Since taking over in 2010, Guatemala's Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz has waged a revolution from inside one of the country's most troubled institutions. She has submitted her name for another four-year term that would begin in May, but her enemies are strong and want to return to the status quo. The third of this three-part series looks at the challenges Paz y Paz faces as she applies for another term. Given her record fighting crime, Guatemala's Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz should be an obvious choice to retain her job. In addition to the high profile arrests of organized crime figures and her work improving access to justice for women, rates of impunity have dropped by 23 percent in the past six years, according to the United Nations-led judicial team the Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). The Attorney General's Office, or Ministerio Publico (MP) as its known, is clearing more cases across the board. In 2013, there were 6,188 criminals sentenced, compared to just 2,884 in 2008. Judges have also issued more sentences for femicides every year since new mechanisms were put into place. Both international and inter-institutional cooperation has increased. However, Paz y Paz is considered a long shot to retain her position. She is criticized for not doing enough to fight common crime and corruption. The MP managed only 12 convictions for corruption in 2012, and 149 in 2013. There have also been complaints about her administrative abilities. For instance, she has split prosecutors into those that do strictly investigative work and those who are litigators. The litigators, however, complained to Contrapoder magazine recently that they do not have enough time to prepare for the cases that some say are being shoved haphazardly through the system. Without doubt, the loudest critics come from ex-military and conservative business and political circles, who say she has taken her leftist human rights agenda too far. They say the case against General Efrain Rios Montt -- in which the former military dictator was convicted for genocide before a high court reversed the decision 10 days later -- shows her partisan zeal. The lack of cases against former guerrillas, they add, illustrates her political agenda. Paz y Paz did not help her case for another term when a witness in the Rios Montt trial insisted President Otto Perez Molina was involved in massacres while he was in the military. (Perez Molina vehemently denied the accusations, and Paz y Paz told InSight Crime she and her team were surprised by the testimony.) In addition to former military members, the economic elites, and numerous political forces, there are also powerful business groups trying to stop Paz y Paz. Land tenure issues continue to plague Guatemala, and some mega-industrial and mining projects have stalled because of protests. Paz y Paz is seen as an ally of the protesters, adding these large business interests to the long list of detractors who are working behind the scenes to make sure she does not return as the attorney general. What's more, groups aligned with organized crime figures are maneuvering to ensure Paz y Paz does not get a second term at the MP. Her record illustrates clearly that she knows few bounds, and four more years of her leadership could prove devastating for more than one large criminal network. Perhaps the most notable of Paz y Paz's opponents, and a man who represents several of these special interests, is Gustavo Herrera. Herrera is a man of many faces. He is a businessman and campaign contributor with close ties to the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG), the party that former General Rios Montt founded and nurtured for years. Herrera fits into this story because he is a broker for special interest groups. When his connections, be they in high political office or dodgy businesses, need something from the judicial system, it is Herrera they call. His ability to maneuver in this system has also helped him navigate stormy waters in his own life. Herrera was accused of moving drugs and laundering money in 2004, including by President Perez Molina, when he worked as a security commissioner for that administration. However, no charges were filed against Herrera. Herrera has also faced down accusations of stealing millions from the government's social security agency, the IGSS, getting a court to drop the charges in 2009. Details: s.l.: Insight Crime, 2014. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 24, 2017 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/the-war-for-guatemala-s-courts Year: 2014 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/the-war-for-guatemala-s-courts Shelf Number: 144578 Keywords: Criminal Networks Organized Crime Political Corruption |
Author: Enough Project Title: Sudan's Deep State: How Insiders Violently Privatized Sudan's Wealth, and How to Respond Summary: The report details how President al-Bashir and his ruling National Congress Party have transformed Sudan into a system of violent kleptocracy that has endured for almost three decades. Regime elites, along with their enablers and facilitators, have amassed personal fortunes by looting and corrupting the country's oil, gold, and land resources in particular, along with other natural resource wealth, productive sectors of the economy, state assets, and the governing institutions that had been in place and largely functioned before this regime took power. For nearly three decades, President al-Bashir has maintained his position at the pinnacle of Sudan's political order after seizing power through a military coup in 1989. During his rule, the government of Sudan has perhaps been best known for providing safe haven to Osama bin Laden and other Islamic militants in the 1990s, for committing genocide and mass atrocities against its citizens in Darfur, for the secession of South Sudan in 2011, and for ongoing armed conflict-marked by the regime's aerial bombardment of civilian targets and humanitarian aid blockade-in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Often portrayed as a country wracked by intractable violence and hampered by racial, religious, ethnic and social cleavages, Sudan ranks consistently among the most fragile or failed states. At the same time, Sudan has considerable natural resource wealth and significant economic potential. Political standing and proximity to the country's ruling elites most often determines on which side of the poverty line a Sudanese citizen lives. The idea that Sudan is a classic failed state is not fully accurate. Sudan is a failed state for the millions of displaced people living in IDP camps in Darfur, for those living in conflict areas and cut off from humanitarian assistance in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and for those struggling in marginalized communities in eastern Sudan or in the sprawling informal settlements outside Khartoum. However, Sudan is an incredibly successful state for a small group of ruling elites that have amassed great fortunes by looting the country's resources for personal gain. In that sense, Sudan is more of a hijacked state, working well for a small minority clique but failing by all other measures for the vast majority of the population. To more effectively support peace, human rights, and good governance in Sudan, U.S. policymakers should work with a range of Sudanese and other international partners to construct a new policy approach to counter Sudan's system of violent kleptocracy. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2017. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 3, 2017 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/SudansDeepState_Final_Enough.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Sudan URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/SudansDeepState_Final_Enough.pdf Shelf Number: 145254 Keywords: Illicit Financial FlowsLootingMoney LaunderingPolitical Corruption |
Author: Couch, Neil Title: 'Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse'. Reality or Exaggeration? Summary: More than 55,000 people have been killed in Mexico's vicious drug wars between 2006 and 2011. The Pentagon's Joint Operating Environment Paper 2008 speculated that the country was one of two major states at risk of rapid and sudden collapse. This paper investigates the potential causes of state failure and the extent to which these are present in Mexico today as a result of corruption and violent, lucrative organised crime. It explains the mutual dependency between the two and shows how deeply entrenched and extensive their power and influence have become at all levels of government and in key state institutions. It examines progress in the National Security Strategy and the impact of crime and corruption on key strategic measures of success. It concludes that the Pentagon's failure to understand the nature of the conflict led to a gross overstatement of the risk to the country. It also demonstrates, however, that crime and corruption threaten the transitional democracy that has emerged in Mexico since the turn of the century. Finally, it raises questions regarding the reliability and general applicability of some theories of state failure, state legitimacy and civil-military relations. Details: London: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2012. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Seaford House Paper: Accessed May 17, 2017 at: http://www.da.mod.uk/Publications/category/90/mexico-in-danger-of-rapid-collapse-reality-or-exaggeration-14620 Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.da.mod.uk/Publications/category/90/mexico-in-danger-of-rapid-collapse-reality-or-exaggeration-14620 Shelf Number: 131268 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug WarsDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Afghanistan Affectations: How to Break Political-Criminal Alliances in Contexts of Transition Summary: The case of Afghanistan analyzes how counterinsurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction dynamics have interacted with the generalized predatory criminality in Afghanistan and how the latter became the crux of Afghanistan's dire and fragile predicament. The transition choices by the Afghan government and the international community, particularly the embrace of problematic warlords for the sake of short-term military battlefield advantages and as tools of political cooptation, shaped and reinforced criminality and corruption in post-2001 Afghanistan and thus delegitimized the post-Taliban political dispensation. The analysis identifies four possible inflection points where the international community and the Afghan government could have fundamentally altered the course after the initial choices of the informal distribution of power and its connections to criminality were made in 2001. These four possible inflection points provided opportunities for tackling corruption and criminality in order to limit power abuse and strengthen the rule of law and political inclusiveness-namely: (1) the 2004 disarmament effort; (2) the beginning of the Obama administration and its surge of resources in Afghanistan; (3) the 2014 formation of the NUG whose two protagonists crucially campaigned on an anti-corruption platform; and (4) the 2015 missed opportunity to react resolutely to the Taliban's takeover of Kunduz City. But the international community and the Afghan government failed to take advantage of these possible inflection points. Or to the extent that they tried, such as during the first two years of the Obama administration, other strategic directives, timelines, and imperatives interfered with them and directly contradicted them. Thus, the anti-corruption and anti-criminality efforts were not underpinned by political heft and power, such as cutting off aid to or otherwise sanctioning particular powerbrokers. Hence pernicious individual powerbrokers and the political system quickly learned how to ride the anti-corruption and anti-crime efforts, further delegitimizing the system and enabling a significant intensification of the Taliban's insurgency in Afghanistan. No doubt, the Taliban itself has become deeply involved in all kinds of illicit economies, including drugs, timber, and gems. This involvement has grown over time despite the fact that since its inception in 1994 and as a product of the brutality and chaos of the 1990s civil war, the Taliban defined its purpose as improving governance in Afghanistan and acting against the rampant criminality that swept the country. Indeed, during the administration of President George W. Bush, it was the Taliban's involvement in the drug economy that received most international attention out of all the illicit economies, corruption, and predatory criminality that went on in Afghanistan. Yet the counternarcotics policies which were chosen both failed to accomplish their stated goal of bankrupting the Taliban and turned out to be highly counterproductive. Far from delegitimizing the Taliban in the eyes of local populations as a mere cartel or as narco-guerrillas, efforts to eradicate opium poppy cultivation as well as particular designs of drug interdiction allowed the Taliban to present itself a protector of people's livelihoods and thereby to obtain significant political capital. Thus, the international community mounted the most intense efforts precisely against the wrong type of illicit economy and criminality: the labor-intensive poppy cultivation that underpins much of the country's economic growth and provides elemental livelihoods and human security to vast segments of the rural population. Instead, the anti-crime efforts should have focused on the predatory criminality and non-labor intensive aspects of transactional crimes, such as drug smuggling. The Obama administration at least defunded eradication, but its efforts against predatory crime ultimately proved unsatisfactory. Its efforts against predatory criminality were held hostage to the administration's own strategic decision to define the mission there as principally one of limited couterterrorism and to de-emphasize state-building and also to impose restrictive and counterproductive timeliness on U.S. assistance, particularly military, efforts. Thus, from the very beginning of the U.S. intervention, when there was the largest window of opportunity to embrace Afghan aspirations for good governance and shape the outcome, and throughout 2014 when the number of U.S. troops in Aghanistan was radically reduced, Washington neglected to commit itself to rebuilding Afghanistan in the right way. And earlier inflection point that perhaps could have countered the basic mis-governance trends in the country and the rise of predatory criminality was in 2004 when the first disarmament effort was undertaken. However, that opportunity was missed, with most of the crucial warlords not fully and sufficiently disarmed. Details: Tokyo: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 2017. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Crime-Conflict Nexus Series: No 8: Accessed June 20, 2017 at: https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2442/Afghanistan-Affectations-How-to-Break-Political-Criminal-Alliances-in-Contexts-of-Transition.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2442/Afghanistan-Affectations-How-to-Break-Political-Criminal-Alliances-in-Contexts-of-Transition.pdf Shelf Number: 146319 Keywords: Crime-Conflict NexusDrug SmugglingDrug WarlordsIllegal EconomiesIllicit DrugsIllicit EconomiesOpiumPolitical Corruption |
Author: Silva Avalos, Hector Title: Corruption in El Salvador: Politians, Police, and Transportistas Summary: Corruption and the infiltration of public institutions in Central America by organized crime groups is an unaddressed issue that lies at the core of the increasing violence and democratic instability that has afflicted the region in the last decade. In El Salvador, infiltration has mutated into a system capable of determining important political and strategic decisions, such as the election of high-level judicial officials and the shaping of the state approach to fighting crime. This paper addresses corruption in El Salvador's National Civil Police (PNC), the law enforcement agency created under the auspices of the 1992 Peace Accord that ended the country's 12-year civil war. Archival and field research presented here demonstrates that the PNC has been plagued by its own "original sin": the inclusion of former soldiers that worked with criminal groups and preserved a closed power structure that prevented any authority from investigating them for over two decades. This original sin has allowed criminal bands formed in the 1980s as weapon or drug smugglers to forge connections with the PNC and to develop into sophisticated drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). These new DTOs are now involved in money laundering, have secured pacts with major criminal players in the region - such as Mexican and Colombian cartels - and have learned how to use the formal economy and financial system. These "entrepreneurs" of crime, long tolerated and nurtured by law enforcement officials and politicians in El Salvador, are now major regional players themselves. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Latin American & Latino Studies, American University, 2014. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: CLALS Working Paper Series, No. 4: Accessed June 26, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2419174 Year: 2014 Country: El Salvador URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2419174 Shelf Number: 146382 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingOrganized CrimePolice CorruptionPolitical Corruption |
Author: Realuyo, Celina B. Title: "Following the Money Trail" to Combat Terrorism, Crime, and Corruption in the Americas Summary: Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States and its Latin American partners have strengthened their ability to combat money laundering and terrorist financing and consciously incorporated the financial instrument of national power into their national security strategies. "Following the money trail," counterterrorism, and Drug Kingpin sanctions and asset forfeiture have become particularly important to attack narco-insurgencies, dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and address political corruption scandals that have reached the highest levels of governments across Latin America. This paper will focus on the threats from money laundering and terrorist financing, distinguishing the two, and explain government efforts to counter illicit financing. It will describe the ways illicit actors raise, move, store, and use money to pursue their dangerous agendas. Specific cases examining the FARC in Colombia, the 2015 fall of the Guatemalan government, and Brazil's "Operation Car Wash" corruption scandal will illustrate how governments use financial intelligence to pursue terrorists, criminals, corrupt politicians, and their financiers n Latin America. Finally, this paper will emphasize the need to design, implement, and constantly update national and international strategies to combat the financing of emerging threats like terrorism, crime, and corruption and to safeguard our financial systems. Details: Washington, DC: Latin American Program, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center, 2017. 20p. Source: Accessed August 8, 2017 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/follow_the_money_final_0.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Latin America URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/follow_the_money_final_0.pdf Shelf Number: 146776 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Money Laundering Political CorruptionTerrorist Financing |
Author: Kemp, Walter Title: Crooked Kaleidoscope: Organized Crime in the Balkans Summary: The Balkans is back in the spotlight. A coup attempt in Montenegro, tensions between Belgrade and Pristina over the status of northern Kosovo, a wire-tapping scandal followed by political unrest in Macedonia, rivalries in Bosnia about the future status of Republika Srpska, as well as the impact of the refugee crisis have started to ring alarm bells. A region which had been out of the limelight for a decade and considered to be on a path towards peace and prosperity is once again looking vulnerable. This can be attributed in part to the failure of the region - and its friends - to come to terms with organized crime and corruption. The report urges countries and organizations that have invested so much economically and politically over the past 25 years to stay engaged in the region and help it avoid back-sliding. In particular, it calls for stronger measures to fight corruption, enhance justice, and go after the proceeds of crime rather than just focusing on police reform. It recommends a more joined-up approach to looking at and responding to organized crime in the Balkans, as well as for enhancing networks to strengthen resilience to this threat. This report looks at organized crime in the Western Balkans. In particular, it focuses on the impact of organized crime on politics and stability. It warns about the impact of relations between political, business and criminal elites, and the spill-over effect of illicit activity in areas of weak governance. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the current situation, and asks why the Balkans is vulnerable to organized crime. Chapter 2 looks at the main types of organized crime in the region, particularly drugs, weapons and the smuggling of migrants. Chapter 3 looks at the relationship between crime and governance. It asks if organized crime is a transitory phase of state-building, or if there is a more deep-seated relationship between crime and politics in the Balkans that results in criminalized states. Montenegro is used as an illustrative case study. The dangerous nexus between crime and ethnicity is looked at in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Chapter 4 looks at responses of the international community to organized crime in the Balkans. Chapter 5 concludes by warning that the international community, particularly Western European institutions, should pay greater attention to the impact of organized crime in the Balkans. It also provides recommendations of what can be done to more effectively prevent and combat organized crime. This report illustrates that in the Balkans things are not always what they seem. When first looking through the hole of the kaleidoscope, certain shapes appear. Turn the kaleidoscope, and while some of the figures may be the same, the impression changes. Such is the Balkans: what might look like an ethnic conflict is actually a diversion from high-level bi-ethnic collusion. Someone who looks like a businessman one day may be a politician or a crook the next. With one quick twist, a calm image can fracture into myriad pieces. Friends may betray you, while enemies may assist you. This is the crooked kaleidoscope of organized crime in the Balkans. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 30, 2017 at: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/OC_balkans.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/OC_balkans.pdf Shelf Number: 146952 Keywords: Organized CrimePolitical CorruptionSmuggling |
Author: Lain, Sarah Title: Corporate Raiding in Russia: Tackling the Legal, Semi-Legal and Illegal Practices that Constitute Reiderstvo Tactics Summary: This paper explores Russian corporate raiding (reiderstvo) tactics, which are used to pressure and/or steal businesses, often with the complicity of corrupt state authorities. Due to its complexity, defining reiderstvo in a way that is helpful can be challenging, but looking at the tactics involved in the practice, rather than the final result - the stealing of the business - can help to focus attention on some of the threats facing business in Russia and the damage done to the country's investment climate. Russian reiderstvo can be a complex process and defining it can be challenging. Indeed, the author found that experts disagree about whether supposedly modern-day examples of reiderstvo - such as the cases of the oil company Bashneft, the chemical producer Togliattiazot and Domodedovo airport - can be labelled as such. In their detailed analysis of how reiderstvo works, Louise Shelley and Judy Deane describe the practice as the use of a "host of illegal tactics ranging from bribery, forgery, corruption, intimidation, and violence employed by raiders to steal companies from their owners, making massive and rapid profits by selling off assets and laundering the proceeds'. This definition certainly holds true for many historical cases, where detailed analysis has revealed a fuller picture of the details and motivations. However, to understand problems associated with reiderstvo today, this definition narrows the focus too much. In reality, the definition is broader. Reiderstvo is not necessarily a single crime aimed at the theft of a business. Reiderstvo tactics are used as a means to achieve multiple and often contrasting ends. This makes the term itself somewhat misleading and at times unhelpful. Although corruption is usually involved, those using reiderstvo tactics do not exclusively rely on illegal practices; indeed, they blur the lines between legal, semi-legal and illegal practices. Often reiderstvo tactics are used as a way to pressure businesses to comply with corrupt requests for personal gain, rather than being used to steal a business outright. Studying the tactics used to pressure businesses as part of a broader view of reiderstvo, rather than concentrating conceptually on reiderstvo, can help to better focus attention on some of the significant threats facing business in Russia and the damage done by reiderstvo to the country's investment climate. Taking this view will assist in better articulating specific measures that need to be taken to combat the various tactics used by those engaged in the practice. This paper, therefore, mostly refers to 'reiderstvo tactics', rather than just 'reiderstvo', in an attempt to capture the wide range of ways that businesses are put under pressure in Russia. Reiderstvo tactics continue to be a concern for businesses in Russia, despite the issue having a lower public profile than during the 1990s and late 2000s. It is difficult to accurately measure the full extent of reiderstvo in Russia, in part because they are often included within broader legislative definitions, such as 'economic crimes', which do not cover or differentiate between the various tactics. It is also difficult because the state agencies tasked with investigating and enforcing against corporate crime are the very agencies that are frequently involved in reiderstvo tactics. These include the tax authorities, security services, courts and legal system, regulatory control agencies, local and regional administrations and law enforcement. Moreover, false accusations of reiderstvo can also be used by state authorities or corporate competitors to falsify criminal cases or pressure business. A key issue is the apparent lack of strong political will to implement comprehensive and consistent measures to protect businesses, despite rhetoric from President Vladimir Putin. The research for this paper - which included an in-depth review of the relevant academic literature and legislation, and interviews with business people, consultants and academic experts - revealed that - apart from a few high-level public cases - reiderstvo tactics are often used at the local level in Russia, frequently involving local political corruption. Initiatives such as the business ombudsman have raised awareness of the need for business protection, but the office is still limited politically in how far it can intervene, and structural issues remain at various levels of government that enable the abuse of power. The paper does not seek to duplicate previous work on reiderstvo, and it is by no means a comprehensive analysis of past and present reiderstvo cases. Instead, this paper seeks to address some of the assumptions surrounding reiderstvo, suggesting that it is more useful to refocus attention on the array of individual legal, semi-legal and illegal means used to pressure businesses. The sum is arguably less important than the parts in understanding how reiderstvo has evolved. By concentrating on reiderstvo tactics rather than the end result, this paper provides a new and improved framework through which Russian business associations and authorities could and should target initiatives to protect business rights. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: RUSI Occasional Paper: Accessed September 2, 2017 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201707_rusi_corporate_raiding_in_russia_lain.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Russia URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201707_rusi_corporate_raiding_in_russia_lain.pdf Shelf Number: 147009 Keywords: Corporate CrimeCrime Against BusinessesFinancial CrimesPolitical Corruption |
Author: Nkoke, Christopher Sone Title: Ivory Markets in Central Africa: Market Surveys in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Gabon: 2007, 2009, 2014/2015 Summary: Weak governance, corruption and shifting trade dynamics are significant factors seriously undermining the control of ivory trafficking throughout five countries in Central Africa, according to a new TRAFFIC study launched today. Ivory Markets in Central Africa for investigations and analysis spanning a decade In the first comprehensive assessment of ivory trade in the region in nearly two decades, investigators from TRAFFIC visited major cities across Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Gabon in 2007, 2009 and 2014/2015. The investigators posed as buyers at known and newly identified ivory markets and workshops throughout the Congo Basin, interviewing everyone that they encountered connected to the ivory industry. In addition, discussions were held overtly with major stakeholders, including government officials in the five countries. The illegal and unregulated domestic ivory markets in (each of) the five Central African countries have been one of the main sources fuelling ivory trade in the region, as well as in West and Southern Africa and beyond (especially to Asia) in recent years. The report's findings show that open ivory markets in the region are disappearing, largely due to increased enforcement and competition with underground criminal networks. In its place, high-level corruption and poor governance are helping enable sophisticated international trade. Corruption, Collusion and Weak Political Pressure Current legislation prohibits domestic ivory trade in all countries except Cameroon. However, according to the report "there is a loose and ambiguous interpretation of the law in all countries, not only by the authorities in charge of enforcement, but also by many other actors...enforcement efforts are hampered by corruption, often involving high-level governmental officials, insufficient human and financial resources, mismanagement and weak political will." In DRC, one ivory trader interviewed claimed to have a relative in the army who supplied him with raw ivory. He also alleged that the main suppliers are government officials and, to some extent, UN peace keepers, who have the ability to move around the country frequently. Also in DRC, researchers recorded well-informed claims that the FARDC, the country's official army, was one of the main groups responsible for elephant poaching in Virunga National Park, with the ivory exported by the non-State "Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda" (FDLR) to whom the army would sell arms and military equipment. Open Ivory Markets Shifting Underground Throughout the multi-year investigation, market research showed that the region's open illegal ivory markets are disappearing or going underground, often in the face of increasing pressure from authorities conducting frequent law enforcement operations. TRAFFIC investigators recorded less than 1 kg of ivory products openly displayed in 2014/2015 within CAR, Congo, Gabon and Cameroon, compared to around 400 kg in 2007, and more than 900 kg in 1999 between all four countries. The one exception was the ivory market in Kinshasa, DRC, where over 400 kg of ivory products were recorded in 2015. DRC, however, has recently committed to stronger enforcement against the illegal ivory market in Kinshasa, a milestone which TRAFFIC and WWF supported last month. Carved ivory items were said to be bought by a mixture of African and non-African buyers: the former mainly acting as middlemen for foreign buyers. In 2014/2015 80% of foreign buyers were ethnic Asians, especially Chinese but also Malaysians and Vietnamese. In earlier studies, in 2007 and 2009, other nationalities were more regularly mentioned as buyers including French, Japanese, Koreans, Lebanese, Portuguese, Russians, Spaniards, and US Americans, according to the report. Rising International Criminal Networks "The generally positive news contained in this report about the decline of Central African ivory markets needs to be weighed against the fact that, throughout this sub-region, there are still many issues to be addressed and underlying trade dynamics may be shifting beyond local markets," according to Sone Nkoke of TRAFFIC and lead author of the report. common theme heard throughout the sub-region were allegations concerning Chinese citizens operating within organized criminal networks as key actors in the ivory trade. The sharp increase in raw ivory prices locally in recent years was ascribed to "high demand and limited supply owing to the shift to exportation through transnational ivory networks and syndicates with greater financial resources." The study found that "ivory trade in the region is shifting from an open domestic retail trade of worked ivory to underground transactions with a focus on the export of raw ivory to foreign markets, especially China." Among other key issues identified was the lack of robust and transparent mechanisms in place to ensure effective management of stockpiles in all the target countries. In Kinshasa, DRC, the investigators found raw tusks and worked ivory pieces in unsecured government offices - signalling a high potential for leakage into the local market. In Bangui, Central African Republic, the investigators were unable to perform a stockpile survey in 2015 as the storage facility had been looted by rebels. "Real concerted efforts are needed to address the serious decline in elephant populations throughout Central Africa: this is no longer just a wildlife issue, but an ecological disaster strongly driven by highly-organized crime syndicates. Criminals involved in international ivory trade are regularly exploiting weak State governance, and official collusion, confusion and corruption," said Sone Nkoke. "Clearly Central African countries face significant governance and enforcement challenges in regulating elephant poaching and ivory trafficking. They urgently need to ramp up their efforts to implement a range of commitments that they have made at multiple international fora over the last ten years," said Paulinus Ngeh, Director of the TRAFFIC Central Africa Regional Office. "Such efforts will need to be continuously and transparently monitored for quality and action." Central African States have pledged commitments to stop elephant poaching and illegal ivory trade under CITES, the African Union Common Wildlife Strategy, and other regional strategies, as well as under the United Nations fora on combatting corruption. Follow-through on these commitments is crucial to sustain wildlife in the region. Details: Yaounde, Cameroon and Cambridge, UK: TRAFFIC, 2017. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 9, 2017 at: http://www.traffic.org/home/2017/9/7/new-traffic-study-lifts-lid-on-central-africa-ivory-markets.html Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: http://www.traffic.org/home/2017/9/7/new-traffic-study-lifts-lid-on-central-africa-ivory-markets.html Shelf Number: 147176 Keywords: Animal PoachingElephantsIllegal MarketsIllegal TradeIllegal Wildlife TradeIvoryOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionTrafficking in WildlifeWildlife Crime |
Author: Chemonics International Inc. Title: Changes for Justice Project: Final Report Summary: The Changes for Justice (C4J) Project was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) under Contract No. DFD-I-00-08-00070-00, a Task Order under the Encouraging Global Anticorruption and Good Governance Efforts (ENGAGE) Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) awarded to Chemonics International with a start date of May 12, 2010. The C4J contract effective end date was May 11, 2014, but the project received a cost extension until May 11, 2015. The C4J Project was based on several recent USAID efforts to support the bureaucratic reform processes of the Indonesian Supreme Court and the Attorney General's Office (AGO), including the Justice Sector Reform Program (JSRP) focused on the AGO, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)/USAID Indonesia Control of Corruption Project (ICCP), focused on the Supreme Court, and the Indonesia Anticorruption and Commercial Court Enhancement (In-ACCE) Project, focused on five first-instance general (district) courts with jurisdiction for commercial and anticorruption cases. C4J was designed to sustain those earlier projects' reforms, compare the knowledge and experiences of each, and deepen the reforms by improving management and increasing transparency and accountability within Indonesia's judicial and prosecutorial systems. The goals of the C4J Project were divided into three parts: Sustaining and Broadening Reforms in the Supreme Court (Component 1); Sustaining and Broadening Reforms in the Attorney General's Office (Component 2); and Special Initiatives (Component 3). Key activities included institutional reforms in human resources, budget and financial management, case management, information technology, education and training programs, and public services. Technical activities included development and launching of prosecution guidelines, a new prosecutorial code of conduct, a new certification program for judges on juvenile cases, and an integrated justice sector training program on combatting threats to biodiversity. Special Initiatives of the project under Component 3 included installation of public information desks, creation of Version 1 of a new case tracking system (CTS) in three pilot district courts during the first year of the project, and a new program to combat threats to biodiversity in three pilot districts, including district courts, district prosecutors' offices, and rural communities. These pilot programs proved to be an excellent model for testing, evaluating, and rolling out reforms. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2015. 130p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 9, 2017 at: http://www.chemonics.com/OurWork/OurProjects/Documents/C4J%20Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.chemonics.com/OurWork/OurProjects/Documents/C4J%20Final%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 147179 Keywords: CourtsCriminal CourtsCriminal Justice ReformCriminal Justice SystemsPolitical Corruption |
Author: Puerta, Felipe Title: Symbiosis: Gangs and Municipal Power in Apopa, El Salvador Summary: The story of Jose Elias Hernandez, the mayor of Apopa, El Salvador, illustrates the dark alliances between gangs and politicians in Central America. Details: Insight Crime, 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 1, 2017 at: https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/symbiosis-gangs-municipal-power-apopa-el-salvador/ Year: 2017 Country: El Salvador URL: https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/symbiosis-gangs-municipal-power-apopa-el-salvador/ Shelf Number: 148669 Keywords: Gang-Related Violence Gangs Political Corruption |
Author: Gramckow, Heike P. Title: Addressing the Enforcement Gap to Counter Crime: Part 1. Crime, Poverty and the Police Summary: Crime and violence impede development and disproportionally impact poor people in many countries across the world. Though crime and violence represent serious problems in many countries, less-developed countries experience particular concentrations, especially those that are characterized by fragile or less-trusted government institutions and pervasive insecurity. Under such circumstances, human, social, political, and economic development suffers. Research across the globe has shown that holistic approaches that focus on the entire spectrum of a government's crime response chain, ranging from crime prevention to enforcement, tend to have better outcomes than isolated interventions involving only the police or other individual government agency. To date, most of the Bank's investment in efforts to reduce crime have focused on crime prevention in the form of urban and social development programs. Investment and policy lending that support the improvement of police operations to reduce crime and develop stronger neighborhoods are more limited. To assist country teams and client counterparts in their efforts to develop effective, holistic responses against crime that include the police, justice reform staff in the Governance Global Practice teamed up with internationally recognized experts to compile evidence-based good practice information for developing effective police responses to crime. The resulting three part publication, titled Addressing the Enforcement Gap to Counter Crime: Investing in Public Safety, the Rule of Law and Local Development in Poor Neighborhoods outlines the impact of crime and violence on development and the poor in particular and explains a proven three-pronged approach to creating police agencies that work in collaboration with communities and other government and private service providers to identify crime problems, develop holistic and inclusive solutions the apply a restorative justice approach. The publication also outlines how such approach can be integrated into Bank projects and client country reform plans. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2016. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2018 at: https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/24416 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/24416 Shelf Number: 149567 Keywords: Development and Crime Gangs Law Enforcement Political CorruptionPoverty Public Safety Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Violence |
Author: Perotti, Victoria Title: Imagining the Future of Crime and Politics Summary: Organized crime networks dedicated to illicit trafficking of drugs, people and wildlife-as well as money laundering and cybercrime, among other activities-are engines of instability. From Latin America to West Africa, from West Asia to Eastern Europe, and from Central Africa to Southern Europe, these networks engage in corruption to advance their interests, depriving the state of precious resources needed to build resilient institutions (OECD 2014). Corruption is channeled through multiple avenues, including by pouring illicit money into political institutions and actors (Villaveces-Izquierdo and Uribe Burcher 2013; Briscoe, Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2014; Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2016). The world is experiencing several parallel trends-including increased violent conflict, democratic backsliding and technological advancements-that affect these corrupt dynamics. Given that conflict and weak governance typically create a fertile environment for organized crime to engage in public sector corruption (Lupsha 1996; Cockayne and Pfister 2008: 18; Kupferschmidt 2009), and since technology may facilitate or hinder criminal behaviour (Baker 2014), these trends will presumably have a pivotal impact on the fight against organized crime and political corruption. On 4 May 2017, International IDEA hosted the workshop 'Political corruption and organized crime: Drivers, effects and responses' at the 2017 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development, organized by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2017). The workshop aimed to discuss potential future trends regarding corruption linked to organized crime and strategic policy responses. It gathered scholars and practitioners in anticorruption, international crime prevention and peacebuilding in a common dialogue. This Discussion Paper was initially drafted as a scenario-building exercise to inform the workshop and was further developed with the input of its participants. Scenario building is an analytical method that encourages prospective thinking within a thematic field to identify new strategic policy alternatives (Conway 2006). Specifically, the scenarios consist of an illustration of possible futures. As such, they are not intended to predict the future (European Commission 2007). The methodology tends to be qualitative and engages a group of people in a simulation process. By developing a future narrative that takes existing interconnected trends to the extreme, participants can challenge assumptions and expand their perceptions of options available, ultimately engaging in strategic conversations. This Discussion Paper and the adapted scenario-building exercise on which it is based were therefore developed from the perspective of a fictitious criminal network. Its hypothetical activity focus is diverse and, depending on the opportunities, it could hypothetically venture to any existing and new illicit activities. Its structure is flexible as well; as such, it can potentially adapt to new markets. Section 1 illustrates some of the key geopolitical trends and drivers in governance, peace and technology that may affect corruption dynamics in relation to organized crime in the coming 10 years. Written from the perspective of a fictitious criminal network, it depicts a scenario where conflict, democratic decline and new technologies exacerbate the negative impact of organized crime on the state. By describing an imaginary future, it includes the most relevant concerns for practitioners within the field. Section 2 briefly presents current policy options for tackling organized crime and political corruption, and outlines recommendations for future policy adjustments that may contribute to the improvement of crime and corruption prevention and mitigation. The main argument of this Discussion Paper is that the policies that seek to address corruption and organized crime should be brought closer together in the promotion of global peace and stability. Details: Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2018. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: International IDEA Discussion Paper 2/2018: Accessed April 3, 2018 at: https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/imagining-the-future-of-crime-and-politics.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/imagining-the-future-of-crime-and-politics.pdf Shelf Number: 149660 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug TraffickingOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionWildlife Crime |
Author: Open Society Justice Initiative Title: Corruption that Kills: Why Mexico Needs an International Mechanism to Combat Impunity Summary: In 2017, Mexico experienced its deadliest year in two decades, with homicides exceeding 25,000. Despite the many crimes which have been committed in Mexico, however, criminal accountability still remains virtually absent. The extraordinary violence Mexico is experiencing, and the questions it raises about collusion between state actors and organized crime, demand a commensurate response. This report calls for an international mechanism-based inside the country, but comprised of national and international staff-which would have a mandate to independently investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes and the corrupt acts that enable them. This report follows the Open Society Justice Initiative's 2016 report, Undeniable Atrocities, which found reasonable basis to believe that Mexican federal forces and members of the Zetas cartel have perpetrated crimes against humanity. Corruption That Kills was produced by the Open Society Justice Initiative in partnership with eight Mexican organizations: the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, the Diocesan Center for Human Rights Fray Juan de Larios, Families United for the Search of Disappeared Persons, Piedras Negras/Coahuila, I(dh)eas Human Rights Strategic Litigationos, the Mexican Institute of Human Rights and Democracy, Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights Center, the Foundation for Justice and Rule of Law, and PODER. Details: New York: Open Society Foundation, 2018. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2018 at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/corruption-that-kills-en-20180502.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/corruption-that-kills-en-20180502.pdf Shelf Number: 150193 Keywords: Criminal Justice SystemsDrug Policy ReformHomicidesHuman RightsPolitical CorruptionViolence |
Author: Global Witness Title: Under-Mined: How corruption, mismanagement and political influence is undermining investment in Uganda's mining sector and threatening people and environment Summary: Uganda is rich in natural resource wealth such as gold, tin and phosphate that could create jobs and support the country's developing economy by generating tax revenues. However, our 18 month long investigation has exposed endemic corruption and mismanagement in the country's fledgling mining sector that means crooked officials, and international investors are profiting at the expense of Uganda's people, environment and economy. Key findings of the investigation include: Miners are working in dangerous, largely unregulated conditions - with children exposed to toxic chemicals on a daily basis Almost half the world's remaining mountain gorillas are at risk as mining threatens Bwindi and Rwenzori national parks, part of the famous Virunga ecosystem, and also risks the economically critical tourism industry which depends on the country's natural beauty and wildlife The country is deprived of tax revenues that could be spent on schools, hospitals and roads Minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan - that might be funding conflict and human rights abuses - pass through Uganda on their way to international markets Details: London: Global Witness, 2017. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 21, 2018 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/uganda-undermined/ Year: 2017 Country: Uganda URL: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/uganda-undermined/ Shelf Number: 150319 Keywords: Environmental CrimesMineralsMining IndustryNatural ResourcesOffenses Against the EnvironmentalPolitical Corruption |
Author: Jackman, David Title: Living in the shade of others: intermediation, politics and violence in Dhaka City Summary: Bangladesh is often perceived as disordered, characterised by the absence of law abiding systems of governance, and with the poor left to rely on corrupt and dysfunctional relationships. This thesis tells a different story. Examining the lives of people living in the open and most basic slums ethnographically in Dhaka city reveals that people have complex dependencies on 'intermediaries' or 'brokers' to access resources. Rather than see these relationships as dysfunctional, the core argument developed is that they are inherently part of how social order is maintained in Bangladeshi society. If order is understood as contingent on actors throughout society establishing a dominant capability for violence and accruing resources on this basis, then intermediation can be seen as a prominent means by which both of these ends are achieved. These relationships are thus intertwined with how violence is organised and controlled. A young man who grew up at a bazar described how people need to live in the shade of others, and this metaphor is used to portray this phenomenon. This thesis argues that intermediation in Dhaka has changed significantly over the past decade, with the mastan gangs once identified as powerful in radical decline, replaced by wings of the ruling political party. At the lowest levels of urban society, a complex web of intermediaries exists, including labour leaders, political leaders, their followers and informers. Some people attempt to rise in this order by mobilising as factions and demonstrating their capability for violence, but more generally people employ tactics and strategies for avoiding, negotiating and even exiting these relationships. Negotiating these relationships and one's place in this order is conceptualised here as the politics of intermediation. Details: Bath, UK: University of Bath, 2017. 223p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 24, 2018 at: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/57425/ Year: 2017 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/57425/ Shelf Number: 150356 Keywords: Political CorruptionUrban Areas and CrimeViolence |
Author: Transparency International Title: Analysing Corruption in the Forestry Sector Summary: Corruption - the abuse of entrusted power for private gain - undermines good governance and the rule of law. Corruption in forestry further degrades the environment, threatens rural communities and robs the public of billions of dollars each year. Transparency International (TI) is committed to a society where corruption-free forest governance and sustainable management enable increased economic development, poverty reduction and environmental protection. To help achieve this objective, TI's Forest Governance Integrity (FGI) Programme monitors the existing anti-corruption instruments that bring about the greatest improvement in the forestry sector and in good governance overall. Each country's forestry sector is unique, as are each country's anti-corruption mechanisms - its laws and the initiatives led by government, the private sector and civil society. Therefore, in order to best use their human and financial resources, civil society organisations (CSOs) must prioritise which corrupt practices to monitor. Otherwise, the temptation is to try to monitor all corrupt practices, or at least those associated with current programmes. Given the limited resources most CSOs have this would be a logistical impossibility, but perhaps more important, it is vital that activists are critically selective in choosing targets that will provide the most effective impact in the long run. This manual outlines a generic methodology for prioritising the corrupt practices that pose the greatest risk to governance - i.e. those practices that are the most likely to occur and have the greatest impact. Interviews with key experts, supplemented by publicly available data, inform the rapid risk assessment, the results of which are validated through stakeholder consultation. Based on this priority setting, it will be possible to assess more thoroughly the corrupt practices that pose the highest risk. In a second step, expert analysis and stakeholder consultation then help identify the existing anti-corruption instruments that most efficiently tackle these priority practices. These anticorruption instruments then serve as the focus for TI's forestry programme - including its monitoring, outreach and advocacy. A greater understanding of corrupt practices in the forestry sector should help focus the public and decision-makers on generating the political will needed to tackle criminal activity associated with the forestry sector - activity which in many countries drastically reduces revenues that could be used for economic development. Details: Berlin: Forest Governance Integrity Programme, Transparency International, 2010. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 24, 2018 at: https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/analysing_corruption_in_the_forestry_sector_a_manual Year: 2010 Country: Asia URL: https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/analysing_corruption_in_the_forestry_sector_a_manual Shelf Number: 150359 Keywords: Forest Law EnforcementForestsIllegal LoggingNatural ResourcePolitical CorruptionRisk Assessment |
Author: Vladimirov, Martin Title: Russian Economic Footprint in the Western Balkans: Corruption and State Capture Risks Summary: Over the past decade, Russia has increasingly sought to reassert its position as a global power and to present itself as alternative to the Euro-Atlantic model of liberal democracy and a free market economy. The Western Balkans is one of the regions in which Russia has been most active in this respect. Thus far, the region has more or less stayed on its course toward NATO and the European Union (EU). But Russia's meddling in the region has enhanced space domestically for political opportunists to try to avoid implementing necessary reforms, particularly those related to strengthening the rule of law and curbing of autocratic tendencies - as a result undermining civil society and the media, leading to democratic backsliding and an economic slowdown. NATO nevertheless could accept Montenegro as a member, while the EU has put forward the Berlin Process, which aims to speed up economic development and transformation. In 2018, the EU will propose a new Enlargement strategy aimed at providing a clear path for the Balkans to integrate into Europe. Tackling outstanding "governance gaps" - deficits in the rule of law, and weak democratic and market institutions - in the Western Balkans is critical to limiting the effects of so-called "corrosive capital" - funds flowing from non-democratic states such as Russia that both take advantage of, and exacerbate the challenges facing struggling democracies - and to restoring the region's democratic transformation. The tools Russia has used to expand its presence in the region are not new: political pressure; soft power, including cultural, media, and religious campaigns; and economic leverage ranging from the control and acquisition of critical energy assets to the financing of political parties and media. These tools are underpinned by a concerted Kremlin narrative designed to counter Euro-Atlantic values. The seeds of this narrative have landed on fertile ground in the Western Balkans, where a climate of unstable institutions of governance and rule of law, and protracted and systemic corruption at both the administrative and political levels, often lead to policy, regulatory or even state capture. The mixture of weak institutions of rule of law and kleptocratic tendencies, media propaganda and geopolitical pressure from Russia (as well as from other countries), has led many Western Balkan governments to adopt policies inconsistent with their national security or development interests. This situation calls for a better understanding and re-assessment of the political and economic factors that threaten the region's development now, and in the future. Details: Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2018. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 24, 2018 at: http://wap.southeasteurope.org/~igardev/typo3/artShow.php?id=18228 Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://wap.southeasteurope.org/~igardev/typo3/artShow.php?id=18228 Shelf Number: 151250 Keywords: Economic CrimesFinancial CrimesFraud and CorruptionPolitical Corruption |
Author: Kasipo, Mafaro Title: Political Transition in Zimbabwe. A New Era for Organized Crime? Summary: This policy brief constitutes a first step towards developing more comprehensive assessments that will broaden our understanding of organized crime and illicit markets in Zimbabwe. It analyzes the development of illicit economies during the three periods of political transition that occurred in Zimbabwe since the country attained independence in 1980, and looks ahead to the current phase of transition under its new president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, whose young administration was cemented by victory for his party at the polls on 30 July 2018.The brief outlines the relationship between Zimbabwe's political transitions and its illicit economies, in particular the central role played by the state in controlling, shaping and benefiting from organized crime. Certain forms of state-sponsored illicit activity have been prevalent during specific phases in Zimbabwe's political trajectory, but are not exclusive to those transitions.In Zimbabwean politics, illicit economies have been a mainstay of the patronage system that ensured that the ruling party, ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front), remained in power for 37 years under Robert Mugabe. Arguably, therefore, there is a possibility that illicit economies will continue to pose a threat to the implementation of a legitimate constitutional democracy in the post-Mugabe era. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 4, 2018 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/TGIATOC-Zim-Organised-Crime-Report-WEB.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Zimbabwe URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/TGIATOC-Zim-Organised-Crime-Report-WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 151343 Keywords: Illicit MarketsOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Reporters Without Borders Title: Journalists: The Bete Noire of Organized crime Summary: Organized crime knows no borders, scorns the rule of law in democracies, and leaves little choice to journalists, who have limited resources and are extremely vulnerable. The only choice for reporters is often to say nothing or risk their lives. Either they don't do their job as journalists or, by violating the criminal code of silence, they expose themselves to terrible reprisals from organizations that stop at nothing to defend their interests. Such is the dangerous dilemma for the media. And it's not just in Italy, the cradle of the mafia, or in Mexico, where narcos control entire swathes of the country. The Mob has spread its tentacles around the globe faster than all the multinationals combined and has spawned offspring whose virulence matches their youth. From Beijing to Moscow, from Tijuana to Bogota, from Malta to Slovakia, investigative journalists who shed light on the deals that involve organized crime unleash the wrath of gangsters, whose common feature is an aversion to any publicity unless they control it. Very sensitive to whenever their image is at stake, organized crime's godfathers do not hesitate to crack down on any reporter who poses a threat. Those who tell the truth deserve to die. For exposing the sordid underside of the Italian mafia's activities, writer and journalist Roberto Saviano has been condemned to living under permanent police protection, with less freedom of movement than those he exposes, who threaten to kill him. The criminal underworld is always masked, but the biggest danger for the investigative reporter nowadays is not necessarily the ruthless, bloodthirsty individuals who people this world; rather, in many countries, organized crime has established a kind of pact with the state, to the point that you cannot tell where one stops and the other begins. How is it possible that Mexico's drug cartels sprout and flourish like mushrooms without the support of part of the state's apparatus in the field? How do you explain the murky links between the yakuza and state in Japanese society? How do these small armies at the head of sprawling business empires manage to live outside the law without the - at least passive - complicity of the states in which they are often well established? Far from combatting them head-on, states tolerate them and give them a free hand by omission. By, for example, failing to apply controls in ports and airports. Organized crime does not fight states; it seeks to merge with them. Instead of trying to exercise power, it wants to control it or rather to contaminate it. Journalists who try to draw attention to organized crime's corruption of the political and business elite in their country must brave not only gangsters, but also white-collar crime that has married its interests to those of the gangsters whose antennae reach into the very heart of the state. Those who tackle this almost institutional impunity need to know that they will be alone at the hour of reprisals, especially in countries where the special units that are supposed to combat organized crime have become no more than cosmetic tools for assuaging public opinion. Details: Paris: Reporters Without Borders, 2018. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed Dec. 7, 2018 at: https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/en_rapport_mafia_web_0.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/en_rapport_mafia_web_0.pdf Shelf Number: 153942 Keywords: Drug Cartels Investigative Reporting Journalists Mafia Organized Crime Political Corruption |
Author: Adeba, Brian Title: A Hijacked State: Violent Kleptocracy in South Sudan Summary: On September 12, 2018, the South Sudanese government and the armed opposition signed a peace deal that could potentially end the 5-year-old conflict, if elites exercise the political will required to implement the agreement. The South Sudanese conflict is rooted in the violent kleptocratic system of governance that the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) began building in 2005, after the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). When President Salva Kiir became the chair of the SPLM and the leader of the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan from 2005 to 2011, a network of allies formed and positioned itself to make decisions about the distribution of influence and oil wealth. In 2011, Kiir became president of newly independent South Sudan, and these key allies drafted the Transitional Constitution, which vested immense powers in Kiir's hands that allowed him, for instance, to prorogue (discontinue without dissolving) the national legislature, fire elected governors, and dissolve legislative assemblies in the country's states. The destructive competition over power and access to opportunities for corruption resulted in a slow expulsion of some elites from the center of power and a consequential rise in power of others, dividing the ruling party into two factions, for and against Kiir. Those opposed to President Kiir largely coalesced behind Vice President Riek Machar. South Sudan's oil production was at its height in 2011 when the global prices of crude oil averaged over 100 U.S. dollars per barrel, which allowed the country to pocket a monthly average of 500 million U.S. dollars from its share. When South Sudanese authorities shut down oil production because of conflict with Sudan that had turned violent along the border, production remained suspended for 15 months-between January 2012 and March 2013-quickly creating a significant deficit in a young economy so heavily reliant on oil for its revenues and gross domestic product (GDP). The government's sudden loss of over 90 percent of cash from oil revenues disrupted entrenched patterns of corruption and tested the limits of the violent kleptocratic system, culminating in a bloody conflict in December 2013. This crisis in turn plunged South Sudan into a series of interrelated economic, fiscal, security, political, and humanitarian crises. In South Sudan's system of violent kleptocracy, leaders have hijacked institutions and stoked violent conflict, committed mass atrocities, and created a man-made famine. Amid the chaos of war, the ruling elites ransacked various sectors of the economy. South Sudan's violent kleptocracy has distorted the country's institutions, heaping catastrophic consequences on the national monetary reserve and creating an atmosphere in which too many hands are left to freely and repetitively reach into the public treasury with impunity. Services remain undelivered, business practices undermine the rule of law, and corruption abounds. While poor regulatory mechanisms made it easy to loot the public treasury with little consequence, the ruling elites could have chosen to improve institutions of accountability rather than deliberately dis-empower them. South Sudan's leaders have incorporated corrupt practices inherited from the north-south war into the current government. Without strong and effective institutions in place, military leaders dominate the decision-making processes on public spending to wield both power and money opportunistically. These leaders have abused their positions of power to steal from public coffers, wage war, and enlarge patronage networks. Violent conflict in South Sudan today stems from competitive corruption that has characterized governance since 2005. Leaders use violence as a means of capturing the national economy and budget and to prolong their stay in power for the purpose of self-enrichment. Oil has represented the key prize in South Sudan since independence. The political elites enrich themselves with oil revenues at the public's expense and to the detriment of the economy and ordinary citizens. Nevertheless, the status quo could be different. U.S. policymakers and international partners can now use the power of the U.S. dollar and the international financial system-on which South Sudanese leaders rely almost exclusively - to target these leaders' finances and the networks that enable the violent kleptocracy to continue to harm the South Sudanese people. In September 2017, the U.S. Department of the Treasury initiated a process of holding South Sudan's leaders accountable for the egregious corruption that feeds war in their country. In the wake of the recently concluded peace agreement, the financial pressures enacted by the Treasury Department must continue because the deal itself lacks meaningful stipulations to end the endemic corruption, heightening the potential for a return to conflict. To be fully effective in thwarting the interests of leaders who may choose to violate the latest peace deal, network sanctions, anti-money laundering measures, prosecutions, and enhanced travel bans must be applied in a genuinely concerted and comprehensive manner. It is also crucial to focus on grievances, inequalities, and violence at the ground level. Primarily, the international community and the region should make it clear they stand with the people of South Sudan: implement and aggressively enforce these enhanced measures of financial pressure that can begin to build leverage over the competing elites, and deliver justice and accountability for the many victims of the war to foster long-term stability. There needs to be a greater focus on removing the rewards of competitive corruption by focusing on both South Sudan's decision-makers and the international firms that enable them. The priority should be to monitor these entities and implement the necessary pressures needed to stop them and thereby dismantle the entrenched violent kleptocratic system, which is a prerequisite for lasting peace, good governance, and human rights in South Sudan. Instead of trying to forge comfortable power-sharing agreements, the focus from the region and broader international community must be on creating consequences for bad actors, as this is the only path to a transformed and reformed functional state in South Sudan. These pressures can help deny the leaders material resources used to perpetuate large-scale violence in South Sudan. This pressure also needs to extend in the region. In June 2018, the U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Sigal Mandelker, traveled to Uganda and Kenya to deliver a strong message on the need for action against the proceeds of South Sudanese corruption that are laundered into neighboring banking systems. This message must continue to be developed with specific pressures delivered not only by the United States, but also by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council, European Union, African Union, and regional bodies. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2019. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2019 at: https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/AHijackedState_Enough_February2019-web.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Sudan URL: https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/AHijackedState_Enough_February2019-web.pdf Shelf Number: 154610 Keywords: Exploitation of Natural ResourcesFinancial CrimesPolitical CorruptionViolent Conflict |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: AMLO's Security Policy: Creative Ideas, Tough Reality Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY -- - Improving public safety, especially reducing Mexico's soaring murder rate, is the toughest challenge of Mexico's new president, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (known as AMLO). - In November 2018, AMLO unveiled his National Peace and Security Plan 2018-2024, describing it as predominantly focused on the roots of insecurity, as opposed to confronting drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The plan combines anti-corruption measures; economic policies; enhanced human rights protections; ethics reforms; public health, including treatment for drug use and exploration of drug legalization; transitional justice and amnesty for some criminals; and broader peace-building, to include traditional anti-crime measures such as prison reform and security sector reform, plus a new law enforcement force, the National Guard. - Various elements of his announced new security strategy-such as the formation of the National Guard - remain questionable and unclear and are unlikely to reduce violence quickly. - AMLO's proffered security strategy will likely create friction with the United States. Jointly countering fentanyl smuggling, however, could provide one venue of U.S.- Mexico cooperation. Corruption and Mexico's justice system - Combatting corruption is a foundational element of AMLO's security policy, and his administration has adopted a wide set of anti-corruption measures, including highly controversial and questionable ones. - However, AMLO has yet to appoint a dedicated anti-corruption prosecutor, make appointments to the National Anti-Corruption System, and support the 2016 National Anti-Corruption System reform. - AMLO has not broken with politically powerful and immensely corrupt unions, proposing instead to reverse reforms and lay off 70 percent of non-unionized federal workers. - It remains unclear whether AMLO will empower Mexico's civil society-crucial for reducing corruption-or continually define it as his antagonist. - AMLO's administration has not yet focused sufficiently on implementing the judicial reform by properly implementing the new prosecutorial system. - The administration has emphasized minimizing salary differences between public ministries, federal judges, prosecutors, and police officials. The weakness of prosecutors and their lack of cooperation with law enforcement and judges have been key stumbling blocks, keeping prosecution rates abysmally low. However, minimizing salary differences is inadequate. - Deleteriously, AMLO has refused to allow the independent selection of an autonomous attorney general. Focus on brutal crimes instead of drug trafficking groups and rejection of high-value targeting - The AMLO administration suspended focus on DTOs, drug trafficking, and high-value targeting of DTO leaders. Instead, it prioritizes "brutal crimes." But that strategy ignores the fact that key perpetrators of homicides, extortion, and robberies are DTOs. - Large law enforcement deployments to Tijuana and efforts to combat fuel theft have been interpreted by DTOs as direct confrontation. Instead, AMLO should prioritize targeting the most violent criminal groups, while deterring new outbreaks of violence. - The target should be the middle operational layer of a criminal group, seeking to disable the vast majority of the middle layer in one sweep, in order to reduce the group's regeneration capacity. - The Mexican government remains challenged in implementing such a policy by the continual lack of strategic and tactical intelligence in an ever more fragmented, mult-ipolar, and opaque criminal market, and by the continual corruption of Mexico's law enforcement apparatus. The National Guard -- - AMLO has not stopped using the Mexican military for domestic law enforcement. However, he has created a new structure combining military forces with Federal Police forces-The National Guard. - To be completed in three years, the National Guard is to be 150,000-strong. Sent initially to 17 areas with high homicide rates, the first contingent of 50,000 is to start functioning by April 2019. The head of the National Guard is a civilian, but much of the leadership is military.... Details: Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute, 2019. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 27, 2019 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190325_mexico_anti-crime.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190325_mexico_anti-crime.pdf Shelf Number: 155191 Keywords: Criminal Justice PolicyCriminal Justice SystemDrug TraffickingHomicidesNational SecurityPolitical CorruptionPublic SafetySecurity ForcesViolent Crimes |
Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Title: A Criminal Culture: Extortion in Central America Summary: In parts of Central America, extortion has become so endemic that it is now a feature of the daily socio-economic life of citizens, businesses and the fabric of the state. The pervasive impunity and weakness of state institutions to combat extortion have meant that, for many central American communities, extortion, or the threat of it, has become a normalized facet of life - a form of violent, omnipresent, criminally enforced taxation - and its effects are far-reaching on a personal, economic and societal level. For the violent, armed street gangs that continually threaten and harass communities in the Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) - a region that is the main focus of this report - the extortion market is the main security threat to those countries and one of the principal sources of criminal income. These gangs have bred a criminal regional economy on such a scale that extortion forms a sizeable tranche of some Northern Triangle countries' GDP. The revenue from extortion has provided some gangs in the region with a solid economic operating base, and at the same time allowed them to diversify into other criminal enterprises, including drug trafficking, and human smuggling and trafficking, which means that they have consolidated their influence over broader transnational organized-crime networks operating in the region. Meanwhile, extortion revenue is laundered through investments in formal businesses, extending the gangs' economic stranglehold over the communities they target. In Panama and Costa Rica, the dynamics are somewhat different; there, gangs, and the threat of extortion they pose, are also present but the groups in these countries rely more on revenue from drug trafficking than from extortion markets. The response to the extortion markets by Central American governments, as well as by non-governmental organizations and community self-support groups, has been largely ineffective, mainly because the violent control exerted by the gangs makes individual citizens and organizations powerless to resist. In some cases, state interventions, in the form of heavy-handed crackdowns by law-enforcement authorities, including mass incarceration of gangsters, have served not to quell the problem, but to exacerbate it, creating more problems than solutions. Non-police intervention policies, involving preventative, rehabilitative and reintegrative measures, have been limited. Another factor that perpetuates the vortex of gang violence is corruption, which weakens state institutions and law-enforcement agencies, and leads to impunity; as a result, some arms of the state have become cells of criminal governance. Until the chain of collusion between corrupt political actors (and other civil servants) and the criminal rackets can be broken, it will be difficult for policy interventions to penetrate and break the circuit of criminality, which reaches into the very organs of state that are constitutionally instituted to combat it. This report offers a comprehensive picture of the nature and impact of the various kinds of gang-based extortion schemes across Central America, but particularly in the trio of countries in the Northern Triangle, and the political-economic environment in which they occur. The report develops a typology of modes of extortion that have been reported in the region under study, with case studies on how certain schemes operate and the impact they have on their victims. In the face of the growing scourge of regional extortion markets, it also examines more innovative ways of responding to extortion and analyzes some promising trends that may threaten the regional gang networks. There has been a shift, for example, towards dismantling the financial structures of the gangs, and investigations into money-laundering schemes they use to conceal their revenue, which may offer the kind of intelligence needed to combat the regional transnational networks. Some citizen- and community-initiated pushbacks against the extortion have shown promise and they have, if only to a small degree, mitigated the impact wrought by the gangs on society by helping generate resilience initiatives. Where these have connected multiple actors within civil society and the private sector, the potential for impact is considerable, and suggests that a whole of community approach to addressing extortion might be a promising practice that could be replicated. The report is the culmination of recent extensive research conducted jointly by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and InSight Crime, an investigative research foundation dedicated to the study of crime trends in Latin America. To produce a comprehensive and balanced analysis of the extortion economy in Central America, field researchers interviewed a large number of representative participants, including victims and perpetrators of extortion; members of regional law-enforcement agencies; analysts; politicians; members of the judiciary and academia; business people; journalists; and civil-society organizations. To corroborate the field investigation, and to provide a broader quantitative framework to inform the findings, statistics on the regional extortion markets were analyzed and a literature review was carried out. The authors also drew from previous investigations by InSight Crime on gangs in the Northern Triangle. This report is the first phase of the 'Building coalitions against extortion in Central America' project developed by the Global Initiative. During the second phase, this report will enable the project to gather stakeholders from each country to discuss and analyze this pervasive phenomenon in the region. It will also allow the creation of a network of experts and stakeholders who will, firstly, exchange information and practices to tackle extortion and then, regionally, discuss alternatives to better respond to the issue. During the third and final phase, the project will aim to strengthen local resilience through a training initiative to help affected communities to better respond to extortion and mitigate its effects, and a roadmap to help build municipal strategies in the medium and long run. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Author, 2019. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2019 at: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Central-American-Extortion-Report-English-03May1400-WEB.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Central America URL: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Central-American-Extortion-Report-English-03May1400-WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 155687 Keywords: Extortion Gang Violence Gangs Organized Crime Political CorruptionStreet Gangs |
Author: Musing, Louisa Title: Corruption and Wildlife Crime: A Focus on Caviar Trade Summary: Corruption is a severe threat to wildlife conservation globally. While conservation practitioner anecdotes and existing empirical research all point to corruption as a main facilitator enabling wildlife crime, there is still limited knowledge about what can change this situation and help reverse the pernicious impact of corruption on conservation outcomes in practice. Corruption has a negative impact on conservation by reducing the effectiveness of conservation programmes, reducing law enforcement and political support, as well as establishing incentives for the over-exploitation of resources. It undermines the effectiveness and legitimacy of laws and regulations and can be an indicator of the presence of organised crime groups. Corruption needs to be addressed as a central part of the approach to tackling wildlife crime. As part of a wider project by TRAFFIC in collaboration with WWF to understand global caviar markets and to identify hotspots for illegal trade (Harris and Shiraishi, 2018), funding was provided by WWF to incorporate an anti-corruption component, working in partnership with and under the guidance of the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. The objectives of this component were to deepen understanding of how corruption may be facilitating the flow of illegal caviar along the value chain, to identify possible intervention strategies, and to inform further studies concerning environmental / wildlife crime and corruption. A typology of corruption for the illegal caviar trade was developed through the review of information gathered by TRAFFIC from academic literature and media reports, interviews with stakeholders who had some knowledge of illegal caviar trade, and the rapid market assessments in Beijing, Berlin, Chicago, Moscow, Paris and Tokyo that were conducted as part of the global caviar markets study (Harris and Shiraishi, 2018). Furthermore, a discussion group with anti-corruption, wildlife trade and sturgeon conservation experts (Table 1) was organised in April 2018 to discuss initial findings from TRAFFIC's rapid assessments, to refine the typology (Figure 3), to develop recommendations for policy and practice, and to build working relationships to support possible future studies (see Annex 1 for discussion group agenda). This report summarises key themes of corruption and wildlife crime as drawn from the literature reviews and interviews, and salient points arising from the discussion group in April 2018. Details: Cambridge, UK: A TRAFFIC, WWF, U4 ACRC, Utrecht University, and Northumbria University report , 2019. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 12, 2019 at: https://www.traffic.org/site/assets/files/11818/corruption-and-caviar-final.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.traffic.org/site/assets/files/11818/corruption-and-caviar-final.pdf Shelf Number: 156400 Keywords: CaviarEnvironmental CrimeIllegal TradeOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionSturgeonWildlife ConservationWildlife Crime |
Author: Economist Intelligence Unit Title: The Global Illicit Trade Environment Index: Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro Summary: Geography, history and political culture (characterised by high levels of corruption) combine in the economies of the former Yugoslavia (and the Balkans in general) to create a range of issues when it comes to combatting illicit trade. Serbia, for one, lies on a major trade corridor known as the Balkan route, which is used by criminal groups for various activities, including human trafficking and the trafficking of drugs coming from Asia and South America. Montenegro's ports are similarly used as transit points for the unloading and reloading of illicit cargo destined for Central and Western Europe. Bosnia's porous borders with the former two economies, as well as with neighbouring Croatia, enable easy transit from Eastern Europe and the Balkans region to economies in Western Europe. This could be made worse by the adoption of a Visa Liberalisation Agreement between the European Union's (EU) Schengen zone and Kosovo (which lies in an area considered by Serbia to be vulnerable to trafficking), expected by the end of the year. Compounding the problem, the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the accompanying conflicts, is thought to have led to an increased risk of terrorism in the region - with an increase in Islamic radicalisation and in nationals of countries and territories in the region joining the so-called Islamic State (IS) as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Ethnic separatist and religious extremist groups are active in some southern regions of Serbia and Kosovo, whose declaration of independence in 2008 was not recognised by Belgrade. These factors lead to increased terrorist financing and thus money laundering. Bosnia's complex and decentralised government structure has also been an obstacle to reforms, and corruption is prevalent in all three economies. This briefing paper will look at the illicit trade environment in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro across the four categories of the index: government policy, supply and demand, transparency and trade, and the customs environment. It will consider how these economies compare at global and regional levels, as well as looking at some of the details particular to each. Details: New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat illicit Trade (TRACIT), 2018. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2019 at: https://www.tracit.org/uploads/1/0/2/2/102238034/eiu_serbia_bosnia_and_montenegro_illicit_trade_paper_final.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: https://www.tracit.org/uploads/1/0/2/2/102238034/eiu_serbia_bosnia_and_montenegro_illicit_trade_paper_final.pdf Shelf Number: 156582 Keywords: Drug TraffickingExtremist GroupsFinancing of TerrorismHuman TraffickingIllegal TradeIllicit TradeOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionTerrorism |